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This thesis examines the development of neoconservatism through the lens of the 
distinctive theory of intelligence associated with the movement. The key primary sources 
for this theory are the writings of the National Strategy Information Center, and its project, 
the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. An analysis of this literature in its historical 
context shows it to reflect the development of an epistemic community theorising the 
practice of a cadre of activists experienced in political warfare - the covert intervention by 
one country in the internal politics of another. 
The roots of this tradition are traced to the beginnings of modern mass propaganda in the 
context of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The Comintern developed as a 
centre of expertise in the field before fracturing in the 1930s. A group of activists 
associated with the Lovestoneite group gravitated towards the Western Allies at the outset 
of World War Two, marking the development of a political warfare coalition, an alliance of 
state intelligence agencies and sympathetic civil society groups committed to supporting 
covert political intervention in other societies. 
This coalition was institutionalised in the early Cold War, but broke up as it lost state 
support in the era of detente in the 1970s. In the context of a counter-movement against 
detente, former intelligence officers and labour activists attempted to develop an 
epistemic community around a theory of intelligence that would provide a basis for 
renewed state support for political warfare. This theory informed the actions of 
neoconservatives in the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush. 
The neoconservative theory explicitly defined itself against rival approaches to intelligence 
based on scientific values. As such, the neoconservative case has significant theoretical 
implications for the scope and assumptions involved in the concept of epistemic 
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Introduction: From the Cultural Cold War to neoconservative 
intelligence 
This thesis examines the development of neoconservatism through the lens of the 
distinctive theory of intelligence associated with the movement. The key primary sources 
which will be used to study this theory are the writings of the National Strategy 
Information Center and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) from the late 
1970s onwards. An analysis of this literature and the historical context from which it 
emerged shows it to reflect the development of an epistemic community theorising the 
practice of a cadre of activists experienced in political warfare - the covert intervention by 
one country in the internal politics of another. These activists were drawn from elements 
of Cold War liberalism which had been allied to the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
included elements such as the ‘Lovestoneites’ around AFL-CIO foreign policy chief Jay 
Lovestone, with experience of covert action extending back to the 1920s. The development 
of an overt theory of intelligence, which gave a privileged place to covert action, at the 
expense of intelligence analysis, was a reaction on the part of these groups to the 
breakdown in the 1970s of their alliance with the CIA, and of the Cold War consensus 
which sustained it 
The neoconservative intelligence theorists will be shown to meet all the classic criteria laid 
down by Haas (Haas, 1992) for constituting an epistemic community. Understanding the 
importance of an epistemic community focused on the theory of intelligence to the 
development of neoconservatism can help to illuminate debates about the nature of the 
Cold War liberalism from which the neoconservative movement emerged. 
The Cultural Cold War and the roots of Neoconservatism 
In recent years, a great deal of literature has examined the Cultural Cold War and the 
extent to which the political life of the west was shaped by the overt and covert 
sponsorship of intellectuals and of sections of the left in support of a US-centred Atlanticist 
order in the post-war period. Notable contributions have come from Francis Stonor 
Saunders, Hugh Wilford, Scott Lucas, Inderjeet Parmar and Giles Scott-Smith, among 
others. 
This thesis will argue that these Atlanticist networks faced a crisis in the late 1960s and 
1970s as many of the assumptions that had underpinned the Cultural Cold War were 
challenged, and that the emergence of neoconservatism as a distinctive political force in 
the US was a response to that crisis. A key element of this response took the form of an 
international campaign to re-establish new institutions of ideological warfare. 
As in the earlier period of Cold War liberalism, this movement was transatlantic.  In the 
1980s, both the US and Europe witnessed efforts to create new institutions explicitly based 
on those of the Cold War. A central feature of this effort was the development of a new 
theory of intelligence, which sought to link intelligence collection and analysis more closely 
to covert political action and counterintelligence, in practice privileging the latter at the 
expense of the former. 
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This ideology received a number of setbacks in the late 1980s firstly with the Iran-Contra 
scandal, and secondly with the new era of detente that heralded the break-up of the Soviet 
Union.  However, it experienced a resurgence in the Twenty-First Century, shaping the War 
on Terror and playing a key role in making the case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
Recent historians of neoconservatism have acknowledged the cold war liberal roots of the 
movement while challenging the significance attributed to the role of the CIA in some 
accounts of cold war liberal organisations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF).  
Thus Jacob Heilbrun writes: 
If the CCF had not existed the left would have had to invent it. To some extent, it 
did this by magnifying the amount of control the CIA had over the CCF. The 
purpose of the mythmaking about the CCF is to create a moral equivalence 
between East and West. But intellectuals, an ornery lot, can seldom be ordered 
around (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.376). 
Heilbrun’s defence is in line with the argument of historians of the Cultural Cold War, such 
as Hugh Wilford, who have challenged the metaphor of control implied in the title of 
Francis Stonor Saunders study of the CCF, Who Paid the Piper?, arguing that “Anti-Stalinist 
intellectuals and unionists had been waging their own war on communism long before 
intelligence professionals appeared on the scene” (Wilford, 2003, p.3).  
Recent scholarship on the cultural Cold War has recognised that the intellectuals of the CCF 
were never simply cyphers for the CIA, while taking works such as Who Paid the Piper? as 
the starting point for a deeper debate about the agency of state and private actors within 
the Cultural Cold War. 
One contributor to this debate, Inderjeet Parmar, has argued that the state-private 
networks of the cultural Cold War can be theorised through “the concepts of 
establishment, organisational sector, parastates and epistemic/knowledge communities” 
but that each of these concepts is best used when subsumed within a wider Gramscian 
analysis (Parmar, 2006,p.18).  
 Parmar, following Diane Stone, identifies epistemic communities as “networks of 
specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to 
their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which 
they should be applied” (quoted in Parmar, 2006, p.17). The full relevance of the concept 
of epistemic communities to the Cultural Cold War, and to its place within the Gramscian 
framework that Parmar suggests, is arguably clarified by a longer historical perspective 
which encompasses the later emergence of neoconservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. 
One strikingly relevant aspect of the epistemic communities concept is a two-tier structural 
dynamic in which “both tiers share a common conceptual framework but operate within an 
agreed division of labour: government officials have access to policy-making and use the 
second tier to publicise their ideas and to legitimate them as ‘objective and scientific’” 
(Parmar, 2006, p.17).  We will show that this two-tier dynamic characterised the 
relationship between Cold War liberal intellectuals and the CIA from the early Cold War, 
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but that it was only in responding to the public scrutiny of the 1970s that the 
neoconservative intelligence theorists articulated the full theoretical basis that 
characterises an epistemic community. 
Understanding this dynamic can help provide a more nuanced account of the relationship 
between the US government and the Cold War Liberals. It also highlights some of the 
inadequacies of the labour-management analogy which Wilford offers in place of Stonor 
Saunders’ Who Paid the Piper metaphor.  
In discussing the trade union cold warriors of the American Federation of Labor’s Free 
Trade Union Committee (FTUC), Wilford writes ”labour–management relations are 
arguably a more appropriate paradigm for conceptualising relations between the FTUC and 
the CIA than the puppet-on-a-string image deployed by many earlier writers on the 
subject” (Wilford, 2003, p.101). 
Yet Wilford himself notes that the FTUC displayed a militancy in defending their own 
position that they rarely displayed in actual industrial relations. Both US officials and 
American trade unionists offered European workers a “productivity gospel” that 
encompassed “non-political trade unionism, labour-management co-operation and 
modern working practices” (Wilford, 2003, p.158).  Despite their own proletarian self-
image, this prescription is in stark contrast to the status that FTUC leaders sought for 
themselves. They were jealous of their own “expertise in anti-communist warfare”, seeking 
to maintain operational autonomy, and to reduce the official role to one of financial 
support (Wilford, 2003, p.95). 
Contrary to Wilford’s intentions, the labour-management analogy might be taken to imply 
greater control than the patron-client relationship captured in Stonor Saunders’ image of 
‘paying the piper’. Indeed, it is arguable that the labour-management underplays a key 
aspect of Wilford’s own account, the insistence of the FTUC on their own expert status 
based on their own prior experience of covert operations (Wilford 2003, p.99). 
As Wilford notes, this claim was founded on extensive experience of covert operations, 
predating the formation of the CIA (Wilford 2003, p.93). This tradition was never fully 
eclipsed by the institutionalisation of covert action within the CIA (Wilford 2003, p.101). 
This thesis will try to show that the neoconservative theory of intelligence was in large part 
a conscious defence of that tradition and the hegemonic relationships which sustained. 
Methodology 
This thesis seeks to account for the existence of a distinctive neoconservative theory of 
intelligence and to assess the extent to which that theory influenced the policies of 
successive US governments. 
This twofold requirement suggests a need for an examination of the reflexive relationship 
between theory and reality, which seeks to understand both the factors that gave rise to 
the theory and how the theory in turn shaped reality.  
12 
 
For these purposes, the key sample is the texts in which the theory is stated. These were 
primarily the publications of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), particularly 
the series Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s, beginning with Elements of Intelligence 
(Godson, 1979), and works published or supported by the CSI’s parent body, the National 
Strategy Information Center, notably Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Godson, 2001) and Silent 
Warfare (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002). A critical reading of these texts provided the starting 
point for an investigation of the historical situation from within which the neoconservative 
theory of intelligence emerged. This sequence is then reversed in the presentation of this 
thesis, to provide a chronological account of the emergence of the theory. 
As will be shown in chapters Five to Seven, These texts offer a relatively clear account of 
the authors’ perspectives on the situation that gave rise to them, and the problems to 
which they were intended to respond, and they give clear recommendations for the future. 
Roy Godson’s introduction to Elements of Intelligence presents Intelligence Requirements 
for the 1980s as a response to a crisis within US intelligence which was at its peak in the 
1970s, and which led to serious divisions within the US intelligence community (Godson, 
1983, pp.3-18). 
Elements of Intelligence and subsequent volumes in the series make it clear that a key issue 
in these divisions was the proper relationship between intelligence disciplines, with a 
majority of contributors arguing for a stronger role for the active intelligence disciplines of 
covert action and counterintelligence. Many contributors draw on their institutional 
experience in the course of making their argument. In other cases, however, their relevant 
experience and institutional interests are less obvious. 
For example, Roy Godson strongly defends the Cold War activities of the American 
Federation of Labour as a model for future covert action (Godson, 2001, p.42). Yet his own 
family and professional connections to those activities are left unmentioned. While this is 
not necessarily unreasonable in context, drawing out such implicit connections is an 
important part of a critical account of the genesis of the neoconservative theory of 
intelligence. The narrative offered by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence needs to 
be examined in the context of the wider historical record. 
This is in part a question of intelligence history, with all of the problems that affect that 
field. As Richard Aldrich has written; “All contemporary historians who study aspects of the 
state share a quite unique experience, that of being dependent upon their government for 
information’ (Aldrich, 2002, p.638). In his work The Hidden Hand, Aldrich nevertheless 
sought to ‘say it with documents’ in producing a history of cold war intelligence that relied 
on archival sources rather than oral testimony, despite the obvious limitations of this 
approach in the field of intelligence (ibid p.638). 
The constraints posed by official secrecy posed a particular problem for the present study. 
It became clear early on that a number of related constituencies were strongly represented 
among the contributors to Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s. One of these groups 
consisted of conservative social democrats close to the political tradition of the American 
Federation of Labour and its former international relations chief Jay Lovestone. Another 
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consisted of former CIA personnel who had served under the Agency’s former 
counterintelligence chief James Angleton. 
It therefore seemed important to establish as much as possible about the agent-handler 
relationship known to have existed between Lovestone and Angleton between the 1950s 
and 1970s.  According to Tom Mangold’s biography of Angleton, this relationship was 
broken off following the report of an internal CIA investigation (Mangold, 1991, p.292). A 
freedom of information request was made to the CIA for this report, but as noted in 
Chapter Four, this request was denied on the grounds that the existence or nonexistence 
of relevant records is still classified (Meeks, 2013). 
This resulted in an unavoidable lacuna in our understanding of the relationship between 
the AFL and the CIA. However, the viability of freedom of information as a research tactic 
in this field has been demonstrated by Michael Best, who has recently uncovered a CIA 
report which informs our view of James Angleton’s relationship with the Consortium for 
the Study of Intelligence (Best, 2017). Declassified CIA documents held by the National 
Security Archive also provided relevant sources. These included a number of CIA internal 
histories and articles in the agency’s journal Studies in Intelligence, on issues such as 
Angleton’s approach to counterintelligence (Studies in Intelligence, 2011). 
The difficulties of researching intelligence matters were somewhat mitigated by a focus on 
covert action offered that some countervailing advantages. As Abram Shulsky and Gary J. 
Schmitt wrote in Silent Warfare, while some forms of covert action involve deep secrecy, 
‘in other cases, the actions themselves are public knowledge, but governments conceal 
their involvement in them‘ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.75). Those public activities can be 
scrutinised even where information about the covert relationships is limited. Even 
autonomous open activities are likely to provide a clue to the goals of such relationships 
given Roy Godson’s injunction that ‘there is no need to control foreign assets’ but that ‘the 
best covert action campaigns help people to do what they want to do more effectively than 
they could do without such assistance’ (Godson, 2001, p.127).  
This statement alerts us to the need to see such covert relationships as alliances within 
which both actors can have agency. However, as we attempt to place Godson’s statement 
in its historical context, we will attempt to show that his emphasis on this point reflects the 
ideological perspective and experiences of the non-governmental allies of US covert action, 
and their attempts to maximise their agency within covert alliances. 
Even if much about the relationship between US intelligence agencies and civil society 
actors in the Cultural Cold War remains enigmatic, studying the cold war activities of 
organisations such as the American Federation of Labour and the International Rescue 
Committee is crucial to understanding the practises that the neoconservative theory of 
intelligence sought to theorise. 
While this was in principle, an easier task than studying the activities of the CIA, the 
logistical realities of conducting research from the UK made it impossible to access some of 
the potentially promising archives in the US. It was, for example, not possible to consult 
the US labour movement archives at the Tamiment Library in New York, except insofar as 
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relevant materials were available electronically. Likewise, copies of New America, the 
official journal of the Social Democrats USA, were not available in the United Kingdom. 
However, creative use of the National Archives in the UK did produce an unexpectedly rich 
seam of relevant material. 
Identifying such sources was made easier by the existence of an extensive secondary 
literature on the cultural Cold War. Key contributors to this literature such as Hugh Wilford 
have noted the continuity between the cultural cold war and neoconservatism 
(e.g.Wilford, 2008, p.253), but have rarely systematically pursued it Conversely (Vaisse 
2010, p.19) writing on neoconservatism, has noted that the role of labour in the Cold War 
is a neglected aspect of the movement’s history. 
The present study seeks to address this lacuna in part by applying some of the theoretical 
tools developed in the literature on the cultural Cold War to the more recent period in 
which neoconservatism developed. This body of work, along with related literatures on 
intelligence history and labour history, was also useful in identifying relevant primary 
sources. (Mahl, 1998) was particularly useful in pointing to documentation in the British 
National Archives on wartime cooperation between British intelligence services and the 
American Federation of Labour. This helped to inspire further investigations which 
identified illuminating sources such as 1930s MI6 agent reports on the activities of the 
Lovestoneite movement, wartime reports on negotiations between the British TUC and the 
American Federation of Labour, and post-war surveillance reports on the activities of AFL 
activists in the British Empire.  
All such sources require their own critical analysis, a fact which is perhaps most obvious in 
relation to the rather jaundiced views of British colonial officials on the activities of AFL 
trade unionists in Africa. Nevertheless, taken together, the disparate material from the 
National Archives provide useful insights on the evolution of the Lovestoneites over a 
period from the 1930s to the early 1960s which saw them make a complex transition from 
fellow travellers of the Comintern to allies of the CIA. 
This provides a useful check on the secondary literature, much of which reflects the 
historical hindsight of scholars with strong commitments on either side of the political 
debates in which Cold War liberals were involved. Indeed for the purposes of this study a 
significant part of the secondary literature is also important as primary source material on 
the self-understanding of Cold War liberalism and its neoconservative offshoot. This will be 
shown to apply notably to (Godson, 1975) on the history of AFL foreign policy. Robert J. 
Alexander’s work on the Bukharinite right opposition might also be mentioned in this 
regard. The major scholarly work on the subject, it was inspired by Alexander’s curiosity 
about Jay Lovestone’s past after working with the AFL-CIO in Latin America (Alexander, 
1981, p.ix).  
This thesis will seek to navigate through these various interpretations by constructing a 
continuous historical narrative, relying on contemporary documents where possible, and 
noting the commitments of various sources where necessary. 
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This longer historical perspective allows us to bring a sociological perspective to bear on 
the relationship between the CIA and Cold War liberalism, to understand the 
circumstances under which some labour activists were willing to enter into an alliance with 
the intelligence community, and to identify the nature of their goals, aspirations and 
disappointments within that relationship.  
In attempting to understand the various actors involved in these relationships, we are 
engaging in researching the powerful, what has sometimes been called ‘studying up’, and 
the experience has reinforced a view of power in line with the injunction of sociologist 
Kevin Williams: 
It is important to get away from the view of powerful organisations as 
homogeneous bodies, with a single ideology, directed, from the top, by a small, 
elite group. Rather such bodies are, as Mungham and Thomas note, "complex 
coalitions of competing interests, sometimes in harmony, sometimes not and 
where there is a constant negotiation for position, prestige and material 
advantage" (Mungham and Thomas 1981). Power is exercised in this environment 
of rivalry, tensions and conflicting interests (Williams, 1989, p.254).  
 
Neither a simplified ‘puppet on a string’ theory of the CIA-Cold War liberal alliance, nor a 
straightforward dismissal of the significance of the CIA’s role can help us to understand the 
genesis of the neoconservative theory of intelligence. It is precisely in investigating the 
tensions and conflicts within the alliance that the historical roots of the theory are to be 
found. 
Outline of the work 
The substance of this thesis will attempt to substantiate this argument by tracing the 
history of the epistemic community based on the neoconservative theory of intelligence 
and the political warfare coalition from which it emerged. 
Chapter One will explain the main theoretical concepts employed in the thesis, indicating 
their relevance and how they will be applied in the body of the work. It will look the 
Gramscian theory of hegemony and at concepts which can be used to theorise state-civil 
society relationships within a Gramscian framework, including those of state private 
networks and of epistemic communities. It will also consider the question of what 
constitutes a theory of intelligence. 
Chapter Two will examine the emergence of a distinct cadre of labour activists with 
experience of political warfare in the pre-World War Two period, who would go on to 
shape the private side of the political warfare coalition, and whose experience would shape 
neoconservative ideas about covert action. It will look at the roots of modern mass 
propaganda in the First World War and the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. It will 
note the importance of the Comintern as a key incubator for a cadre of covert action 
specialists, many of whom would ultimately gravitate towards western state powers in 
response to the rise of Stalinism and fascism. It will note the importance of the 
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Lovestoneites as a group which maintained a degree of cohesion in the course of this 
transition. 
Chapter Three will look at the role World War Two in cementing an Atlanticist alliance, 
within which covert action specialists drawn from the Non-Communist Left formed 
relationships with organisations like the British Political Warfare Executive and the 
American Office of Strategic Services, alliances which would provide a precedent for future 
iterations of the state-private network. The overlapping and sometimes contradictory roles 
of British and American state sponsorship underlined that this was an essentially 
transnational process. 
Chapter Four will look at the role of the political warfare coalition which emerged from 
World War Two in re-orienting the United States towards confrontation with the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War, in a two-tier alliance between policy-makers and activists that was 
formalised in the CIA’s alliance with the Non-Communist Left. It will examine the shifting 
balance of power between state and private actors within a network that became 
increasingly institutionalised in the 1950s. It will note how AFL-CIO activists around Jay 
Lovestone responded to this shift by gravitating towards James Angleton’s CIA Counter-
intelligence Staff, in an alliance that would inform future neoconservative ideas about the 
relationship between covert action and counterintelligence as active intelligence 
disciplines. 
Chapter Five will examine the growing crisis which faced this political warfare coalition in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, including unprecedented scrutiny of the CIA; the challenge to 
its domestic political base from the New Left, and the turn towards détente at an 
international level. 
Chapter Six will look at the emergence of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence in 
the late 1970s and the campaign by the political warfare coalition to challenge détente by 
asserting its status as an epistemic community in a new alliance with conservative political 
forces. 
Chapter Seven will look at the revival and consolidation of the political warfare coalition as 
an epistemic community of renewed influence in its new neoconservative configuration in 
the early years of the Reagan administration and its subsequent displacement as a result of 
the Iran-Contra Affair and the renewal of détente with the Soviet Union. 
Chapter Eight will look at the renewed bid for epistemic authority by writers from within 
the political warfare coalition in the 1990s, which gave further elaboration to a distinctive 
neoconservative theory of intelligence, receiving practical application in the campaign for 
war with Iraq following their return to influence in the George W. Bush administration. It 
will also consider how these ideas were recast in the post-Iraq War period to influence 
policy at a lower operational level. 
In conclusion, Chapter Nine will review the significance of this epistemic community for the 




Chapter One: Theorizing the neoconservative approach to 
intelligence. 
This chapter will seek to outline the key concepts to be deployed in understanding the 
significance of the neoconservative theorists of intelligence, roughly in order of increasing 
specifity. 
The Gramscian theory of hegemony provides the basic framework for understanding 
political action and the political role of intellectuals, while the concepts of state-private 
networks and epistemic communities will be used to examine in more detail the 
mechanisms by which intellectuals exercise political influence. In considering the 
neoconservative writers of intelligence as an epistemic community, we will need to 
examine the extent to which their ideas on the subject constituted a distinctive theory. 
Hegemony 
As it emerges in his essay on intellectuals in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony arises from a complex of problems around the Marxian distinction between 
structure and superstructure, and the application of that distinction to the Western 
European societies of his time.  
For Marxist intellectuals of the 1930s, this issue had practical implications for their analysis 
of the Russian Revolution, an apparently advanced political development in an 
economically backward country, and the prospects for emulating it in Western Europe. 
Gramsci distinguishes civil society and the state as two levels of the superstructure which 
sustain the power of the ruling economic class through consent and coercion respectively 
(Gramsci 1976, p.12). The term hegemony is applied particularly to the former category, 
which Gramsci elaborates as: 
‘The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group ; this 
consent is "historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which 
the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of 
production (Gramsci 1976, p.12). 
‘The intellectuals are the dominant group's "deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of 
social hegemony and political government’ (Gramsci 1976, p.12). While the theoretical 
distinction between these two functions is clear, the complex relationship between them 
emerges from Gramsci’s remarks in an essay on education which posited a ‘necessary, 
organic development which tends to integrate the personnel specialised in the technique 
of politics with personnel specialised in the concrete problems of administering the 
essential practical activities of the great and complex national societies of today’ (Gramsci 
1976, pp.27-28). 
 While for Gramsci, everyone is an intellectual, it is the exercise of these social functions 
that mark out intellectuals as a distinct group.  
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In characterising the relationship of the intellectuals to the ‘fundamental groups’ or 
economic classes, Gramsci distinguishes between ‘organic’ and ‘traditional’ intellectuals. 
The former are those who emerge out of a particular economic class giving it ‘homogeneity 
and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and 
political fields' (Gramsci 1976, p.5). Traditional intellectuals, in contrast, are those whose 
existence predates the ascendancy of a given class and which seem to ‘to represent an 
historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in 
political and social forms’ (Gramsci 1976. p.7).This continuity allows them to assert an 
autonomy in relation to the dominant social group which Gramsci sees as being reflected in 
idealist philosophy. 
Despite this apparent autonomy, Gramsci sees traditional intellectuals as also having 
organic class relationships. This is reflected in his choice of ecclesiastics, a group he sees as 
being organically-linked to the landed aristocracy, as a representative example of the class 
of traditional intellectuals as a whole (Gramsci 1976, p.7). He nevertheless sees the 
traditional/organic distinction as important and relates it to problems concerning the role 
of political parties, which are seen as the vehicles in which intellectuals elaborate the 
political interests of their own class, but also as vehicles for the achievement of hegemony 
in civil society, through the fusion of traditional intellectuals with those of the leading class 
(Gramsci 1976, p.15). 
This concept of hegemony implies that even in the course of representing the interests of 
their class, intellectuals are led to adopt political logics that go beyond the articulation of 
class interests. This is made explicit by distinguishing the role of political parties from the 
concept of economic-corporate activity seen as the province of professional associations 
(Gramsci 1976, p.16). 
A class can only fully realise its autonomy by becoming the ruling class of the state. Other 
classes are ‘subaltern’ (Gramsci 1976, p.52). To the extent that this true their political 
organisations will tend to pursue goals of a ‘limited and partial character’ a formulation 
which is presumably intended to encompass Lenin’s concept of trade union consciousness’ 
(Gramsci 1976, p.52). 
These limits are shaped by the hegemonic classes, as ‘Subaltern groups are always subject 
to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: only "permanent" victory 
breaks their subordination, and that not immediately’ (Gramsci 1976 , p.55). Gramsci sees 
this pressure taking various forms which reproduce the basic dichotomy of hegemony and 
dictatorship: ‘A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate", 
or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social 
group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental 
power’ (Gramsci 1976, p.57). 
The implication that classes achieve power only through wider political alliances is 
reflected in Gramsci’s concept of the ‘historical bloc ’in which ‘the complex, contradictory 
and discordant ensemble of the superstructures.is the reflection of the ensemble of the 
social relations of production’ (Gramsci 1976, p.366) and in which “precisely material 
precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form’ (Gramsci 1976, 
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p.377). If formulae such as these appear opaque, it is clear that Gramsci wishes to 
emphasise that the historical bloc is not merely an epiphenomenon of the economic class. 
Indeed, Gramsci saw a belief in automaticity as itself the ideology of a subaltern group, 
which had to be superseded in order to take up the creative political tasks of hegemony 
(Gramsci 1976, p.396). 
 
If the economic-corporate sphere of trade unions and similar associations is one where 
policies follow relatively clearly from economic interests, the hegemonic sphere is one in 
which the need to balance competing interests bring the situational logic of politics to the 
fore. The production of intellectuals is seen as crucial to this process.  
 
Gramsci attributes the fall of the medieval communes in Italy to ‘the rule of an economic 
class which did not prove able to create its own category of intellectuals and thus exercise 
a hegemony as well as a dictatorship’ (Gramsci 1976, p.55, n.5). Likewise, the absorption of 
the intellectuals of subaltern groups is seen as an effective hegemonic strategy, 
exemplified by the role of the Moderates during the Risorgimento (Gramsci 1976, p.58). 
 
This emphasis on the role of intellectuals has led Kees Van Der Pijl to argue that Gramscian 
thought,  as well as that of earlier Italian elite theorists, is itself the ideological reflection of 
the distinctive class position of an intellectual/managerial ‘cadre stratum’ (Van Der Pijl, 
2005). 
 
Some modern thinkers, such as Laclau and Mouffe have seen a contradiction between the 
Gramscian theory of hegemony and the Marxian theory of class, arguing that ‘on the one 
hand the political centrality of the working class has a historical, contingent character: it 
requires the class to come out of itself, to transform its own identity by articulating to it a 
plurality of struggles and democratic demands. On the other hand, it would seem that this 
articulatory role is assigned to it by the economic base – hence that centrality has a 
necessary character’ (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p.70). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s attempt to sever the theory of hegemony from class analysis has been 
characterised as rooted in a form of inter-subjective idealism by Jonathan Joseph, who 
argues that ‘hegemony is given a central role because of its ability to articulate discourse’ 
undetermined by pre-discursive reality (Joseph, 2004, p.111). The integration of the theory 
of hegemony into a wider framework founded on discourse theory is not necessarily an 
unnatural development given that Perry Anderson has suggested that ‘the most striking 
single trait of Western Marxism as a common tradition is thus perhaps the constant 
presence and influence on it of successive types of European idealism’ (Anderson, 1979, 
p.63). 
 
This observation was prefigured by Gramsci himself in his comments on idealism in Some 
Problems in the Study of the Philosophy of Praxis, when he asked why Marxism has ‘had 
this fate of having served to form combinations between its principal elements and either 
idealism or philosophical materialism?’ (Gramsci 1976, p.390). 
 
Gramsci was perhaps a self-aware example of Western Marxism’s tendency towards 
engagement with idealism. Nevertheless, while he sought to avoid what he saw as a pre-
Marxist mechanical materialism, he also sought to overcome traditional idealism (Gramsci 
1976, p.435). His particular position is reflected in the particular Marxian formulas to which 
he returns such as the theses on Feuerbach and the Preface to Critique of Political 




For Marx ‘Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his 
thinking in practice’ (Marx, 2016).  For Gramsci, theory that did not illuminate practice was 
mere scholasticism (Gramsci 1976, p.201). This led him towards an interpretation of 
political reality which stresses the role of creative action within material and non-material 
constraints. Consistent with this is his emphasis on the value of the individual error ‘which 
by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it’ (Gramsci 1976, p.377). 
 
It is not necessary to adopt an essentialist or teleological view of class, to understand the 
importance of material constraints, and of economics as an expression of them, in applying 
the concept of hegemony. In his own concrete analyses, Gramsci drew inspiration from 
Marx’s historical writings as a counterweight to mechanical interpretations of his more 
theoretical work. Gramsci’s own interpretation of contemporary events illustrate his 
distinctive conception of the relationship between the economic and the political. 
 
Consider the following passage from the essay on Americanism and Fordism: 
  
Recall here the experiments conducted by Ford and to the economies made by his 
firm through direct management of transport and distribution of the product. 
These economies affected production costs and permitted higher wages and lower 
selling prices. Since these preliminary conditions existed, already rendered rational 
by historical evolution, it was relatively easy to rationalise production and labour 
by a skilful combination of force (destruction of working class trade unionism on a 
territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely 
subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the whole 
life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in the factory 
and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and 
ideological intermediaries (Gramsci 1976, p.285).  
 
Given Gramsci’s analysis of American conditions, the emphasis here is on economics, but 
both an objective set of material possibilities, ‘preliminary conditions’, and creative action 
to make the most of those possibilities, ‘the skilful combination of force and persuasion’, 
are essential to the analysis.  
The historical resonances acquired by Americanism and Fordism in later decades arguably 
illustrate the value of a Gramscian concept of hegemony that sensitises us to the political 
opportunities inherent in economic developments. Giles Scott-Smith has noted the 
prescience of Gramsci’s question ‘whether America, through the implacable weight of its 
economic production … will compel or is already compelling Europe to overturn its 
excessively antiquated economic and social basis’ in the wake of post-war developments 
such as the Marshall Plan (Scott-Smith 2002, p.12). 
Scott-Smith employs the concept of hegemony to interpret the post-war Congress for 
Cultural Freedom as a ‘hegemonic institution in the Gramscian sense’ that ‘provided an 
ideology which connected to prime economic interests and which could claim normative 
status (Scott-Smith 2002, p.138).He shows that the Congress in part reflected a political 
response to the perception, notably held by Gramsci himself, that the United States lacked 
cultural weight commensurate with its economic power (Scott-Smith 2002, p.11). 
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Scott-Smith seeks to analyse the class dimension of the CCF’s hegemonic relationships 
while avoiding Laclau’s charge of essentialism by utilising ‘the valuable work of Kees van 
der Pijl in mapping the class alliances between groups in the USA and Western Europe in 
the twentieth century’ (Scott-Smith, 2002, p.7). 
This research may help provide an empirical framework for neoconservative history in 
terms of the Gramscian analysis recommended by Parmar. Van der Pijl argues that trade 
union officials are part of a professional, managerial ‘cadre class’ that has developed over 
the course of the Twentieth Century: 
Once the working class responds to the increasing scale of production by 
organising the sale of its labour power on a commensurate scale, it is faced with 
the same dynamic as capital itself: it must rely on a new, mediating executive 
stratum, the trade union bureaucrats. While representing the workers, they do so 
as labour market specialists committed by necessity to this specialism. Since the 
power of the trade union resides in its capacity to mediate, this presupposes its 
relative independence also from the workers (van der Pijl, 1998, p.140) 
We may tentatively note here the possible application of this dynamic to Cold War labour 
activists, while adopting more definitely another insight of van der Pijl’s, that of the 
significance of covert action to transnational class relations: 
States exploit the structural accessibility of integrated societies to state power 
other than their own, in order to influence the political process there...This 
includes transnational covert action, an aspect of relations among ‘allies’ that 
tends to be overlooked. This form of rivalry is obviously imbricated with 
transnational class relations, but necessarily involves competing state powers 
operating transnationally (van der Pijl, 2006, pp.16-17). 
A full account of the emergence of neoconservatism must account for the movement’s 
links to cold war covert action, without over-simplifying its relationship to state power.  We 
will argue that this can most appropriately done by recognising the emergence from within 
cold war state-private network of an epistemic community focussed precisely on the 
theory and practice of covert action, which reached a new level of formalisation with the 
transition to neoconservatism. We will call this epistemic community the political warfare 
coalition, adopting a British term which emphasises the role of propaganda, rather than 
the more paramilitary aspects of covert action, as best reflecting the areas which have 
been the primary, though not exclusive, subjects of neoconservative expertise. 
The third way in which van der Pijl can assist us is by providing an account of the 
transnational class relationships within which this epistemic community was embedded. 
Van der Pijl has argued for the existence, in the post-war period, of a transatlantic 
hegemonic bloc based on corporate liberalism, an ideology that sought to accommodate 
socialist aspirations within the framework of capitalism. The crisis of the 1970s saw the 
displacement of corporate liberalism, and a transition to a new hegemonic ideology of 
neoliberalism (van der Pijl, 2006, pp.19-20). 
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In terms of this perspective, the political warfare coalition can be seen a grouping which 
emerged within the American state-private network during the corporate liberal period, 
and whose formalisation as an epistemic community in the 1980s, with a full panoply of 
scholarly associations, conferences and literature, helped to anchor its status within the 
new hegemonic alignments which emerged after the break-up of the post-war liberal 
consensus. The emergence of neoconservatism in place of cold war liberalism as the 





The idea of the ‘state-private network’ stands alongside that of hegemony as a key concept 
employed by a number of scholars seeking to understand the relationship between state 
and civil society in the Cultural Cold War. Scott-Smith notes that this framework was first 
put forward by Scott Lucas ‘ not as a means to find the cause of Cold War political activity, 
but to enable a greater understanding of the cohesion of public–private interests and the 
effects this had on the conduct and outlook of political and civil society’ (Scott-Smith 2002, 
p.3). 
In Freedom’s War, Scott Lucas introduces the concept to describe the relationship 
established between the American state and a range of private individuals and 
organisations in the early Cold War (Lucas 1999, p.2). The formulation reflects the 
perception that initiative was not confined to one side of the state-private dichotomy; ‘the 
CIA might be providing most of the finance but the impetus was coming from individuals 
with no Government position, individuals with their own interests in ensuring the triumph 
of freedom’ (Lucas 1999, p.2). This is one reason why US ideology was never ‘simple a 
“screen for geopolitical and economic objectives’ and indeed sometimes over-rode more 
pragmatic considerations, as in the case of operations such as those focused on the 
liberation of Eastern Europe in the early 1950s (Lucas 1999, p.2).. 
Lucas illustrates the autonomy of the ideological with Eisenhower’s 1954 comment that ‘of 
course he was willing to go to any lengths to defend the vital interests of the US, but as 
soon as you attempted to define what these vital interests were, you got into an argument’ 
(Lucas 1999, p.277).  
It is perhaps implicit in this remark that the very autonomy of ideology may be driven not 
so much by the absence of material interests as by the interplay of competing interests 
which are more easily reconciled at a higher level of abstraction. As Lucas has written 
elsewhere: ‘Government officials who drafted plans for the extension of US political, 
economic, military and cultural influence were able to hold visions of power and profits 
alongside the belief in an American exemplar of freedom. And private individuals and 
groups could work alongside those government officials, not necessarily because they 
shared that same vision of power and ideology, but because their own complex 
conceptions and interests were furthered by the relationship’ (Lucas 2006, p.11). 
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This conception of the state-private network, as a coalition formed from a plurality of 
official and private agencies, each with distinct interests which are not necessarily merely 
instrumental, has suggested a Gramscian interpretation to a number of scholars, including 
(Parmar 2006, p.20) and (Scott-Smith 2002, p.3). 
As Parmar argues, such an approach implies that political conflicts ‘are not mere more 
automatic reflections of unequal economic or class relations: they are also sites of struggle 
between rival, ideas, values, policies, programmes and regimes.’ Winning hegemony 
means building cross-class coalitions that require ‘the mobilisation of public opinion to 
convince the masses – or at least a critical proportion of them – that they have a stake in 
current arrangements’ (Parmar 2006, pp.20-21). 
The dynamic nature of this process of negotiation and renegotiation suggests there is value 
in a diachronic approach to the application of the concept of the state-private network. In 
his examination of one dimension of the US state-private network of the early Cold War, 
that of official support for international exchange programmes, Scott-Smith has warned 
that ‘an all-encompassing ideological interpretation tends to collapse the longue durée of 
cultural development into its Cold War moment’ eliding the extent to which ‘in the 
ideological struggle, different traditions, motives and methods worked in parallel, in 
combination, sometimes even in opposition’(Scott-Smith 2006, pp.85-86). The concept of 
the political warfare coalition is intended to reflect those elements of the state-private 
network whose intelligence dimension was a function not simply of covert support from 
the state side, but also of the traditions, motives and methods of the private side. 
Lucas has highlighted the longevity of state-private network established in the early Cold 
War, through exposure in the 1960s, and successive regenerations in the 1980s, and early 
Twenty-First Century (Lucas 2006, pp.10-11). 
The present work looks at a group of labour activists centred on Jay Lovestone whose 
participation in state-private networks is well-documented, but following Scott-Smith’s 
injunction, we will pursue a diachronic approach that will enable to understand the 
particular traditions, experiences and other intellectual and social resources that this group 
brought to the network.  
This will enable us to observe how the reproduction of this strand’s place in the state-
private network both shaped and was shaped by the emergence of the particular set of 
ideas which we have dubbed the neoconservative theory of intelligence, ultimately giving 
birth to a distinct epistemic community. 
Epistemic communities 
In considering the significance of intellectuals as functionaries of civil society and the state, 
Gramsci noted that 'In the modern world the category of intellectuals, understood in this 
sense, has undergone an unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system 
has given rise to a great mass of functions which are not all justified by the social 
necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities of the 
dominant fundamental group’ (Gramsci, p.13). 
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One field where the problem of the relative autonomy of such intellectuals has impressed 
itself on scholars is that of international relations, notably in a 1975 issue of International 
Relations co-edited by John Ruggie and Ernst Haas. Ruggie sought to examine the role of 
politics in international technical organisation, challenging approaches which could be said 
to tend towards technological determinism (Ruggie 1975, p.558). 
Ruggie argued that the technological progress had led to an expansion of the scope for 
political decisions in relations to scientific and technical matters, in areas characterised by 
a degree of mutual interdependence between the policies of different states (Ruggie 1975, 
p.560). The examples given were manifold, stretching from arms control and 
communications, to shipping and marine resources (Ruggie 1975, p.567). Ruggie observed 
that the study of international organisations did not exhaust the forms which international 
responses to these responses could take (Ruggie 1975, p.568). He described two other 
possibilities: international regimes based on shared rules, and epistemic communities, in 
which institutionalisation takes a ‘purely cognitive’ form, consisting in a ‘dominant way of 
looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and predictability of intention’ (Ruggie 
1975, p.569-570).  
The term epistemic communities had earlier been formulated by the sociologist Burkart 
Holzner (Davis Cross, 2013, p.141), whose usage was however seen by the international 
relations scholars as broader than their own, signifying a community united by 
commitment to the scientific method in general (Haas 1992, p.3, n.4). The narrower usage 
adopted by IR scholars reflected the influence of wider trends in epistemology such as 
Thomas Kuhn’s emphasis on the existence of rival paradigms within the scientific 
community (Davis Cross, 2013, p.141). 
A definition later offered by Ernst Haas stated that ‘an epistemic community is composed 
of professionals (usually recruited from several disciplines) who share a commitment to a 
common causal model and a set of political values. They are united by a belief in the truth 
of their model and by a commitment to translate this truth into public policy, in the 
conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a result’ (Haas, E. 1990, p.). 
If this emphasised the political side of concept, the epistemological side received more 
prominence in a formulation by Peter Haas of the epistemic community as a ‘a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 
P. 1992, p.3). This, however, was put forward alongside a set of more detailed diagnostic 
criteria which encompassed both aspects, including 'a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs', 'shared causal beliefs', 'shared notions of validity', and 'a common policy 
enterprise' (Haas, 1992, p.3). 
In Ruggie’s usage, the concept of episteme was that of Foucault’s The Order of Things 
(Ruggie 1979, p.569). Foucault would later formulate the concept as ‘ the strategic 
apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are 
possible those that will be acceptable within, I won't say a scientific theory, but a field of 
scientificity, and, which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the 
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'apparatus' which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of 
what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’ (Foucault 1980, p.197). 
Haas and Adler root the concept of epistemic communities in ‘an ontology that embraces 
historical, interpretive factors, as well as structural forces, explaining change in a dynamic 
way’ (Adler & Haas 1992, p.370).  This suggests a certain affinity with the concept of 
hegemony to the extent that the latter represents an attempt to find a middle way 
between voluntarism and economism. 
There is also a congruity with Scott-Smith’s insistence on the importance of the longue-
durée in relation to state private networks, given Haas and Adler’s view that ‘The most 
fruitful metaphor for thinking about epistemic communities is that of evolution’ conceived 
in terms of path dependent development in which an initial vision shapes subsequent 
institutionalisation (Adler & Haas 1992, p.373). They go on to suggest that this process can 
be analysed in sequential terms: ‘Such a process of policy evolution has four primary steps: 
policy innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence’ (Adler & Haas 1992, p.).   
In the course of our narrative chapters we will examine the extent to which these steps 
apply to the epistemic community which we propose grew up around the neoconservative 
theory of intelligence. 
Other pointers for the use of the epistemic communities concept can be seen in Ruggie’s 
original application of it to international relations, where he suggested that the dominant 
role is played by ‘the epistemic community that derives from the role of representing 
national public authority internationally’ but raised the issue of  ‘the extent to which 
behavior rules from other more specialized or more universal epistemic communities are 
becoming institutionalized internationally’ (Ruggie 1975, p.570).  He concluded: 
First, it appears that scientific and technological images and roles inform patterns 
of institutionalization as long as a given issue remains at a relatively low level of 
political concern. With involvement by higher levels of government, the issue tends 
to become redefined in accordance with more traditional maxims. Second, in 
ongoing international collectivities the norm seems to be for the several epistemic 
communities to inform different activities, not to come into conflict with each 
other over the same ones (Ruggie 1975, p.570). 
Ruggie’s suggestion of greater openness to technical input at lower levels of government is 
perhaps a precursor to the two-tier pattern identified by Drake and Nicolaidis in their study 
of an epistemic community focused on international trade policy. They argue: 
The community's membership has two tiers. The first includes personnel from 
governments, international agencies, and private firms-individuals who work for 
organizations with direct interests in alternative policy solutions. In contrast, the 
second tier includes academics, lawyers, industry specialists, and journalists-
individuals whose stakes, if any, are more purely intellectual or a matter of 
professional entrepreneurship. But the members of the first and second tiers share 
a conceptual framework and agenda, and this, coupled with the latter's 
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organizational independence, helps legitimate the former's views in the eyes of 
cautious policymakers (Drake & Nicolaidis 1992, p39). 
The two-tier framework might be said to be cognate with Gramsci’s state-civil society 
dichotomy given the extent to which juridical or other direct power and authority is a 
property of the first tier and relative intellectual autonomy of the second.  For that reason, 
we shall sometimes apply the two-tier framework in the context of hegemonic 
relationships which do not necessarily fit all the criteria for epistemic communities. 
Adler & Haas (1992, p.373) have warned that ‘epistemic communities should not be 
mistaken for a new hegemonic actor that is the source of political and moral direction in 
society.’ If, however, epistemic communities are not themselves a ‘ruling group’ this in 
itself raises the question of their relationship to wider social and economic pressures. 
Parmar suggests that Haas’ approach suffers from a ‘lack of articulation of epistemic 
communities with other aspects of power, especially the power of the purse,’ but that this 
can be remedied by the application of the concept within a Gramscian framework (Parmar, 
2012b, p.21). In particular, he has suggested that the two-tier aspect of epistemic 
communities makes it a useful lens for examining the role of intellectuals and think-tanks 
of Cold War state-private networks (Parmar 2006, pp.17-18).  
The very name of the CIA’s International Organizations Division of the 1950s perhaps 
underlines the extent to which some of the transnational developments that the concept is 
intended to capture were a central concern of the Cultural Cold War. 
If this suggests that influencing transnational epistemic communities might itself be a goal 
of Cold War actors, it is also possible to consider whether the diffusion of Cold War 
policies, such as the successive phases of containment and containment militarism, as 
described by (Sanders 1983, pp.11-12), could be analysed in terms of epistemic 
communities. Parmar’s account of the growth of a network based on a realist paradigm 
among US international relations theorists from the 1930s onwards arguably represents a 
cognate conclusion (Parmar, 2012b, pp.95-96). 
The growth of realism might be seen as a movement within, or a more narrowly specified 
version of, ‘the epistemic community that derives from the role of representing national 
public authority internationally’ described by (Ruggie 1975, p.570). 
However, we will suggest that the neoconservative intelligence theorists conformed more 
to Ruggie’s second type of epistemic community, gaining influence at lower levels of 
government through more specialised expertise. In order to understand the nature of that 
specialisation, we shall address the question of what constitutes a theory of intelligence, 
before considering what is required for the formation of an epistemic community around 
that theory. 
Theories of intelligence 
One of the most influential approaches to theorizing intelligence has been that of early CIA 
analyst Sherman Kent, covering ‘the three separate and distinct things that intelligence 
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devotees usually mean when they use the word’; these are: knowledge, the type of 
organisation which produces the knowledge, and the activity pursued by the intelligence 
organisation (Kent, 2015, p.ix). 
Many theorists have followed Kent in seeing the acquisition of knowledge as central to 
intelligence. Loch Johnson offers an account of intelligence as traditionally defined which 
conforms to Kent’s characterisation: 
Strategic intelligence may be defined broadly as a set of activities conducted by 
government agencies that operate largely in secret. These activities include, 
foremost, the collection and interpretation of information drawn from a mixture of 
open and clandestine sources to arrive at a product—knowledge—useful to 
illuminate foreign policy deliberations (Johnson 2010, p.1). 
Similarly among those we shall describe as neoconservative intelligence theorists, Abram 
Shulsky and Gary Schmitt follow Kent in analysing intelligence in terms of certain kinds of 
information, activities and organisation (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002, p.1). 
Both (Johnson 2010, p.1) and (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.3) note that a characterisation 
focused on information lacks an explicit role for aspects of intelligence such as 
counterintelligence and covert action. Johnson nevertheless takes it as the starting point 
for his own attempt to ‘provide a sense of the dimensions that a theoretical framework 
must encompass’ (Johnson 2010, p.1). 
Any theory of strategic intelligence must be built around the so-called intelligence 
cycle, a model that describes the flow of activities necessary for the collection and 
the interpretation (“analysis”) of information. The cycle consists of five phases: 
planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and 
dissemination (Johnson 2010, p.2). 
In this approach, counterintelligence and covert action are interpreted as distinct ‘core 
missions’, alongside the information-gathering activities which are the focus of the 
intelligence cycle (Johnson 2010, pp.13-14). 
Where Johnson focuses on the intelligence cycle, neoconservatives writers such as (Godson 
2001, p.xvii) and (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.8), tend to focus on four interdependent 
‘elements of intelligence’, with information-gathering activities split into intelligence 
analysis and collection, the first two elements, the others being covert action and 
counterintelligence. 
It is arguably the neoconservative approach to the relationship between these elements, 
and the principles underlying that approach, that justify the ascription to them of a 
distinctive theoretical model of intelligence. 
A key principle enunciated by Shulsky and Schmitt in their chapter Towards a Theory of 
Intelligence is that ‘intelligence involves a real struggle with human opponents, carried on 
to gain some advantage over them’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). This adversarial 
emphasis is reflected in their definition of intelligence as seeking ‘access to information 
some other party is trying to deny’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). One advantage of this 
perspective is that shows why counterintelligence ‘is not an afterthought, but an integral 
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part’ of intelligence (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). ‘Not only is it important to limit or 
distort what one’s opponent can learn about one,’ they argue ‘but one cannot even be sure 
of what one knows about an adversary without the counterintelligence capability to detect 
any deception effort he might have undertaken’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). 
However, the adversarial perspective has broader implications than this. In Godson’s view, 
‘the end product, the mission of counterintelligence, is action – action to protect against 
foreigners and action to manipulate foreigners in the service of national goals’ (Godson 
2001, p.239). 
In the context of Johnson’s model of the intelligence cycle, the neoconservative theory of 
intelligence might be products as a model of competing intelligence cycles, in which 
protecting and promoting one’s own intelligence cycle, and manipulating one’s opponent’s 
cycle via offensive intelligence are both parts of the fundamental struggle. Within this 
model, intelligence is seen as inevitably tending towards ‘a counterintelligence duel’ 
because ‘whatever else one wishes to know, one has to pay attention to the adversary’s 
intelligence services as well’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.175). 
For Shulsky and Schmitt, this adversarial model helps to determine the kind of information 
and knowledge that is relevant to intelligence, ‘those factors that can be manipulated or 
changed’ rather than fundamental causes that might be of academic interest.  
It perhaps here that the neoconservative theory of intelligence has the clearest claim to be 
an episteme in the Foucauldian sense, defined as ‘the 'apparatus' which makes possible the 
separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised 
as scientific’ (Foucault 1980, p.197). If the word scientific sits uneasily given the 
neoconservative insistence on delimiting the domain of intelligence from social science of the 
kind attributed to Sherman Kent, it nevertheless remains the case that they see themselves as 
scholars contributing to making intelligence ‘a recognized field of academic study’(Shulsky & 
Schmitt 2002, xiii). It must therefore be considered to what extent their theory of intelligence 
was the product of an epistemic community. 
 
Neoconservative Intelligence: The elements of an epistemic community 
This thesis will argue that the neoconservative theory of intelligence developed as the 
product of such an epistemic community from the late 1970s onwards. This epistemic 
community provided a theoretical defence of the intelligence practices in which some Cold 
War liberal intellectuals had co-operated with the US intelligence community. This earlier 
Cold War community exhibited some of the features of an epistemic community, notably a 
two-tier dynamic between experts and policymakers. However, it was only in response to 
the challenge of public exposure and criticism in the 1970s, that it developed all of the four 
main criteria set out in (Haas, 1992, p.3): 'a shared set of normative and principled beliefs', 
'shared causal beliefs', 'shared notions of validity', and 'a common policy enterprise'. This 
process will be considered in detail in chapters Six and Seven, but key recurring ideas 




The Consortium for the Study of intelligence was founded, according to (Godson 1979, p.4) 
to study intelligence to ensure that ‘that US performance would enhance American values.’ 
While acknowledging intelligence abuses uncovered in the 1970s, Godson criticised 
suggestions that covert action was either immoral or useless. Rather, the key question was 
whether the intelligence system was ‘capable of defending our open society effectively’ 
(Godson, 1979, p.3). 
The basic legitimacy of and necessity for intelligence capabilities including 
counterintelligence and covert action, were thus key normative assumptions, alongside a 
belief that effectiveness required ‘a consensus encompassing objectives and the main 
contours of modus operandi’ (Godson, 1979, p.9).  
Causal beliefs 
In their approach to causal explanation, neoconservative intelligence theorists from 
(Godson, 1980a, p.2) to (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, p.173) cast themselves in opposition to a 
school of thought based on empirical social science, attributed to the influential CIA analyst 
Sherman Kent. This was seen as the dominant paradigm in an existing intelligence analysis 
system that was vulnerable to surprise and deception (Godson, 1980a, p.2). 
Godson advocated an alternative approach which he identifies with political theory, seen 
as necessary for ‘developing hypotheses about likely courses of action’ and for estimating 
‘the possible effects of US foreign policy in terms of external events’(Godson, 1980a, p.2). 
Perhaps the starkest example of this approach was Richard Pipes’ argument that he did not 
need to know anything about anti-ballistic missiles to be able to testify that the Soviets 
would never accept strategic parity (Pipes, 1986, p.43). Pipes’ call for American analysts to 
emulate the Soviet understanding that ‘politics everywhere is the driving force and that to 
concentrate on military and economic figures is misleading’ underlined that this was an 
approach that prioritised explanation in terms of intentions rather than capabilities (Pipes, 
1986, p.45). 
Notions of validity 
Pipes’ succinct definition of intelligence as ‘useful information’ provided the 
neoconservative intelligence theorists with a criterion of validity which later writers 
expanded on (Pipes, 1986, p.41).  Shulsky and Schmitt argued that social science views the 
world as a passive object of inquiry, whereas for intelligence, knowledge is a means by 
which enemies compete to gain advantage in the human struggle (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, 
p.172). In their view,  intelligence must ‘emphasize those factors that can be manipulated 
or changed’ in contrast to social science which, they suggest, must ‘regard the future as 
already determined’ to the extent it seeks to predict it (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, p.171). 
A common policy enterprise 
This activist view of the discipline informed a policy enterprise which sought to revive the 
offensive intelligence machinery of the Cold War. Godson reported general agreement at 
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the first colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence that the US needed to 
strengthen all four major elements of intelligence (Godson, 1979, p.9). 
In the area of analysis, an increased emphasis on competitive analysis was seen as central 
to this (Godson, 1979, p.12). A renewal of the US clandestine intelligence apparatus was 
seen as vital for the other three disciplines of collection, counterintelligence and covert 
action (Godson, 1979, p.10). In the case of covert action, this was seen as requiring the 
reversal of key legislative restrictions imposed during the Carter administration (Godson, 
1979, p.9). Counter-intelligence was seen as having a strategic function that required a 
centralised organisation with access to the full range of intelligence activities (Godson, 
1980, p.5). 
 
While many of these prescriptions represented a call for a return to the status quo ante of 
Cold War intelligence prior to détente, it was only in the course of the public debate of the 
1970s that previously secretive practitioners of covert action articulated each of these 
elements with sufficient clarity to constitute an epistemic community. 
There are precedents for identifying intelligence as the domain of an epistemic community. 
Fry and Hochstein have applied the concept to the discipline of intelligence studies as a 
whole, in the course of calling for international relations theorists to take account of 
intelligence activities as a ‘vast bureaucratic and intellectual exercise in international 
epistemology’ (Fry, 1993, p.25). Although this thesis will apply the concept more narrowly, 
Fry and Hochstein’s description should alert us to the possibility that intelligence practice 
as well as scholarship can be analysed in terms of its epistemic commitments. 
Identifying the neoconservative intelligence theorists as an epistemic community has 
significant implications for debates about the concept, notably for disputes about the 
extent to which it reflects a certain normative evaluation of science. For example, Dave 
Toke has argued that the concept reflects 'an acceptance of a broadly positivist position 
concerning the role of scientists as the legitimate bearers of truth which, in view of the 
evidence, is unjustified’ (Toke, 1999, p.101). Claire Dunlop has argued that this view is 
based on a misinterpretation of Haas’ approach, which does not necessarily involve a 
normative affirmation of epistemic communities (Dunlop, 2000, p.138). Instead, Dunlop 
argues that the distinguishing feature of epistemic communities is ‘an internally settled 
paradigm’, and that Haas’s second and third criteria of shared causal beliefs and a shared 
notion of validity are decisive (Dunlop, 2000, p.138). In the absence of these elements, 
Dunlop argues ‘the epistemic community ceases to function as an authoritative voice of 
advice in state decision-making’ and it can therefore be ‘undermined decisively by the 
discovery of technical anomalies which are irreconcilable with the received wisdom’ 
(Dunlop, 2000, p.138).  
If Dunlop’s reading of Haas is taken to imply that a true epistemic community must be 
committed to seeking out such anomalies in a classically Popperian manner, then there is 
some force to Toke’s claim that the concept implies a normative commitment to 
positivism. However, as (Dunlop, 2000, p.140) notes, Haas himself saw the idea of 
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epistemic communities as influenced by the distinctly non-positivist concept of scientific 
paradigms introduced by Thomas Kuhn (Haas, 1992, p.3, n.4). 
Dunlop goes on to argue: 
Indeed, Haas’s own case study on CFCs, cited by Toke, provides a prime example of 
the centrality of agreed knowledge, rather than proven truths. In this case study, 
the atmospheric epistemic community bound itself to the ‘Rowland–Molina’ 
hypothesis, which focused upon CFC’s chlorine origins, linking them to the 
depletion process. Even though this had not been confirmed, the hypothesis was 
‘sold’ to the decision-makers and to the public because the consensus was firm 
(Dunlop, 2000, p.140). 
This example has distinct parallels with the case of the neoconservative intelligence 
theorists. In both cases a group of scholars made a theoretical case for a particular policy 
approach, which it was argued was too urgent to wait for empirical confirmation. 
That such a situation can often arise is implicit in the suggestion by the philosopher of 
science Imre Lakatos that the evaluation of paradigms or scientific research programmes is 
often only possible with historical hindsight (Lakatos, 1978, p.92). Dunlop’s rejection of 
positivism implicitly recognises this. 
This being the case, we will apply the concept of an epistemic community on the basis that 
such communities are distinguished by their elaboration of a unified theory rather than 
their empirical character. On this view, it is open to question whether epistemic 
communities could not encompass what (Lakatos, 1978, p.95) has called metaphysical 
research programmes as well as scientific research programmes. Indeed, if epistemologists 
can only differentiate the latter two categories with historical hindsight, it may not always 
be possible to assign epistemic communities to one or other category within the timescales 
that matter for political influence.  
Chapter Two: The origins of mass propaganda 1917-1939 
Scholars of the Cultural Cold War have long recognized the need to situate the period in a 
longer historical perspective, as a way to understand the extent to which ‘in the ideological 
struggle, different traditions, motives and methods worked in parallel, in combination, 
sometimes even in opposition’(Scott-Smith 2006, pp.85-86). Scholars such as (Wilford 
2003, p.125) have turned to the pre-World War II activities of the Non-Communist left as a 
way of understanding the autonomy of the private side of the post-war state private 
network. 
This chapter will examine the emergence of the Lovestoneites as an element within the 
pre-war Non-Communist Left whose pre-war political activism would shape the traditions, 
networks and institutional forms of the American state private network during the Cold 
War. This heritage would go on to provide a key intellectual resource for neoconservative 




Wilson’s Crusade for Democracy 
In 1917, US President Woodrow Wilson entered the First World War on the side of Great 
Britain, intervening in a European continent riven by years of war and the shock of the 
Russian revolution. Kees Van Der Pijl has argued that this moment marked the first 
abortive attempt to establish an Atlanticist world order as a basis for economic expansion 
that would reconcile the free trade interests of finance capital with an emerging 
corporatist ideology associated with industrial capital. 
The Wilson policy was a perceptive anticipation of the underlying social capacities 
of capitalism which would take the New Deal and World War Two to fully 
materialize in the corporate-liberal synthesis. The universalist concept of world 
order went beyond the deflationary liberalism of the financiers and already 
represented an attempt to combine a growing domestic industrial economy with 
commercial and financial expansion abroad. Lacking a firm basis in the 
contemporary class structure, Wilson’s strategy of progressive counter-revolution 
was supported by a bourgeoisie frightened by the spectre of Bolshevism – and was 
discarded as soon as that threat had subsided. (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.275-277) 
Wilson’s Crusade for Democracy would nevertheless leave a lasting legacy. In the words of 
journalist George Creel, “It was in this recognition of Public Opinion as a major force that 
the Great War differed most essentially from all previous conflicts” (Creel, 1920, p.3) . 
 
Creel headed the Committee on Public Information formed in the United States in 1917 
(Cull, 2003, p.99). In Britain, the same year saw the establishment of the Ministry of 
Information under Lord Beaverbrook and a separate Enemy Propaganda Department 
formed at Crewe House under Lord Northcliffe (Cull, 2003, p.xvi). Although they were 
short-lived in themselves the propaganda organisations of the First World War proved to 
be significant precursors of the institutions established during World War Two and the Cold 
War.  
One key precedent was the involvement of organised labour in the allied propaganda 
effort. In the United States, the American Federation of Labor was a close supporter 
Wilson's interventionism. In October 1916, its leader Samuel Gompers was appointed to 
the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defence. In a speech to the AFL's 1917 
convention, Wilson invited its leaders to serve on the National Labor Conference and later 
on the National War Labor Board (van der Pijl, 1984, p.59). 
 War-time full employment helped to ensure that Wilson’s policy enjoyed strong support 
within the trade union bureaucracy and among skilled workers. However continuing 
economic insecurity meant that more radical anti-war socialist currents found a hearing 
among immigrant workers. This stratification of the labour force was reflected in an 
element of Anglo-Saxon chauvinism in the ideology of the Wilsonian offensive and in the 
segregationist policy of the AFL. At a 1917 meeting of the AFL Executive Council, Gompers 
rebuffed a delegation of black trade unionists for "somehow conveying the idea that they 
are to be petted or coddled and given special consideration and special privilege. Of course 
that can't be done." (van der Pijl, 1984, p.60.) 
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The AFL’s internationalism, like the broader Wilson Offensive, did not long outlast the war. 
Yet the period set a pattern that would endure.  It marked the first emergence of an 
hegemonic bloc in which the British and American states and their propaganda institutions 
advanced an Atlanticist programme that drew support from a broad range of class 
interests, within which sections of organised labour had a significant, if subordinate and 
contested, role. 
The nascent Atlanticist bloc broke down in the 1920s, amid sharpening conflict over the 
reconstruction of Europe between its liberal finance and corporatist industrial elements 
(van der Pijl, 1984, p.62). It would take another World War to spark its re-emergence. 
 Munzenburg’s Red Orchestra 
The divisions within the American labour movement over the First World War were 
paralleled in Europe, where the outbreak of conflict shattered the Socialist International, as 
social democrats rallied to their rival national standards (Eley, 2002, p.123.). 
The Second International was revived by the socialist parties that had supported the war in 
1919, the same year that saw the Bolsheviks set up the rival Communist Third 
International. Although many socialists remained non-aligned, both extremes moved to 
cement the split. Across Europe the left split, as the Bolsheviks sponsored the foundation 
of Communist Parties (Eley, 2002, p.177). 
The Communist International or Comintern soon developed its own mass propaganda 
organisation.  At its centre was the brilliant young German communist, Willi Münzenberg. 
In 1921, Münzenberg established the Berlin-based Internationale Arbeiterhilfe to send 
famine relief to the Soviet Union (Koch, 1996, pp.23-26). This was the first major project in 
a vast propaganda network that would become known as the Münzenberg Trust. 
Münzenberg pioneered many of the techniques of mass persuasion that would become 
familiar during the Twentieth Century.  He arranged spectacular conferences, and set up 
front organisations which he called ‘innocent’s clubs’, ostensibly dedicated to causes with 
broad appeal, but in reality intended to defend the Bolshevik revolution (Wilford, 2008, 
p.12). A number of the key propagandists of the Cold War, for both West as well as the 
East, would learn their trade in the Comintern organisations of the inter-war period 
(Saunders, 1999, p.65) . 
One such figure was Jay Lovestone, born in 1897 into a Jewish-Lithuanian family which 
emigrated to the US ten years later (Morgan, 1999, p.5). In 1915, he entered the City 
College of New York, an institution which had a large working class Jewish student 
contingent at a time when Ivy League universities still practised discrimination (Morgan, 
1999, p.10).  
In 1919, Lovestone and his friend Bertram Wolfe became founder members of the 
Communist Party of America, led by Charles Ruthenberg, despite Lovestone’s doubts about 
the viability of a party that was dominated by non-English-speaking immigrant workers 
(Morgan, 1999, p.19). Lovestone was thrown into both overt and underground work for 
the Party. He produced a slew of pamphlets, one of which attacked the AFL as the ‘Labor 
Lieutenants of American Imperialism’ (Morgan, 1999, p.32).  By the time he was sent to 
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Berlin in 1922, as a delegate to a Friends of the Soviet Union conference, he was under 
surveillance by the FBI (Morgan, 1999, pp.30-31). When Ruthenberg was prosecuted for 
‘criminal syndicalism’ a year later, the Bureau took a close interest in Lovestone’s 
testimony for the defence, which included an admission that the Friends of Soviet Russia 
and the Federated Press news agency were party fronts (Morgan, 1999, p.38). 
Lovestone made his first visit to Moscow in 1925, then in the midst of a succession battle 
following the death of Lenin. Joseph Stalin was allied to Nikolai Bukharin against Kamenev 
and Zinoviev in the power struggle (Morgan, 1999, pp.48-49).  He formed a close friendship 
with Bukharin, who he had first met in New York in 1916-17 (Alexander, 1981, p.16). 
This alliance was to prove fateful when Lovestone found himself engaged in his own 
succession battle as acting Secretary of the American Communist Party following the death 
of Ruthenberg in 1927 (Morgan, 1999, p.66). This internal struggle pitted the Ruthenberg-
Lovestone faction against a rival group led by William Foster and James Cannon.  According 
to Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, the Foster-Cannon group was closer to the American trade 
union movement and more domestically-oriented because of its strength in the Mid-West, 
while the Ruthenberg-Lovestone faction was more responsive to influences from Moscow 
(Alexander, 1981, p.14). According to the Cannonite Max Shachtman, “we had pretty well 
the view that the Lovestone group ... was composed of intellectuals, of New York 
intellectuals, whereas the Foster-Cannon group represented the proletarian elements in 
the party, the native elements in the party, and to a large extent this was true” (Alexander, 
1981, p.14).  
Both sides took their differences to Moscow, where Lovestone still had support from 
Bukharin, though Foster found allies among supporters of Stalin. On their return, 
Lovestone won an apparently decisive victory in the August 1927 Party Convention 
(Morgan, 1999, p.69). During his short period of uncontested supremacy, he threw the 
party into the 1928 presidential election campaign, hiring thousands of professional 
canvassers and encouraging them to resort to tricks to get the signatures needed to place 
the Communist candidate, William Foster on the ballot. This approach earned him a rebuke 
from Bukharin, when his instructions were leaked by the Fosterites (Morgan, 1999, p.71). 
As a supporter of Bukharin, Lovestone was part of a strong faction in the international 
Communist movement during this period, which included leading figures such as the 
Germans Arthur Ewert, Heinrich Brandler, and August Thalheimer and the Italian Palmiro 
Togliatti (Cohen, 1980, p.294). In the course of that year, however they faced a growing 
challenge from Stalinists advocating what would become the ‘Third Period’ policy, a shift to 
the left based on the expectation of imminent revolution in Western Europe (Cohen, 1980, 
p.292). Those like Bukharin who were sceptical about this prospect were accused of ‘right 
deviation.’ (Morgan, 1999, p.70) (Cohen, 1980, p.294). Lovestone’s belief in “the 
tremendous reserve powers of American capitalism,” marked him out as vulnerable 
(Morgan, 1999, p.68). 
At the Sixth Comintern Congress in July 1928, Bukharin defended Lovestone’s view, arguing 
that ‘In no country is capitalism so strong as it is in the United States of America... Is it a 
terrible thing to say that there is little likelihood of an immediate revolutionary situation?’ 
35 
 
(Morgan, 1999, p.73). Lovestone returned Bukharin’s loyalty, allowing Foster to outflank 
him by backing Stalin and the Third Period (Morgan, 1999, p.76). The third factional leader, 
James Cannon, threw in his lot with Trotsky on the delegation’s return to the United States 
(Morgan, 1999, p.76). This prompted Lovestone to launch a purge, which according to 
Howe and Coser, “surpassed anything before known in the American radical movement” 
with the Trotskyist leaders’ homes raided, their meetings disrupted and their newspaper 
sellers attacked (Alexander, 1981, p.19). 
Ironically, this move came as Stalin was preparing to purge Bukharin’s supporters from the 
Comintern (Alexander, 1981, p.7). The February 1929 convention of the Communist Party 
USA was dominated by Lovestone’s supporters, yet his position was fatally undermined 
when a delegation from Moscow demanded he go to Russia to work for the Comintern 
(Alexander, 1981, p.20). 
Lovestone responded by organising a delegation to Moscow, which found itself confronted 
by a special American Commission of the Comintern led by Stalin himself. In a speech to 
the commission on 6 May, Stalin insisted: “It would be wrong to ignore the specific 
peculiarities of American capitalism. The Communist Party in its work must take them into 
account. But it would be still more wrong to base the activities of the Communist Party on 
the specific features, since the foundation of the activities of every Communist Party, 
including the American Communist Party, on which it must base itself, must be the general 
features of capitalism, which are the same for all countries, and not its specific features in 
any given country” (quoted in Alexander, 1981, p.22). 
On the 12 May, the Commission presented a draft address accusing Lovestone of American 
‘exceptionalism’. In response the American delegation attempted to activate precautionary 
measures to take control of party property. However, after the delegation refused to 
accept the address, following a Comintern presidium meeting on 14 May, Lovestone’s 
support in the American Party collapsed (Alexander, 1981, p.26). 
While officially awaiting reassignment from the Comintern, Lovestone escaped from 
Moscow on 11 June, with assistance from a Latvian contact in Soviet intelligence, Nicholas 
Dozenberg (Morgan, 1999, p.101). He was expelled from the American Communist Party 
within the month (Morgan, 1999, p.103).  Several hundred loyalists were forced out with 
him, all that was left of his majority in the party a few months earlier (Morgan, 1999, 
p.105, Alexander, 1981, p.28). 
Brandler’s International Communist Opposition 
Events in America mirrored a wave of expulsions that had already begun in Europe. In 
Germany, a right-wing faction led by veteran Comintern activists Heinrich Brandler and 
August Thalheimer responded to their expulsion from the Communist Party in January 
1929 with the formation of a new vehicle, the Communist Party of Germany (Opposition) 
(KPO) (Alexander, 1981, p.137). By late 1929, similar organisations had begun to emerge in 
a number of European countries, including France and Austria (Alexander, 1981, p.262). 
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In line with this trend, the Lovestoneite faction in the US formed the Communist Party of 
the U.S.A. (Majority Group) in October 1929, and launched their own newspaper, 
Revolutionary Age, the following month (Alexander, 1981, p.28). 
The second conference of the KPO in November 1929, laid out what would become the 
official position of the right opposition groups. Their goal, in the words of Revolutionary 
Age correspondent M.N. Roy was to “save the Party and the International”, rejecting “even 
the slightest tendency in the direction of organization of a new party” (quoted inAlexander, 
1981, p.140).  
The first move towards uniting the various right opposition groups took place in March 
1930, when a number of groups agreed to form an information centre based in Berlin. The 
first full conference of the International Communist Opposition (ICO) took place in the 
same city in December 1930, with delegates from Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and the Unites States, and messages from Austria, Italy, 
Finland and Canada (Alexander, 1981, p.279). 
The platform agreed in Berlin reiterated the ICO’s claim to be a part of the Communist 
International, but sharply criticised Stalin’s doctrine of the Third Period, emphasising the 
importance of united front tactics and of trade union unity (Alexander, 1981, pp.280-281.). 
As the American delegate, Jay Lovestone reported from the conference that “Our platform 
very correctly emphasizes the Leninist tactical attitude toward trade unions and the need 
for the militants and communists working in the mass unions. The necessity of united front 
tactics, the need of the Party’s winning the majority of working class are brought home 
very clearly” (Alexander, 1981, p.279). 
The abandonment of the Stalinist dual-union policy was crucial in allowing the 
Lovestoneites to regain a foothold in the mainstream American labour movement. A key 
figure in this respect was Charles ‘Sasha’ Zimmerman, who had led the left wing opposition 
to the leadership of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) prior to his 
expulsion from the union in 1926, following a failed strike that had shut down the entire 
New York garment industry. He was expelled from the Communist Party along with the rest 
of the Lovestoneites three years later (Chester, 1995, p.9). In May 1931, Zimmerman was 
allowed to re-join the ILGWU and soon rose to head one of its key strongholds, Local 22. 
He became the second most powerful figure in the ILGWU after its leader David Dubinsky 
(Chester, 1995, p.9). 
The position would become increasingly important to the ICO as a whole because of the 
deteriorating situation faced by its European affiliates in the course of the 1930s. In the 
summer of 1932, Lovestone travelled to Europe for the second ICO conference. He arrived 
in Berlin at a key moment in Hitler’s rise to power, as President von Hindenburg dissolved 
the Reichstag for the elections which he realised would make the Nazis the largest party 
(Morgan, 1999, pp.108-109). During Lovestone’s visit, he was informed by Brandler and 
Thalheimer that the KPO had joined with another left-wing group, the Socialist Workers 
Party (SAP), to set up an organisation to help victims of the growing state repression, the 
International Relief Association (IRA) (Chester, 1995, p.8). 
37 
 
The IRA moved its headquarters to Paris the following year, as Hitler’s ascent to power 
forced the German left underground. In April 1933, Lovestone wrote to a number of 
potential sponsors, about a possible American Committee of the IRA (Chester, 1995, p.8). 
By the time of its launch in July 1933, a number of prominent liberals had joined the board, 
including the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin and the eminent 
theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, paralleling the endorsement of the German committee by 
prominent intellectuals such as Albert Einstein and Kathe Kollwitz (Chester, 1995, pp.8-9). 
Although Lovestone himself remained in the background, other members of his group, 
notably Bertram Wolfe, joined the board, and another Lovestoneite, Sheba Strunsky was 
appointed as secretary (Chester, 1995, p.9). According to the Eric Chester’s history of the 
IRA, ‘Lovestone hoped to use the new formation as a conduit for aid to his comrades in the 
German underground, the Communist Party (Opposition), but he fully understood that only 
the endorsement of a wide range of prominent progressives could provide the IRA with the 
necessary credibility’ (Chester, 1995, p.9) . 
Given the Comintern roots of the ICO, Lovestone’s role invites comparisons with Willi 
Munzenberg’s ‘Innocent’s Clubs’. In his history of the ICO, Robert J. Alexander argues that 
the Lovestoneites did not try to dominate the IRA: 
 
“The Communist Oppositionists did not organize “front groups” or “transmission 
belts” such as those the official Communist Party established and dominated for 
many decades. However, the Lovestoneite leaders and some of the rank and file 
did participate in organizations in which they collaborated with members of other 
radical factions and with independent leftist intellectuals” (Alexander, 1981, p.40). 
This difference in approach may have reflected the Lovestoneites’ negative experience of 
Comintern discipline, but perhaps also owed something to the relative weakness of their 
position. If the IRA was not a rigid front organisation, the necessarily covert nature of its 
role in Nazi Germany exacerbated the tensions between the Lovestoneites and the IRA’s 
liberal backers. 
Crucial among these was David Dubinsky, whose ILGWU was a key source of finance for the 
IRA (Chester, 1995, p.9). 
The Lovestoneite position within the ILGWU had been consolidated in April 1933, with the 
election of Zimmerman as manager of Local 22 (Alexander, 1981, p.46). The passage of the 
National Industrial Recovery in June as part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal enabled a 
wave of union recruitment and Zimmerman led a successful strike in August (Alexander, 
1981, p.47). The following year Dubinsky invited Lovestone to speak at the ILGWU 
convention, underlining a rapprochement that proceeded despite Lovestone’s use of the 
platform to attack the New Deal from a communist position (Morgan, 1999, p.111). 
Roy Godson, who interviewed Dubinsky and other AFL leaders, writes of this period: 
Before America became involved in World War II, David Dubinsky and Matthew 
Woll had feared that if the democratic leadership of Eastern and Western Europe 
were destroyed by the Nazis, the Russians and the well-organized Communist 
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underground might emerge from the ensuing political vacuum as the new rulers of 
the continent. With this in mind, Woll and Dubinsky enlisted the support of the 
AFL's president William Green and its secretary-treasurer George Meany in the 
Jewish Labor Committee's effort to rescue hundreds of democratic labor leaders, 
politicians, and intellectuals from the Nazis (Godson, 1975, pp.326-327). 
Godson notes that Dubinsky, unlike Woll, did not possess the confidence of AFL leaders, 
who were suspicious of his contacts with the Lovestoneites and other socialists, and who 
sometimes made anti-Semitic remarks (Godson, 1975, p.329). 
The response of the AFL to the plight of European refugees was significantly shaped by the 
strong nativist element in its craft union tradition.  Although, its President William Green 
became chair of the Labor League for Human Rights in 1938, the union opposed the lifting 
of quotas on European refugees in the United States, instead endorsing a Jewish homeland 
in Palestine (Tichenor, 2002, p.163). 
Despite these tensions, Dubinsky enjoyed a significant say in the AFL’s foreign policy due to 
his control of the ILGWU and its finances (Godson, 1975, p.330). Dubinsky’s own politics 
inclined more towards social democracy, and accordingly he sought to strengthen the 
social democratic element in the German resistance (Chester, 1995, p.7). However, the 
KPO and SAP initially proved more effective resistance groups than the Social Democrats 
and the Communists, because they were smaller and less open to Nazi penetration 
(Alexander, 1981, p.145). 
If this made the IRA a natural conduit for Dubinsky’s anti-fascist support, there 
nevertheless remained a significant difference between his agenda and that of the 
Lovestoneites. For one thing, the Lovestoneites had still not given up on their hopes of 
reuniting with the Comintern, and made attempts to re-open negotiations with US 
communist leaders in January 1932 and December 1934 (Alexander, 1981, pp.80-82). 
An interesting, if jaundiced commentary on these tensions is preserved in the archives of 
the British Security Service, which maintained a file on Heinrich Brandler, including 
extensive reports on intercepted correspondence between Lovestone and the KPO leader 
(National Archives KV2/580). 
In November 1934, the head of the Security Service, Sir Vernon Kell wrote to Ray Atherton 
of the US embassy about negotiations between the ICO and the Comintern, asking that the 
Americans monitor an expected attempt by Lovestone to travel to Europe under an 
assumed name in January 1935 (National Archives KV2/580, Kell to Atherton, 27 Nov. 
1934). 
A number of letter intercepts summarised by the Secret Intelligence Service testify to 
controversies over the Communist Opposition role in the IRA. In March 1935, Lovestone 
informed Thalheimer that Dubinsky’s secretary had become suspicious after receiving two 
letters from Brandler, one of which was signed with an apparently false name (National 
Archives KV2/580, Subject: Heinrich Brandler, 16 Mar. 1935). In September 1936, 
Lovestone warned Thalheimer that American IRA comrades had protested against the 
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impression given in Paris that the IRA was strictly an organisation of the Communist Party 
Opposition. The SIS report quoted Lovestone as stating: “very likely it was a mistake to 
have told him (Dr. NATHAN) that Heinz uses the name of “Peters” but that he is actually 
directing the I.R.A. work. It is on this grounds that NATHAN now contends that the I.R.A. is 
too much a strictly BRANDLER organisation (National Archives KV2/580, Subject: Heinrich 
Brandler, 13 October 1936)”. 
A December 1937 note on the activities of the Communist Opposition in the previous two 
years offered a strikingly cynical assessment of the relationship between the Lovestoneites 
and their union backers: 
The Paris centre is run entirely by German refugees and is mainly supported by a 
monthly contribution from the American organisation and also by donations, some 
of which come out of the pockets of the Lovestone Group, but others which are 
secured by Lovestone from various Trade Unions in the United States, which are 
under the impression that their contributions are to be used for the underground 
fight for Trade Unionism in Germany, and which are kept very carefully in 
ignorance that these Paris comrades are Communists, albeit not of the brand 
recognised by Moscow. Incidentally, the Unions from which donations are secured 
are equally unaware of the extent to which they themselves are manipulated by 
Lovestone. 
It is considered by Lovestone that great headway is being made by the Paris Centre 
and it is worthy of note that, more particularly since the Comintern has been 
victimising Germans in the course of its heresy hunts, something approaching an 
understanding, or at all events, a better understanding, has taken place between 
Heinz BRANDLER and Willi MUENZENBERG, though there has, or course, been no 
suggestion of open co-operation. Willi MUENZENBERG is at the moment by no 
means persona grata with Moscow (National Archives KV2/580, Notes on the 
Communist Opposition Movement, 6 Dec. 1937).  
The ‘heresy hunts’ within the Comintern reached a fateful turning point for the right 
opposition with the arrest of Nikolai Bukharin in February 1937, and his execution the 
following year (Cohen, 1980, pp.372-4). For the first time Lovestone and other ICO leaders 
became openly critical of Stalin’s purges, forcing a reconsideration of their own attitude to 
the Comintern (Alexander, 1981, p.124). Bukharin’s death made it brutally clear that there 
was little prospect of a power-shift in Moscow that would bring his followers in from the 
cold. The impression was compounded by the Communist-led suppression of the ICO-
aligned Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista in Republican Spain in 1937 (Alexander, 
1981, p.229). 
Stalinist repression combined with continuing fascist advances to ensure that the ICO was 
in retreat across continental Europe. Following the Revolutionary Socialist Congress in Paris 
in 1938, Lovestone, travelled to Vienna at the invitation of the Austrian group Der Funke, 
arriving in time to witness the Nazi occupation that preceded the Anschluss (Morgan, 1999, 
p.127). According to Robert Alexander, Lovestone brought with him eight false passports 
which were used to smuggle out Austrian opposition leaders (Alexander, 1981, p.269) .  
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In 1936, Lovestone had sent American money to Brandler to extend the ICO’s work in 
Czechoslovakia (TNA KV2/580, Subject: Brandler, Heinz; 20 Jan. 1936). Here too, however, 
the ICO presence was destroyed by the Nazi occupation that followed the 1938 Munich 
Agreement. 
As the ICO’s position in Europe weakened during the course of the 1930s, the 
Lovestoneites drew closer to their allies among US labour leaders. The growth in US union 
membership in the mid-1930s was seen by the Lovestoneites as justifying their turn away 
from communist dual union policies. The Lovestoneite paper Workers’ Age initially 
welcomed the formation of the Committee of Industrial Organisations (later the Congress 
of Industrial Organisations or CIO) in 1935 (Alexander, 1981, p.59). 
In contrast to the conservative, craft-union traditions of the AFL, the CIO was committed to 
organising the new mass production industries and a number of its leaders were associated 
with the Socialist Party (Wilford, 2003, p.12). It was also more favourable to immigration 
than the older organisation, organising many workers of southern and eastern European 
origin (Tichenor, 2002, p.163). 
In 1936 and 1937, the CIO led an unprecedented wave of sit-down strikes which won union 
recognition in a number of the new mass production industries (van der Pijl, 1984, p.96). 
However, the prominence of Communist organisers in the strikes prompted concern 
among some of the more conservative CIO leaders. Through the offices of David Dubinsky’s 
ILGWU leadership, Lovestone was deputed as chief of staff to Homer Martin, head of the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), with a brief to take on the Communists (Morgan, 1999, 
p.125). 
A number of people close to the Lovestone group were appointed to UAW staff positions 
as a result, most notably, Francis Henson, who became an assistant to Martin, and Irving 
Brown (Alexander, 1981, p.57). In the preceding two years both had been involved in the 
Revolutionary Policy Committee, a left-wing caucus within the Socialist Party, where their 
closeness to Lovestone provoked widespread suspicion (Alexander, 1981, p.109).  Socialist 
Party leader Norman Thomas was among those who regarded Brown in particular as a 
Lovestoneite plant (Alexander, 1981, p.110). 
As well as the Communists, the struggle in the UAW brought the Lovestoneites into conflict 
with a Socialist group around Victor Reuther, sparking a feud that would later mark 
relations between the AFL and the CIO. Reuther would denounced Lovestone as “one of 
the most Machiavellian union-splitters ever to prey on the American Labor movement” 
(quoted in Morgan, 1999, p.125). 
At the 1937 UAW convention, Lovestone’s plan to purge the union was frustrated by CIO 
leader John L. Lewis, and it split into pro and anti-Martin factions (Morgan, 1999, p.126). In 
the bitter struggle that followed the anti-Martin faction published some of Lovestone’s 
correspondence with Martin, apparently stolen from Lovestone’s flat by the communists 
(Alexander, 1981, p.59). 
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By 1939, the split had become permanent, with Martin’s faction leaving the CIO for the 
AFL.  Within a year, Martin’s union had folded. Henry Ford took pity on the former UAW 
boss, setting him up with a house and car and a position buying paint (Morgan, 1999, 
p.131). 
Despite, the CIO’s victory among the auto workers, the late 1930s saw a recovery for the 
AFL. The 1937 recession compounded pressure on the Roosevelt administration to 
moderate working class militancy, blunting the CIO advance, and enabling the AFL to make 
up some of the ground lost to its newer rival (van der Pijl, 1984, p.96). One such victory 
was the return of David Dubinsky’s ILGWU from the ranks of the CIO, a move supported by 
the Lovestoneites in 1940 (Alexander, 1981, p.48). 
Kees van Der Pijl summarised the result of the period as follows: 
If the overall outcome was heterogeneous (also due to the fact that the protracted 
struggle of the working class took place under changing legal and political 
conditions), the compromise, worked out on the national level, between high 
productivity industry and organized workers became its dominating feature. In the 
course of the Roosevelt offensive, organized labour first had to be cut down to size 
to make this compromise attractive to the capitalist class; but once this renewed 
subordination was achieved, the corporatist mechanism allowed for a relatively 
smooth interplay between the big unions’ economic demands and the expansion 
of American capital. The AFL and the CIO both supported labour-saving 
mechanization in exchange for pay rises for the stably employed workers forming 
their core constituencies (van der Pijl, 1984, p.97). 
By the late 1930s, the Lovestoneites were increasingly playing a role in defending this 
corporatist settlement. If the Lovestoneite involvement in the UAW was the clearest 
example of this, it was also a factor in US trade union support for the group’s activities in 
Europe. 
During this period, the ideological differences that separated the Lovestoneites from 
sponsors such as David Dubinsky were fast disappearing. 
 The Lovestoneite group went through successive changes of name from the Independent 
Communist Labor League to the Independent Labor League of America (ILLA), a process 
reflecting a gradual abandonment of communist ideology, and a shift towards social 
democracy. Internal debate amongst the Lovestoneites increasingly focused on the issues 
that were dividing American social democrats: attitudes towards the Roosevelt 
administration and towards the prospect of a European war (Alexander, 1981, p.133). 
The Lovestoneites and the intellectuals: Corporatism and the ‘New Class’ 
Over the course of their existence, the Lovestoneites were involved in a number of 
significant cultural activities. These included their newspaper, initially the Revolutionary 
Age (later the Workers Age) and the educational activities organised by their New Workers 
School, which had become the Independent Labor Institute by the late 1930s (Alexander, 
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1981, pp.31-34). They were also prominently represented in the intellectual circles 
involved in two independent magazines, The Modern Monthly and the Marxist Review. 
The emerging anti-Stalinism of the Lovestoneites placed them alongside their Trotskyite 
rivals in a wider current of non-communist ‘New York Intellectuals’ on the American left in 
the late 1930s (Wilford, 2003, pp.7-10). 
The attempts by the New York intellectuals to rationalise the struggles within the 
Comintern and the rise of Stalinism were to have a lasting influence on ideas about the 
changing class structure of Twentieth Century society. Those theories may in turn offer a 
useful starting point for an analysis of the role of the ex-Communist intellectuals 
themselves. In the 1930s, it was the Trotskyites rather than the Lovestoneites who made 
the running in these debates, largely because the latter were much slower to become 
openly critical of the Soviet Union. 
 A resolution at the CPO conference in December 1933/January 1934 accused the 
Trotskyites of going to “a counter-revolutionary extreme” for propounding the view that 
“The Communist Party, the trade unions, the activists in the U.S.S.R. and all other 
organizations of the workers are declared to have been ‘destroyed’ by the ‘Stalinist 
burocracy’ [sic], which is supposed to represent the interests of elements alien to the 
proletariat”(Alexander, 1981, p.102).  
Trotsky’s thesis of the ‘bureaucratic degeneration’ the Soviet Union was to have a 
profound impact on the New York Intellectuals.  His History of the Russian Revolution was a 
key influence on James Burnham, who argued that in his 1941 book, The Managerial 
Revolution that a technocratic ‘new class’ was taking power both in the US and Russia 
(Heilbrunn, 2008, p.49). 
The theory of the new class would be taken up by other New York intellectuals, notably 
Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, and much later, Kristol would employ this concept as part of a 
neoconservative critique of post-war liberalism (Blumenthal, 2008, p.136). 
It can fairly be asked whether the New York intellectuals themselves exemplified the New 
Class they described. This is particularly true of the Lovestoneites, who did not finally give 
up hope of regaining a place in the Comintern apparatus until well after they had won the 
patronage of US labour leaders. 
One useful approach to that question is through Van Der Pijl’s concept of the state-
monopoly tendency, an interpretation of early twentieth century corporatism, cognate in 
certain respects with that of the new class.  
According to Van Der Pijl: 
 The increasing bureaucratic complexity of large-scale industrial production, as well 
as its scientific management according to the supposedly ‘objective laws’ of 
optimal productivity prescribed by Taylor, Ford and others, tended to obscure or 
displace consciousness of exploitative relations on the shopfloor... 
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... The need to intervene in the self-regulating market dictated by large-scale 
production, reflected in the shift from ‘micro’ to ‘macro’ economics, further 
enhanced the apparently anti-capitalist, ‘socialist’ quality of the transformation 
(van der Pijl, 1984, p.21). 
 In contrast to the theorists of the new class, Van Der Pijl argues that this emerging 
corporatist stratum remained subordinate to productive capital except in the Soviet Union, 
“Therefore, we shall speak of a state-monopoly tendency to denote the class form of the 
hegemony of productive capital in its antinomy with money capital, in order to avoid the 
suggestion that capitalism actually has overcome its liberal basis: a full state monopoly 
would be equivalent to a planned economy of the Russian type” (van der Pijl, 1984, p.22). 
Key aspects of the state monopoly tendency, exemplified in the ideas of Henry Ford, were 
the integration of mass production and mass consumption, and the extension of industrial 
management into the sphere of labour power (van der Pijl, 1984, p.19). Such requirements 
underline the extent to which the growth of mass propaganda in the interwar period was 
itself part of the corporatist trend. 
Seen in this light, the Lovestoneites can be seen as a fraction of the emerging corporatist 
stratum which abandoned its initial support for a corporatist-led project, that of the 
Comintern, which, despite its incipient transnational nature, was always destined to be 
subordinated to Soviet state interests, to the detriment of their own position in the US 
labour movement. In exchange, the Lovestoneites gained a subaltern role in supporting the 
New Deal variant of corporatist capitalism via their alliance with the AFL.  
The Lovestoneites and covert action 
The AFL’s role in Europe in the 1930s would be cited in the 1970s by Roy Godson in a 
defence of the union’s post-war role which dismissed claims of CIA support as 
‘unsubstantiated’ (Godson, 1975). Later writers such as Hugh Wilford who have 
documented the CIA’s post-war funding role have nevertheless accepted that Lovestone 
and the AFL were “entirely confident of their own ability to carry out covert operations, 
indeed, positively jealous of their independence in the field” (Wilford, 2003, p.99). 
Noting the AFL’s pre-existing support for the European non- communist left, Wilford 
writes: 
In part this reflected the intense anti-communism of such AFL leaders as Woll and 
David Dubinsky, not to mention the particularly bitter hatred of Stalinism felt by 
the Lovestoneites… 
...Also significant, however, was the powerful tradition of internationalist labour 
solidarity most evident amongst members of the New York garment unions which 
earlier had found organisational expression in such bodies as the Jewish Labor 
Committee (Wilford, 2003, p.93). 
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While the latter point is valid, it should be borne in mind that, as we have seen, the 
necessarily covert nature of the Lovestoneites’ work in Europe in the 1930s enabled them 
to turn anti-fascist support to much narrower partisan purposes. 
As Wilford notes, the Lovestoneites represented a tradition of covert action that both pre-
dated and post-dated the CIA’s sponsorship of the AFL (Wilford, 2003, p.101). Indeed, the 
Lovestoneites arguably passed from Soviet state sponsorship in the 1920s to American 
state sponsorship in the late 1940s in part because of their own determination to retain 
their freedom of manoeuvre.  
This degree of strategic autonomy in part reflected the transnational nature of the 
Lovestoneite networks.  In this respect, Lovestoneite activities in this period support Van 
Der Pijl’s characterisation of the role of transnational rivalries in global political economy as 
one in which interstate competition overlaps with transnational class relations (van der Pijl, 
2006, pp.16-17).    
The extent to which state-sponsored covert operations reflect transnational class relations 
is further borne out by an examination of the role of the Lovestoneites during the Second 
World War.  
Chapter Three: World War Two 
Chapter Three will look at the role World War Two in cementing an Atlantic alliance, within 
which covert action specialists drawn from the Non-Communist Left were allied to 
organisations like the British Political Warfare Executive and the American Office of 
Strategic Services. 
The Non-Communist left would play a distinctly subaltern role in this hegemonic 
relationship with Atlanticist elites. However, the dissolution of the Lovestoneites would 
facilitate the absorption of much of its cadre into a complex of organisations around the 
American Federation of Labor. This would allow to them to play a distinctive role in the 
war-time state-private network, providing a model that would influence post-war 
developments and later neoconservative prescriptions. 
The Non Communist Left in the Early Years of World War Two 
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 sealed the break between the 
Lovestoneites and Soviet Communism. In the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the 
ILLA declared that the Comintern had “pronounced its own death sentence”(Alexander, 
1981, p.127). Opposition to the Soviet alliance with Germany did not, however, translate 
into immediate support for the western allies.  The International Marxist Center called 
instead for “uncompromising opposition to this war and to the war makers” (Alexander, 
1981, p.293) 
Left anti –fascist networks grew increasingly critical of the conduct of the official 
Communists in the European underground.  In February 1940, four groups, Neu Beginnen, 
the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria (RSO), the Socialist Workers Party (SAP) and the 
international Socialist Militant League (ISK), issued a joint response to German Communist 
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leader Walter Ulbricht after he attacked Social Democratic critics of the pact as lackeys of 
British imperialism.  The statement charged that his defence amounted to a call for 
collaboration with the Gestapo. (The KPD and the Solidarity of the Illegals, 1941) 
Under the pressure of such events, the left anti-fascist networks grew increasingly close to 
the western allies. From the late 1930s, Willi Münzenberg had attempted to build an 
independent position at the centre of anti-fascist networks in Paris as insurance against 
Stalinist purges.  With the onset of the war, he began lunching allied intelligence officers, 
including his own former protégé, Paul Willert, now based at the British Information Office. 
(Koch, 1996, p.308).  
During the Munich crisis, the British had noted the effectiveness of Munzenberg’s 
Deutsche Freiheitsender radio station, ostensibly broadcasting from within Germany, in 
reality from Paris. (Garnett, 2002, p.32) 
After Munzenberg’s mysterious death during the fall of France, two broadcasters from his 
station, Ernst Adam and Alexander Mass, were recruited by the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) to work on a black propaganda station broadcasting to Germany from 
Britain, known as Gustav Seigfried Eins (GS1). SOE, formed in July 1940 under the 
chairmanship of Labour cabinet minister Hugh Dalton, was responsible for propaganda 
through its SO.1 section. (Garnett, 2002, p.36.)  In addition, to the GS1 unit, SOE also 
controlled a “Neu-Beginn” research unit that broadcast left-wing propaganda to Germany 
from 1940. (Garnett, 2002, pp. 41-42) 
 In the US, a less official rapprochement between government and the anti-fascist left was 
manifested in the formation of the Emergency Rescue Committee.  Key movers in the 
organisation included a number of veterans of the European underground left 
organisations including Karl Frank of Neu Beginnen and Joseph Buttinger of the RSO, 
alongside establishment liberals such as the theologian and former Socialist Party activist 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Their efforts had tacit backing from the Roosevelt administration 
through first lady Eleanor Roosevelt and Assistant Secretary of state Adolf Berle. (Chester, 
1995, pp.11-15.) 
The ERC also developed close links with British intelligence. Its key field operative was 
Varian Fry, a former activist in Dubinsky’s American Labor Party. As ERC representative in 
Marseilles from August 1940, Fry accepted covert British funding to help escaping allied 
servicemen. (Chester, 1995, pp.16-17.)  
The growing links between the allies and the non-communist left were reflected in the 
evolution of the Lovestoneite movement in 1940. The ILLA’s periodical Workers Age 
published critiques of Lenin, marking a fundamental break with communist ideology. 
(Alexander, 1981, p.128). In his private correspondence with Bertram Wolfe, and Fenner 
Brockway of ILLA’s British ally, the Independent Labour Party, Lovestone himself grew 
increasingly impatient with their pacifism. (Morgan, 1999, p.134-135) 
During this period, Lovestone’s patron David Dubinsky was engaged in a struggle which 
overcame intense communist opposition to secure the American Labour Party’s 
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presidential nomination for Roosevelt in September 1940 (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p. 
272). 
This domestic American conflict reflected the wider international backdrop of a deepening 
gulf between communists loyal to Moscow and a non-communist left increasingly close to 
the allies. It was in these circumstances, that Lovestone decided at the end of 1940 that 
there was no longer a distinctive role for the ILLA, and wound up the organisation (Morgan, 
1999, p.136) (Alexander, 1981, p.132). David Dubinsky had long argued that his 
Lovestoneite allies were held back by their association with communism. (Dubinsky and 
Raskin, 1977, p.241). With the ILLA consigned to history, the way was clear for Lovestone 
to acquire a higher profile role in the AFL’s international operations. 
Shortly before the United States entered the war in 1941, Lovestone was appointed Labour 
secretary of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), the main pro-
allied lobby group.  Dubinsky recalled: 
“He was supposed to be chairman, but I had a problem with that one. The 
Committee was made up of extremely distinguished people, and I wondered how 
the hell can Jay Lovestone, the man who used to run the American Communist 
Party, be in a committee with them. I suggested that he change his name, but he 
wouldn’t do that. So we made Sam Shore, one of our I.L.G. vice-presidents 
chairman of the Labor Division and Jay was Secretary, the guy who did all the work. 
We made him kosher, just as Matthew Woll had made me kosher in the A.F.L. 
leadership which had no great love for Jews” (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.243). 
The AFL was also involved in a number of other interventionist groups. AFL President 
William Green served as honorary president of the American Labor Committee to Aid 
British Labor (ALCABL), founded in March 1941, while third Vice-President Matthew Woll 
served as chairman.  Woll was also chairman during this period of a third group, the League 
for Human Rights (Mahl, 1998, p.32). 
Woll’s role underlined the continuity of the AFL’s stance with its support for intervention in 
World War One, two decades earlier. Less obviously, it may also have represented a 
deepening of the alliance between British intelligence and the non-communist left. 
By January 1941, all British intelligence agencies in the United States were brought 
together within British Security Co-ordination (BSC) based at the Rockefeller Center in New 
York under Sir William Stephenson (Mahl, 1998). In July 1941, agent Sydney Morrell wrote 
a report on the activities of Special Operations Executive SO.1 propaganda section within 
the BSC. He identified a number of AFL-linked organisations, including ALCABL and the 
League for Human Rights, as BSC fronts. Morrell noted that most of the BSC’s fronts were 
closely interlocked, but added; “none of the above organisations is aware of British 
influence, since this is maintained through a permanent official in each organisation, who 
in turn is in touch with a cut-out – and never with us directly” (Morrell, 1941). 
BSC historian Thomas Mahl suggests that Matthew Woll was the permanent official in 
contact with the British in ALCABL (Mahl, 1998, p.32). 
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One person who is likely to have been witting as to the British role was one of Lovestone’s 
former men in the United Auto Workers, Francis Henson. From 1940, Henson worked as an 
assistant to the BSC agent Sandy Griffith at Market Analysts Inc., a firm based in the same 
building as the New York chapter of the CDAAA. His job was to use the company's polls to 
encourage Congressional support for more aid to Britain (Mahl, 1998, pp.88-92). Griffith 
was himself a BSC agent, with the SOE codename G.112, who played a major role in co-
ordinating British propaganda broadcasts to Europe by the American radio station WRUL 
under the cover of CDAAA sponsorship (Mahl, 1998, pp.44-45). 
It seems unlikely that Lovestone himself, as experienced as he already was in the ways of 
covert action, can have been entirely unwitting about the covert British role in organising 
the interventionist network. Whatever formally recruited agents may have underpinned 
that role, its true foundation lay in the community of interests between the British and 
their American supporters, a fact which would be demonstrated when those interests 
began to drift apart with the Soviet entry into the war. 
Anti-communism had proved a powerful bulwark for the AFL’s alliance with Britain during 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Following the Nazi invasion of Russia, the policy of the CDAAA was to 
support the Soviets but make no favourable mention of communism (Morgan, 1999, 
p.137). If the latter instruction was congenial to the AFL internationalists like Dubinsky and 
Lovestone, less welcome was a renewed wave of popular front sentiment, both 
domestically and internationally. This was reflected in Dubinsky’s claim that the AFL was 
engaged in a struggle with the British TUC throughout the war over policy towards the 
Soviets (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.245). 
Dubinsky’s involvement in the CDAAA has been interpreted by (van der Pijl, 1984, p.112)  
as reflecting ‘a larger process of gearing working class opinion to interventionism’ within 
the context of a ‘Roosevelt offensive’ aimed at achieving a new Atlanticist order based on 
the expansion of New Deal corporate liberalism. 
Dubinsky’s remark about the need to make Jay Lovestone ‘kosher’ to the WASP elites of 
the CDAAA underlines that AFL internationalists were distinctly subaltern players in this 
hegemonic bloc. Nevertheless, their roles were significant in a number of ways. 
Economically, Dubinsky and his post-Lovestoneite allies supported a corporatist brand of 
unionism that was more congenial to the New Deal expansionism of the Atlanticist bloc 
than either the conservatism of the old-line AFL leaders or the radicalism of some in the 
CIO. Politically, they were also staunch supporters of Roosevelt in domestic Democratic 
politics through vehicles such as the American Labor Party and the Union for Democratic 
Action.  
This domestic activism took on an international dimension through their involvement in 
the BSC’s political warfare campaign. A second international dimension was provided by 




Each of these dimensions is best understood as a partial perspective on the Lovestoneite 
role as a corporatist stratum within an essentially transnational hegemonic bloc, which 
would emerge more fully when the United States entered the war after Pearl Harbour. 
The passage of hegemonic leadership from Britain to the US was symbolised by the 
construction of a US intelligence apparatus modelled on, and strongly encouraged by the 
BSC. 
The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) had been established in 1941 on British 
prompting, and many of its personnel had been involved in BSC networks (Mahl, 1998, 
p.19).  In June 1942 it was split into the Office of War Information (OWI) covering open 
propaganda, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) responsible for secret intelligence 
and covert action. 
Like the BSC, the new American intelligence network quickly established links with the non-
communist left. In April 1942, the Neu Beginnen activist Karl Frank sent a memo to Allen 
Dulles, outlining a potential programme of political warfare with strong echoes of the 
activities of the pre-war Paris-based anti-Fascist left. 
He argued that the first step would be a careful study of the existing German underground 
networks. “That could be done through a special agency in cooperation with such people 
experienced in underground work, carefully selected as trustworthy to the cause of an 
allied victory and the defeat of Nazism. This agency would have to make out a plan how to 
make contacts; first in the few border places in Europe where inside contacts can still be 
reached; in consequence with the inside groups themselves.” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, 
p.18) For this purpose he suggested, “In Sweden as well as in Switzerland contacts may be 
reorganized from reliable elements of the labour organisations like the Swiss Social 
Democratic Party or the Swedish Social Democratic Party.” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, 
p.19) 
He suggested a number of other roles for the same agency. One section “could train 
trustworthy refugees for investigation, help in questioning war prisoners and similar 
people.” Another could include “a research office in America, to analyse and study carefully 
German newspapers, and above all, all of the available local newspapers, reviews, books, 
etc.” He added that this section could have “an official research institute affiliated with it, 
which would be able to co-ordinate knowledge and expert experience of many things; 
emigrations from Germany, Jewish refugee knowledge, technical and economic facts, etc. 
It might even be possible to get additional military information through such a careful 
digest of this material. It would certainly produce important political information.” 
(Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.18) 
Dulles recommended these proposals in a letter to William Donovan, the head of the COI, 
and subsequently passed on the memo to Arthur Goldberg, who founded the OSS Labor 
Section in June 1942. (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.17) 
The formation of this section reflected the high priority attached to labour by the OSS. In a 
July 1942 memo, OSS officer Heber Blankenhorn called labour “the most important factor 
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in the psychological warfare situation in Western Europe.” He argued that “In Occupied 
France, Czecchia [sic], the Lowlands [Low Countries], etc., it is the factory workers, 
railwaymen, miners, etc, whose activities against the enemy have been important. In many 
areas they keep their unions intact or maintain underground their union habits and 
connections. It is their principle form of cohesion. Their unions moreover had accustomed 
them to international labor relationships, to which they still look, especially to affiliated 
types such as the American and British union federations” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, 
p.25)  
The make-up of the OSS Labor Section reflected this imperative. Arthur Goldberg had been 
a labour lawyer with close connections with the CIO before the war.  He was recruited into 
the OSS by George Bowden, who had himself been an organiser for the Industrial Workers 
of the World before entering the legal profession (Smith, 2005, p.10). 
The OSS’s willingness to recruit socialists and even communists co-existed with a tendency 
to assign senior positions to scions of the moneyed WASP elite (Smith, 2005, p.13). A 
number of OSS veterans, Arthur Goldberg among them, would later suggest that this led to 
significant tensions between front-line officers and their more patrician superiors (Smith, 
2005, p.15). This class divide was perhaps an element of continuity with the BSC-allied 
pressure groups from which many OSS officers were drawn (Mahl, 1998, p.182). 
Jay Lovestone was in many ways a natural recruit for the OSS. Like Goldberg, he had close 
links with US labour leaders, and like Karl Frank, he had significant experience of the 
European anti-fascist underground. Like Dulles, he had been close to the interventionist 
groups around the BSC before US entry into the war. Yet the concerns which had given 
Dubinsky pause about Lovestone’s suitability for the CDAAA, were to resurface in relation 
to the OSS. 
Lovestone applied to the organisation on 24 August 1942, writing to Bowden, that ‘I have 
made a first-hand study of the Nazi movement and I have had practical experience in 
underground as well as open work in nearly fifteen countries’ (Morgan, 1999, P.137).  
In the event, however, Lovestone’s past caught up with him.  An OSS memo of 31 August 
1942, stated “Lovestone is engaged not only in a number of intrigues involving the 
Communist Party, from which he ostensibly broke in 1929 when he formed the Communist 
Party Opposition, but also in other activities which may render him useless as an impartial 
source of information” (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.138). This rejection was repeated when 
Lovestone applied for a Department of Labor job a month later, prompting a memo from 
FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, which pronounced: “It is positively shocking that this man is 
even being considered for a government job” (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.138). 
Lovestone’s position was a particularly delicate one during 1942. In February, his associates 
Nathan and Esther Mendelssohn were arrested during a customs check (Morgan, 1999, 
p.138). The subsequent investigation uncovered links to the forged passport activities 
which had been central to Lovestone’s activities over the years (Morgan, 1999, p.139).  
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The hostile attentions of Hoover’s FBI were to be a continuing feature of Lovestone’s 
career (Morgan, 1999, p.237). So too would ongoing class tensions between US intelligence 
chiefs and their labour operatives (Wilford, 2003, p.99). 
Dubinsky’s War within the War 
Lovestone’s rejection by the OSS did not prevent him playing a role in allied labour 
operations, in part because some of his AFL colleagues were to enjoy a closer relationship 
with the organisation. Irving Brown was hired as a consultant under cover of his formal job 
at the War Production Board, working closely with OSS London chief William Casey and 
Arthur Goldberg (Rathbun, 1996, p.92-93).  During late 1944, he visited Norway to meet 
German Social Democrat Willy Brandt, Copenhagen to meet officials of the International 
Transport Workers Federation, and Paris to meet anti-Communist trade unionists from 
Force Ouvriere (Rathbun, 1996, p.94-95).  
Serafino Romualdi, an Italian socialist exile and former staffer in Dubinsky’s ILGWU, also 
joined the OSS in 1944. In October that year, he was sent to the Franco-Swiss border, 
supposedly to deliver arms, but in reality on a mission, "planned outside normal channels" 
to smuggle the socialist writer Ignazio Silone into Italy to combat communist influence 
(Smith, 2005, pp.97-98). 
In his autobiography, Dubinsky emphasised the autonomous role of the CDAAA’s 
Lovestone-run Labor Division in these operations: 
“The Labor Division of the Committee to Defend America worked closely with the 
International Transport Workers Federation, particularly with J.H. Oldenbroek and 
Omer Bécu, who did exceptionally fine work against the Nazis. We gave them 
money for their underground operations. They also established contact with the 
European labor desk of the Office of Strategic Services, operating out of London 
with Arthur J. Goldberg as its chief. 
“Money raised by American workers provided a lot of help to Norwegian 
underground forces headed by Haakon Lie. We also helped Léon Jouhaux, the 
great French trade-unionist, and the French resistance movement. The Germans 
got only limited assistance, mostly in the form of aid to Social Democratic refugee 
leaders outside Germany” (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.245). 
The anti-communist focus of Brown and Romualdi’s activities reflected an AFL agenda that 
was distinctly out of sympathy with wartime popular front sentiment. Dubinsky bitterly 
denounced what he saw as British government pressure for closer relations with the 
Soviets: 
“A largely unseen war behind the war was being waged between us and the British 
trade unions over relations with the Soviet trade unions. We stood fast in the 
belief that it would be a betrayal of a war against totalitarianism to make 
partnership in that war an excuse for letting organizations that were an instrument 
of a dictatorial government take on the aspect of legitimate trade unions; we had 
no doubt that their only goal on the labor front would be to subvert the unions of 
51 
 
all other countries into instruments of Soviet dictatorship” (Dubinsky and Raskin, 
1977, p.245). 
That this suspicion was to some extent mutual is shown by a report by professor RH 
Tawney for the British Embassy in Washington following a visit to the United States by Sir 
Walter Citrine of the TUC, seeking Allied cooperation between British, American and Soviet 
trade unions. Tawney outlined three distinct reasons for the strength of anti-communism 
within the AFL. Firstly, it was an assertion of patriotism in a country which was still 
suspicious of trade unionism as an institution. ‘The pose – often half-hearted – of European 
Labour Movements is internationalism’ Tawney suggested, ‘The pose – normally a sincere 
one – of the American Labour Movement, and particularly of the A.F. of L., has hitherto 
been a fervent nationalism’ (Tawney, 1942, p.16). 
Secondly while American trade unionism was far more political than it sometimes claimed 
to be, that politics was, in Tawney’s view, strongly individualist: ‘The A.F. of L., in particular, 
is not only anti-Communist but anti-Socialist, believes in Capitalism more whole-heartedly 
than many European capitalists; and, while accepting such favours as governments may 
bestow, is antagonistic to all policies which, by magnifying the province of public 
authorities, might encroach on its own” (Tawney, 1942, p.16) 
Thirdly, Tawney pointed to the ‘peculiar composition’ of the AFL leadership which he 
likened to ‘that of the directors of a combine or the bosses of a political machine rather 
than the leaders of a Labour Movement’, and which represented ‘a type of “business trade 
unionism” which has its place in Labour Movements, but which is mischievous when 
exaggerated and which, in the case of the A.F. of L., reigns almost alone’ (Tawney, 1942, 
p.17) 
In Tawney’s view, the AFL retained the mentality ‘of a nation not wholly at war’ (Tawney, 
1942, p.14). He saw their reaction to Citrine’s mission as short term thinking which 
prioritised fear of press and public reaction over the Allied cause, and perhaps hinted at 
corruption in his description of the conservatism of AFL leaders who he saw as ‘suspicious 
of new policies, contemptuous of all ideas which look beyond the moment, preoccupied to 
excess with the defence of the vested interests of their own organisations, perpetually on 
the defensive, and apprehensive, sometimes with good reason, of the lightest breath of 
public criticism’ (Tawney, 1942, p.17).  
A similar view of the AFL was reflected in a report compiled for the British Political Warfare 
Executive in February 1943, on Citrine’s continuing attempts to persuade the AFL and the 
CIO to support fraternal links with the Soviet trade unions. 
The British official, codenamed G.400, reported of a meeting with the AFL: 
The negative attitude of the A. F. of L. towards Citrine’s proposal (see clipping 
attached) was to be expected. Nothing worries the leaders of the Federation more 
than the growth of left-wing tendencies in the rank and file. The fight in the 
American Federation of Labour is that of right-wing leaders against growing leftist 
minorities of the rank and file. The victory over the left-wing constitutes a 
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paramount interest of the leaders, which overrides any other considerations of a 
more general character. 
Sir Walter Citrine’s arguments which of course he did not express in public but 
which he stressed with great energy in the course of his conversations were that it 
was precisely in order to fight communism among the rank and file that it was 
necessary to come to terms with the Russian movement; he implied that the 
Russians carried out strictly the letter and spirit of their agreement not to give any 
encouragement to the British Communist Party, and that if the Trade Union 
Leaders have the Russians on their side the Communist danger in England becomes 
less. These arguments made no impression on the “diehards” of the A.F. of L. led 
by Mr Woll (G.400, Political Warfare Executive, 25 February 1943). 
The British view of short-termism on the part of the AFL can also be reversed. If the need 
for Allied solidarity in the struggle with Germany had greater immediacy for the British, the 
Americans were better placed to look towards the post-war order.  
As the prospect of German defeat grew closer, the anti-communist focus of the AFL’s 
foreign policy grew more intense. The campaign was formalised in the autumn of 1944, 
when the AFL voted to create the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), to aid free unions 
abroad. The resolution was drafted by Lovestone, who became the Committee’s Executive 
Secretary (Morgan, 1999, p.144). 
The AFL’s priorities were shared by many of their allies in the interventionist community 
which had emerged prior to Pearl Harbour. Writing to David Dubinsky on 6 April 1945, 
Varian Fry of the International Relief and Rescue Committee (IRRC) predicted that the 
European labour movement would split along ideological and geographic lines: “The 
Communists will be represented in the governments of the individual countries. With the 
help of the Russian state and a powerful propaganda machine they will strive for the 
domination of the labor movement in every country”(cited in Morgan, 1999, pp.152-153.).  
The IRRC had been formed in February 1942 with the merger of the Emergency Rescue 
Committee and the international Relief Association, with the Lovestoneite Sheba Strunsky 
as director of the united organisation. The IRRC was even more closely aligned with 
government than its predecessors. Between 1943 and 1946, it was primarily funded 
through the National War Fund (NWF), the only body allowed to raise funds for the relief 
of war victims abroad. It was represented at the NWF by David Seiferheld, a senior OSS 
officer (Chester, 1995, pp.18-19). 
Within the OSS itself, Labor Desk chief Arthur Goldberg was working with Irving Brown on 
post-war plans to help the underground in Eastern Europe, according to Brown’s 
biographer, Ben Rathbun (Rathbun, 1996, p.93).  
This did not however necessarily reflect a settled government policy of anticommunism. 
Roosevelt himself was the most personally committed of the allied leaders to a post-war 
continuation of the grand alliance, with the Soviet Union as one of the four guarantors of 
the United Nations (Aldrich, 2002, p.57).  Within the US, war-time allied co-operation 
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provided a backdrop that allowed Earl Browder’s Communist Party to achieve a new level 
of respectability and growing public tolerance (Levenstein, 1981, p.186). 
Domestic political rivalry was a crucial factor in the AFL’s hostility to communism 
internationally. Since the 1930s, the AFL and the Lovestoneites had worked through a 
variety of vehicles to support Roosevelt and his new deal electoral coalition. Charles 
Zimmerman and the Lovestoneites in the ILGWU had cemented their relationship with 
Dubinsky in part through common work in support of Roosevelt’s re-election in the 
American Labor Party (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.117). This party had been founded by 
Dubinsky and fellow garment union leader Sydney Hillman in 1936. According to Richard 
Schifter, the intention was to provide a way for New York voters to support Roosevelt 
without supporting the Tammany Hall-tainted Democratic Party in the state. (Schifter, New 
York Times, 3 June 1992) According to Paul Buhle, the key aim was to win left-wing voters 
away from Norman Thomas’s Socialist Party candidacy, which it was feared would hand the 
state to the republicans (Buhle, 1999, p.112). 
Hillman was much more open than Dubinsky to tactical alliances with the communists, a 
position which was to prove problematic in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 
when Dubinsky and Hillman fought off an attempt by the communist faction in the CIO to 
deny Roosevelt the American Labor Party’s nomination for the 1940 presidential election. 
The subsequent communist volte-face following Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union only 
confirmed Dubinsky in his conviction of their duplicity. For Hillman, who became head of 
the CIO Political Action Committee in 1943, the turnaround created a new opportunity for 
a united front (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.272). 
Dubinsky’s attempts to force a showdown came to nothing when he failed to win the 
support of Roosevelt or of the republican New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, a prominent 
ALP supporter. Ultimately, Dubinsky formed a separate Liberal Party of New York, which 
delivered 305,000 votes for Roosevelt in 1944, while Hillman’s American Labor Party 
delivered 500,000 (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, pp.275-277).  
Hillman’s committee was credited with a key role in shoring up the New Deal coalition 
which secured Roosevelt’s re-election, a fact which contributed to the prestige of his 
communist allies. This emboldened Browder in his policy of strengthening links with what 
he viewed as the progressive bourgeoisie, a stance which had led the Communist Party to 
dissolve itself into the Communist Political Association in May 1944 (Levenstein, 1981, 
pp.184-187). 
In April 1945, the French Communist publication Cahiers du Communisme published an 
article by the former Comintern official Jacques Duclos attacking Browder’s uncritical 
stance towards the Roosevelt administration and American capitalism. The article was 
noted by Ben Mandel, a consultant to Eur-X, a small anti-communist unit in the US State 
Department, who interpreted it as evidence that Soviet policy towards the west would 
harden after the war. He passed the article on to Eur-X head Ray Murphy, who sought 
outlets for the information.  One of the few interested parties was the Free Trade Union 
Committee under Jay Lovestone, who was familiar with Duclos from his time in the 
Communist Party (Godson, 2001, pp.204-205). 
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Such is the account of the Duclos episode from intelligence theorist Roy Godson. According 
to Lovestone’s biographer Ted Morgan, Murphy wrote an analysis of the Duclos article 
entitled “Possible Resurrection of the Communist International, Resumption of Extreme 
Leftist Activities, Possible Effect on United States”, which was largely ignored in the State 
Department.  Morgan makes no mention of Mandel’s role in relation to the Duclos article 
or Eur-X (Morgan, 1999, p.148). He does however note that Mandel was also known as 
Bert Miller, and that he was one of a circle of ex-communists including Ben Gitlow and 
Whittaker Chambers, in Lovestone’s ‘entourage’ at around this time (Morgan, 1999, 
p.139.). 
Mandel/Miller had in fact been head of the New York district of the Communist Party when 
he was purged along with Lovestone in 1929 (Alexander, 1981, p.28). He had subsequently 
broken with the Lovestoneite organisation in the early 1930s over his support for an 
alliance with non-communist socialists (Alexander, 1981, pp.63-64). 
In the light of Mandel’s connections, the Duclos episode takes on a slightly different 
significance, as an example of the anti-communist circles around Lovestone lobbying the 
State Department rather than doing its bidding. 
In forecasting the downfall of Browder and its policy, the Lovestoneites were proved 
correct, yet some have questioned the broader conclusions they drew about Soviet foreign 
policy.  In his history of communism and anti-communism in the CIO, Harvey Levenstein 
challenged the picture of the article as a “kind of opening shot in the cold war” 
... Duclos did not object to the CPUSA’s alliance with bourgeois progressive forces. 
Indeed, he applauded the party’s fervent support for Roosevelt. He called for a 
policy of preserving the unity forged with progressive bourgeois forces into the 
post-war era. But Browder had gone too far. In effect, Duclos said, for Communists 
alliances with the bourgeoisie were short-run or medium-run ones. French and 
other Communists throughout the world had been busily constructing fruitful 
alliances of that sort (Levenstein, 1981, p.187). 
It was precisely these alliances, in France and elsewhere in Europe that were the targets of 
the Free Trade Union Committee. The emerging Lovestoneite strategy in Europe was 
intimately bound up with the AFL’s struggle with American Communists and their tactical 
allies in the CIO for political and industrial influence in the United States. 
The Lovestoneite afterlife: Transnational labour politics in World War Two 
The dissolution of the Independent Labor League of America in 1940 marked the end of the 
Lovestoneites as a political organisation. However, as Robert Alexander noted, Lovestone 
continued to work with former Lovestoneites such as Irving Brown and Harry Greenberg in 
the AFL’s Free Trade Union Committee (Alexander, 1981, p.133). Charles Zimmerman and 
Israel Breslow would remain influential in the International Garment Workers Union into 
the 1970s. Although Alexander suggested that few former Lovestoneites remained active 
in radical politics, he noted that Breslow and Jack Cypin would become senior figures in the 
Socialist Party, and Ben Davidson would serve as head of the Liberal Party of New York.  
Other struck out in different directions,  Bertram Wolfe became a scholar at the Hoover 
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Institution, while Will Herberg became a prominent Jewish theologian (Alexander, 1981, 
p.134). 
If anything, Alexander understates the degree of continuing cohesion among many of the 
former Lovestoneites, and the organisations in which they were involved. David Dubinsky’s 
ILGWU was a key powerbase for the both the Free Trade Union Committee and the Liberal 
Party of New York. The same was true of the International Rescue Committee, with its 
Lovestoneite executive director Sheba Strunsky (Chester, 1995, p.246). Francis Henson, 
Lovestone’s former auto union operative, played a key role in the war-time British front 
network linked to the AFL (Mahl, 1998, 92). Former Lovestoneites Ben Gitlow and Ben 
Mandel played a key role in Lovestone’s dealings with the House Un-American Activities 
Committee (Morgan, 1999, p.139). Despite moving towards Conservatism, Bertram Wolfe 
could still unite with his former colleagues in the cause of anti-communism, as 
demonstrated by his post-war membership of the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
(Saunders, 1999, p.198).  European Members of the Congress would include old allies from 
the pre-war Communist Right Opposition such as Richard Lowenthal (Wilford, 2003, p.196). 
In a sense, David Dubinsky was the ultimate heir of Nikolai Bukharin. He found in the 
Lovestoneites a valuable instrument of the ILGWU’s foreign policy, a cadre of activists with 
transatlantic networks and long experience of covert action, assets that were at a premium 
in the late 1930s and 1940s. For their part, the Lovestoneites embrace of Dubinsky 
reflected the fact that they were no more inclined to Trotskyite isolation than to Stalinist 
obedience.  Over the course of little more than a decade they moved from the patronage 
of the Soviet Union and the Comintern to an alliance first with Britain’s BSC and then with 
the United States’ OSS. If they were frequently active in groups that would later be 
regarded as front organisations, they were never mere ciphers.  
Their fervent anti-communism often surpassed that of intelligence officials, and remained 
a consistent driving force, whether they were working with British intelligence in New York 
or American agents in London. That antipathy reflected bitter experience of Stalinism from 
third period sectarianism to the Moscow purges and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but it was also 
shaped by a rivalry that was at its sharpest in those popular front periods when popular 
front policies suggested that communists could earn a place in the New Deal hegemonic 
bloc, threatening the role that Dubinsky and his supporters had carved out for themselves.  
If the former Lovestoneites around Dubinsky were a channel for British influence in 
America, and later for American influence in Europe, their role was ultimately reducible to 
neither. They represented a distinct tradition of transnational covert action, which could 
trace its roots via the US Government sponsored International Rescue Committee to the 
International Relief Association of the Right Opposition, and ultimately to Comintern 





Chapter Four: The Early Cold War 
Chapter Four will examine the emergence of the state-private network of the early Cold 
War. This was a dynamic process with several phases. The immediate post-war period was 
a significant moment in the emergence of a political warfare coalition, in which non-state 
actors and former intelligence officers stepped into the gap left by official retrenchment 
and lobbied for a renewal of state-sponsorship. 
The emergence of the CIA would see a renewed expansion of state-support and ultimately 
a degree of institutionalisation that would cause tensions with private actors. For the AFL 
networks centred on Jay Lovestone, a new equilibrium would be found in an alliance with 
James Angleton's CIA Counterintelligence Staff, a relationship which would provide a 
model and a constituency for later neoconservative ideas about the relationship between 
covert action, counterintelligence, and other intelligence disciplines. 
Post-war Interlude 1945-47 
The Political Warfare Coalition after World War Two 
The tradition established in the 1930s and the 1940s would lay the groundwork for AFL 
labour diplomacy as a key feature of US covert action in the Cold War. In the years 
immediately after World War Two however, with wartime intelligence agencies 
retrenching, the AFL would come to the fore as an independent actor in a renewed 
interventionist coalition. 
With the return of peace there was initially a retrenchment from wartime exigencies. In 
Britain, MI6 took over what was left of the functions of the wartime Special Operations 
Executive, with Prime Minister Clement Attlee declaring in August 1945 that he saw no 
need for an organisation of the ‘Comintern’ kind (Aldrich, 2002, p.79). A month later, US 
President Harry Truman signed an executive order abolishing the Office of Strategic 
Services (Aldrich, 2002, p.81). 
As a result of this winding down of government capacity for transnational political warfare 
the immediate post-war years have been seen as something of a heroic period of 
independent labour diplomacy. 
Hugh Wilford has argued that “In 1945, with the disbanding of the wartime secret service, 
the U.S. government effectively abolished its political warfare capability in the labour field. 
The Lovestoneites filled this vacuum with a foreign policy of their own geared to exporting 
the principles of AFL-style “free trade unionism” – in particular, workers’ freedom from any 
form of political control – and thwarting communist attempts to win the allegiance of 
European labour” (Wilford, 2008, p.53). 
In his trenchant 1975 defence of the AFL’s foreign policy record, Roy Godson concluded 




There were no indications in the AFL's archives that the AFL was offered or 
accepted government money during the first few years after the war. In fact, Tom 
Braden—a former Central Intelligence Agency official—in a controversial and 
unsubstantiated Saturday Evening Post article which alleged that the CIA 
subsequently financed some AFL overseas activities, maintains that the Federation 
operated with its own funds until at least December, 1947 (Godson, 1975, p.332). 
Godson acknowledged that the AFL remained in contact with a number of government 
officials throughout the post-war period (Godson, 1975, 328). However, he argues that “in 
the very early post-war period when the dominant group in the U.S. government and the 
AFL leaders did not share similar perspectives about Russian objectives and the danger of 
communist control of organized labor in Western Europe and elsewhere, the AFL went its 
own way” (Godson, 1975, p.333). 
As Godson’s reference to a ‘dominant group’ implies, the continuation of war-time 
‘popular frontism’ was not uncontested within the US government itself. In many ways, the 
situation paralleled that of five years earlier. Public passivity masked the support of many 
state managers for a more interventionist policy, and private covert action abroad was 
intimately bound up with domestic lobbying in an essentially transnational struggle. 
Even in the immediate post-war period, the US Government never entirely withdrew from 
clandestine intelligence, despite President Truman’s order abolishing the Office of Strategic 
Services as of 1 October 1945 (Aldrich, 2002, p.81.)  Key OSS operations were preserved in 
the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), thanks to an order secured by William Donovan's Deputy, 
General John Magruder from Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy (Weiner, 2007, 
p.10.). There were still 73 people working at the SSU in London, successor to 
the OSS station which had run wartime labour operations, as late as December 1945 
(Aldrich, 2002, p.83).  
In January 1946, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was placed in charge of the SSU’s successor, 
the Central Intelligence Group, with responsibility for nearly two thousand intelligence 
officers. Although Souers had no written authority to run a clandestine intelligence service, 
General Magruder claimed that this was the President’s intention (Aldrich, 2002, pp. 14-
15). 
In July 1946, the Central Intelligence Group was authorised to create a new intelligence 
unit, the Office of Strategic Operations (OSO) (CIA, 2010). The OSO quickly established links 
with Jay Lovestone and the FTUC, in a relationship which Olmsted Hughes describes as 
‘clear-cut and cooperative: the CIA provided monetary support in exchange for 
information, the use of the labor organization's name and access to the FTUC's contact 
networks’ (Hughes, 2011, p.66).  
It would seem therefore that the threads of the AFL’s informal intelligence links, 
established first with BSC and later with the OSS, were picked up fairly quickly after the 
war. The post-war interlude, in which the reorganisation of intelligence left the initiative 
with the AFL, was a brief one. 
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The Two-Tier Dynamic - Eur-x and Ben Mandel 
 
In fact, one of the AFL’s most important roles during this period was as a domestic ally of 
those forces within the American state working for a post-war covert action capability. 
Roy Godson has identified the Eur-X unit, headed by Ray Murphy at the State Department, 
as “a promising nucleus for covert action” during this period: 
 It specialized in the international Communist movement and encouraged 
sophisticated Foreign Service officers to do all they could to help anti-Stalinist 
elements. But Eur-X had a limited budget and no influence outside the State 
Department. What little influence it had was overshadowed by Stalin’s wartime 
abolition of the Comintern (Godson, 2001, p.29). 
Within the State Department, Murphy’s closest allies were among diplomats who had 
reported on the Soviet Union from postings in Latvia before the war, such as George 
Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen. Another member of this group, Elbridge Durbrow was one 
of the ‘sophisticated’ diplomats who provided Murphy with a small foreign intelligence 
network after the war. Along with Durbrow in Rome, this group included Brewster Morris 
in Germany and Norris Chipman in France (Morgan, 1999, p.149). 
Lovestone received reports from these circles via Murphy, who in return received material 
from Lovestone’s Canadian connection with Nathan Mendelssohn, the very connection 
which had got Lovestone into trouble with the FBI during the war (Godson, 2001, p.139). 
Ray Murphy’s June 1945 analysis forecasting a resumption of communist political warfare, 
discussed in the last chapter, was effectively an opening shot in this struggle within the 
State Department itself.  Murphy’s cooperation with Ben Mandel and the AFL in 
interpreting and publicising the Duclos letter, underlines that the challenge to the 
dominant State Department view came from a network of anti-communists both inside 
and outside the Government. One way of conceptualising such state-private networks is 
through the concept of epistemic communities, which have been defined by Diane Stone 
as “networks of specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships 
which relate to their domain of expertise , and common political values about the type of 
values to which they should be applied” (quoted in Parmar, 2006, p.17). 
Within the wider American state-private network, there were a range of motives for 
witting and unwitting cooperation. The concept of a 'political warfare coalition' attempts to 
distinguish those political activists and intelligence professionals who saw themselves as 
experts in and lobbyists for covert action in their own right, as well as potential allies of the 
US Government in carrying it out. Such a designation would reflect the common view its 
members took of the threat from Soviet political warfare and the need to counter it in 
kind. It would also reflect the experience of political warfare which some had acquired in 
the pre-war Comintern, European anti-fascist networks, the British-supported 
interventionist organisations, or the Office of Strategic Services. 
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Inderjeet Parmar has argued that epistemic communities can be characterised by a ‘two-
tier’ dynamic: 
The first tier consists of government officials, international agencies and corporate 
executives; the second comprises academics, lawyers, and journalists. Both tiers 
share a common conceptual framework but operate within an agreed division of 
labour: government officials have access to policy-making and use the second tier 
to publicise/disseminate their ideas and to legitimate them as ‘objective and 
scientific’, as well as to elaborate on public officials’ ideas (Parmar, 2006, pp.17-
18). 
Parmar argues that war-time interventionist groups like the CDAAA and Fight for Freedom 
played such a second-tier role for the Roosevelt administration prior to American entry 
into World War Two (Parmar, 2006, p.22, n.27). They were also, as we have seen, playing a 
similar role for British intelligence. Indeed in calling for the creation of the Office of 
Strategic Services, they were at once demanding American political warfare and carrying 
out British political warfare. This suggests that the two-tier dynamic is potentially complex 
and transnational.  
The latter property is often typical of epistemic communities, as described by Peter M. 
Haas (Haas, 1992, p.4).  Perhaps the biggest obstacle to seeing the political warfare 
coalition as an epistemic community at this period is the issue of the shared set of causal 
beliefs which Haas sees as one of the diagnostic features of the concept (Haas, 1992, p.18).  
A commitment to the importance of the ‘Non-communist Left’ as a counterweight to 
communism was one common element that would emerge among diplomats, intelligence 
officers and ex-communist intellectuals in the early post-war period (Wilford, 2003, p.88). 
However, the activist approach to intelligence that these groups sought to preserve from 
the wartime period rarely received full theoretical articulation. Roy Godson notes 
Wilmoore Kendall’s argument for opportunity-oriented activist intelligence analysis in the 
July 1949 edition of World Politics precisely because it was exceptional in providing a clear 
theoretical statement of views that ‘have held a certain currency in the intelligence 
community’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2). In terms of Haas’s typology, groups bound by shared 
principled beliefs but not shared causal beliefs are interpreted as interest groups or social 
movements. From this point of view, the political warfare coalition can be seen as an 
interest group on the threshold of becoming an epistemic community but for the largely 
tacit nature of the theoretical assumptions underpinning its world view (Haas, 1992, p.18). 
Parmar’s survey of state-private networks in American foreign policy concludes that the 
concepts such as that of the epistemic community should be subsumed within a wider neo-
Gramscian analysis (Parmar, 2006, p.14). Indeed, Gramsci’s dichotomy of dictatorship and 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1971, p.239) provides a broader framework for analysing the two-tier 
dynamic in broader contexts than the concept of epistemic communities allows. 
 In these terms, it can be argued that the political warfare coalition played a key role in 
reshaping the New Deal hegemonic bloc after the war, contributing to the end of the 
wartime grand alliance and the onset of the Cold War. The proactive role of the political 
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warfare coalition in this period can be traced across a number of dimensions, public and 
private, American and European. 
 
The Two-Tier Dynamic – Whittaker Chambers and HUAC 
 
 The role of Ben Mandel in passing on the Duclos Letter to Raymond Murphy was a clear 
example of the two-tier dynamic at work. At the same time, however, another member of 
the ex-Communist circle around Lovestone was playing the second-tier role in a way which 
was to have much more dramatic consequences for the first tier in the State Department. 
In March 1945, Murphy interviewed Whittaker Chambers for two hours at his home in 
Maryland.  Chambers’ testimony at this meeting and a second interview in August 1946 
encouraged Murphy to pursue his suspicion that State Department official Alger Hiss was a 
covert Communist (Morgan, 1999, p.148). Hiss resigned from the Department in the wake 
of a November 1946 security investigation partly initiated by a report from Murphy.  In 
February 1947, Murphy passed Chambers’ material to Richard Nixon, then a Congressman 
on the House un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). He would later help prepare 
Chambers for his sensational testimony before the committee in August 1948 (Morgan, 
1999, pp.149). 
Under the chairmanship of Martin Dies, HUAC had been targeting communist subversion 
since the late 1930s, when testimony from John Frey, a senior AFL figure, about infiltration 
of the CIO, had caused a sensation (Levenstein, 1981, p.133). Nevertheless, CIO historian 
Harvey Levenstein concludes that HUAC was ahead of its time in this period:  
It was too obviously a part of the conservative Democratic revolt in Congress 
against the liberal New Dealers, and thus aroused suspicion, rather than co-
operation, from the administration and liberal Democrats, who had no 
compunctions about cavorting with those the committee was denouncing 
(Levenstein, 1981, p.134). 
By the late 1940s, HUAC’s time had come.  Sidney Blumenthal cites the Hiss case as one of 
a number of key events of the time favouring the Conservative cause, writing of Chambers 
“by casting clouds of doubt over the patriotism and integrity of the New Deal, he had 
created an opening for the right” (Blumenthal, 2008, p.15). 
The Hiss case arguably provides support for Parmar’s view that the concept of epistemic 
communities can be integrated into a wider Gramscian analysis. Through the second-tier 
expert Whittaker Chambers, first-tier officials like Raymond Murphy were able to reshape 
the hegemonic bloc that had emerged from the New Deal to the exclusion of communists 
and those that were open to working with them. 
Yet within the constituencies that made up the political warfare coalition as it emerged 
from World War Two, the Hiss case was a double-edged sword. In this instance, the two-
tier structure partially overlapped with a social distinction between what might be called 
the patrician and plebeian wings. 
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This distinction had been visible in the wartime interventionist organisations where ILGWU 
leader David Dubinsky marvelled at finding himself in the exalted company of Winthrop 
Aldrich and John D. Rockefeller (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.244).  It had caused tensions 
within the Office of Strategic Services, according to Labor Branch officer Arthur Goldberg, 
who lamented the unsuitable background of the wealthy young men who were appointed 
to senior positions in the organisation (Smith, 2005, p.17).  
The challenge which the Hiss case presented to the liberal establishment wing of the 
political warfare lobby is well summed up in a comment by the biographer of Willi 
Münzenberg, Stephen Koch, on the ‘Wise Men’, a group of Democrat foreign policy 
luminaries who overlapped with Raymond Murphy’s Riga Group allies through the 
inclusion of Charles Bohlen and George Kennan: 
...the Wise Men owed their political position to Roosevelt’s coalition and to the 
ascendancy it gave the Democratic party, even though to a man they regarded the 
Soviet policy of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins as the work of dangerously 
incompetent dilettantes. Like their chief, President Truman himself, they could 
neither endorse not repudiate Roosevelt’s approach. Meanwhile, any very public 
housecleaning of the Washington penetrations would have handed the populist 
right an all-too-useful blunt instrument for attacking Yalta, containment , and their 
own position in power (Koch, 1996, p.368). 
 For the members of the plebeian wing of the political warfare coalition the threat was 
even more acute.  For the non-communist left, made up of socialists or ex-communists, 
many of them European immigrants, the very background that underpinned their expertise 
exposed them to suspicion, as Lovestone’s wartime brush with the FBI indicated. 
Conservative opponents of the New Deal were not necessarily anxious to make fine 
distinctions on the left between communists and pro-British interventionists. Indeed, 
during the war, HUAC had sought to investigate British covert operations in the United 
States directly but found the political climate unpropitious. Some of those involved with 
the BSC believed they had been smeared as communists because of their role in 
campaigning against US companies involved in trading with the Axis. The British were 
ultimately persuaded to drop the campaign by Allen Dulles, a former Standard Oil attorney 
and one of the centrist republicans brought into Roosevelt’s wartime intelligence 
apparatus by William Donovan (Mahl, 1998, p.100-101). The recruitment of such figures 
may have been partly intended to protect the right flank of the New Deal hegemonic bloc. 
They would come to play a crucial role when McCarthyism turned the anti-communist 
spotlight on the political warfare coalition itself.  
The Non-Communist Left at home 
In the immediate post-war period, however, the advance of the State Department anti-
communists presented new opportunities for their counterparts in groups such as the AFL. 
Indeed, it was at this period that the concept of the Non-Communist Left (NCL) as a natural 
ally of US foreign policy emerged in the circles around diplomats George Kennan and 
Charles Bohlen (Wilford, 2003, p.88). Although initially driven by the need to find allies in 
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Europe not discredited by fascism, the idea soon found a domestic application describing 
organisations like Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which stood in opposition to 
former vice-president Henry Wallace, who was then emerging as the standard-bearer of 
the spirit of the Popular Front (Wilford, 2003, p.88).  
Americans for Democratic Action was a reformation of the wartime Union for Democratic 
Action (UDA), in response to the emergence of Wallace’s Progressive Citizens of America in 
late 1946, backed by key leaders of the CIO (Hemingway, 2002, p.197). This was only one 
instance of a more general phenomenon, in which interventionist organisations formed 
during the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, many of them linked to the AFL, played a leading role 
in challenging attempts to accommodate Communists within the post-war order. 
The World Federation of Trade Unions 
The domestic struggle between the AFL and the CIO was linked to similar conflicts around 
the world in a transnational struggle over nature of post-war international labour 
organisation. 
The founding conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) took place in 
Paris in 1945. Louis Saillant of the French Communist CGT was elected as Secretary-General 
of the new organisation, which was to be based in Prague. Walter Citrine of the TUC was 
elected as President, while CIO delegate John Brophy defied CIO president Phil Murray by 
refusing to take a position as WFTU vice-president (Rathbun, 1996, pp.126-127.). 
The AFL stayed out of the WFTU and the Free Trade Union Committee firmly opposed it as 
a bastion of Soviet influence (Wilford, 2003, p.39) . In the first flush of post-war optimism, 
the American and British governments had an open mind about the new federation. 
However, it soon became a key concern for those officials who saw a new political struggle 
between east and west emerging. In February 1946, US diplomat George Kennan described 
the WFTU as an ‘instrument of Soviet foreign policy’ in a cable from Moscow (Morgan, 
1999, p.153). 
Both the AFL and the CIO sought official patronage in the struggle over international labour 
organisation, by seeking to have their members appointed as US labour attaches and in 
other positions abroad (Morgan 1999, 144-145). In effect, both federations were trying to 
shape an emerging transnational state-private network in the labour sphere; the CIO 
towards a continuation of wartime popular-frontism, the AFL towards what would soon 
become the Cold War. It was a struggle that would play out across the globe, and crucially 
in newly liberated Western Europe. 
Lovestoneite activities in Post-war France 
Irving Brown arrived in Paris shortly after his wartime ally Leon Jouhaux was ousted as 
President of the CGT by the Communists in September 1945 (Rathbun, 1996, p.177.). 
Brown supported Jouhaux and his erstwhile Secretary-General Robert Bothereau in their 
attempts to regain control of the confederation, but did not expect them to succeed. In a 
letter to Lovestone on 5 December, he predicted a split at the next convention, and 
requested $100,000 to help bolster Jouhaux’s Force Ouvriere faction. (Morgan, 1999, 
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p.179). According to Irwin M. Wall, little money was available until after the April 1946 
convention, which was dominated by the Communists (Wall, 1991, p.99). 
Brown was aided by the fact that, influenced by their strong position in the French 
Government, the Communists were advocating wage restraint, a position he mocked 
during a debate with Benoit Frachon, the key Communist figure in the CGT, at a congress in 
Lille in February 1946 (Rathbun, 1996, p.178). 
He was, however, hampered by Jouhaux’s unwillingness to split the CGT despite his 
differences with the Communists. The split Brown predicted did not ripen until 1947, when 
an acute crisis was sparked by the sacking of Communist Ministers from the Government in 
May, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June. The Communists now reversed 
their policy and launched a wave of strikes prompting an open break with the Force 
Ouvriére group, which emerged as a separate union in December (Morgan, 1999, pp.181-
182). 
This outcome clearly owes something to Irving Brown’s plans of two years previously, but 
there were also limits to the Free Trade Union Committee’s capabilities as an independent 
force. Morgan’s account suggests that Brown’s $100,000 request for support for Force 
Ouvriére had been approved by the Free Trade Union Committee in January 1946 (Morgan, 
1999, 179). However, Wall reports that this level of funding was not available in 1945-46 
and it was 1947 before sums of $20,000 each were made available from the AFL and the 
ILGWU (Wall, 1991, p.101). 
It is also notable that Force Ouvriére did not finally break with the CGT until six months 
after the inauguration of the Marshall Plan, which led to a stronger anti-Communist 
emphasis to US Government policy. In November 1947, acting Secretary of State Robert 
Lovett authorised Ambassador Caffery to help Brown and to extend secret funding to Force 
Ouvriére. After the CGT split Jouhaux called on Caffery, seeking to ensure that Brown’s role 
remained in the background (Morgan, 1999, pp.181-182). 
The FTUC’s ‘heroic period’ was perhaps more of an interlude. Lovestone and Brown 
brought to the French situation long experience of intra-union conflict, which in 
Lovestone’s case had ironically been honed in the union-splitting days of the third period 
Comintern. Nevertheless, their plan to split the CGT only came to fruition when the State 
Department had entered the lists. 
The covert alliance between the US Government, the Lovestoneites and Force Ouvriére 
was effectively a continuation of wartime resistance relationships with a new anti-
Communist focus. Dubinsky’s ‘war within the war’ had become the central front, and the 
FTUC’s French intervention provided a model of political warfare that would be applied in a 
number of other countries. 
Lovestoneite activities in Post-war Germany 
 
American trade unionists had a more direct influence over the post-war reconstruction of 
their German counterparts as a result of the allied military occupation. The Labour 
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Relations Branch of the Office of Military Government, US (OMGUS), was marked by the 
rivalry between the CIO and the AFL.  
The CIO members were initially more strategically placed, including Labour Relations head 
Mortimer Wolf, while the AFL were more numerous. Mortimer favoured a bottom-up 
process of reconstruction through the elections of shop stewards and works councils, a 
plan which chimed with emerging demands for economic democracy from German 
workers, many of whose employers had been discredited by support for the Nazi regime 
(Eisenberg, 1996, p.153). This process was welcomed by CIO chief Sidney Hillman, who 
believed a new generation was needed to replace discredited pre-war leaders (Eisenberg, 
1996, p. 156). 
Such aspirations were at odds with the more narrowly-focused ‘business unionism’ 
tradition of the AFL, whose supporters feared the Mortimer plan would create an opening 
for the German Communists, at the expense of the AFL’s allies amongst exiled pre-war 
socialist leaders. Their suspicions were shared by Louis Wiesner, the labour attaché under 
Robert Murphy, the political advisor to the Military Governor General Lucius Clay 
(Eisenberg, 1996, p.155). 
The AFL also had access to Clay through Joe Keenan, an AFL vice president and brigadier-
general on Clay’s staff. When Irving Brown visited Berlin in July 1945, Keenan introduced 
him to Clay (Rathbun, 1996, p.225). According to biographer Ben Rathbun, Brown quickly 
built up a rapport with Clay and was instrumental in persuading him against the 
dismantling of German industry envisaged in the wartime Morgenthau plan (Rathbun, 
1996, p.232). 
On this issue, the AFL’s position largely chimed with that of leading business figures such as 
the former OSS chief and corporate lawyer Allen Dulles, who recognised the value of 
labour support in making the case for reconstruction (Eisenberg, 1996, p.138). 
Nevertheless, on the trade union question, the AFL and CIO partisans were left to fight it at 
the lower levels of OMGUS for some time (Eisenberg, 1996, p.152). Wiesner and Keenan 
succeeded in having Wolf replaced with Newman Jeffrey, whose subordinates began 
recognising Social Democratic unions. By the autumn of 1945, however, Wolf had been 
reinstated by Manpower Division chief General Frank McSherry (Eisenberg, 1996 pp.159-
160) . 
Seeking to reverse the emergence of a top-down pattern of union organisation, Wolf 
appointed Captain Joseph Gould to investigate developments in the Baden-Wurttemberg 
area (Eisenberg, 1996 p.161.). Gould had previously been an operative in the OSS Labor 
Division, recruiting socialist exiles to be parachuted into Germany, in an operation that, 
apparently unbeknownst to him, was later judged to have been infiltrated by Soviet 
intelligence (Gould, 2002). Another of Wolfe’s subordinates, George Shaw Wheeler, had 
been accused of communism in an October 1945 Washington hearing, but retained his 
post thanks to the intervention of Hillman aide David Morse (Morgan, 1999, p.161) 
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Gould sent Wheeler to the Stuttgart office of labour field officer Major Alfred Bingham, in 
an action which Lovestone biographer Morgan described as a break-in. Wheeler uncovered 
evidence that Bingham had colluded with the Social Democrats to exclude Communists 
from the local labour league (Morgan, 1999, p.163). Wolf, however, found himself unable 
to discipline Bingham, and losing support from higher authority, in part because of 
lobbying in Washington by Newman Jeffrey (Eisenberg, 1996, p.161). He resigned in 
January 1946 (Morgan, 1999, p.163). 
In March, following lobbying from the AFL’s George Meany, the State Department 
announced that trade unions would be allowed to organise in the American zone.  A 
conference on 12 April in Frankfurt led to the formation of what would eventually become 
the Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund (DGB), a West German labour federation countering the 
Soviet-backed FDGB (Morgan, 1999, pp.165-166) 
On 13 April 1946, Brown attacked one of the last survivors of the CIO faction in the New 
York Herald Tribune, labelling Wheeler a communist who was working to the same line as 
World Federation of Trade Unions. According to Brown, this episode soured his relations 
with General Clay for some months, until Wheeler’s defection to Czechoslovakia some 
months later allowed him to claim vindication (Rathbun, 1996, pp.238-239). In October 
1946, Henry Rutz was demobilised but remained in Germany as an AFL representative 
funded by the FTUC (Morgan, 1999, p.166). 
In early 1947, the focus of the anti-communist struggle moved to Berlin, where Irving 
Brown was involved in the formation of the Unabhängige Gewerkschaftsopposition (UGO), 
a group of dissident trade unionists opposed to the communist-led union in the city. This 
strategy would pay off handsomely when the Communists attempted to launch a general 
strike in Berlin the following year (Rathbun, 1996, p.239).  
Lovestone was also working on establishing an underground labour network across East 
Germany with the help of transport officials (Morgan, 1999, p.169). This idea may have 
been inspired by the then-recent war-time resistance activities of the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation. 
Lovestone sought to use this project to gain the support of US Defense Secretary James 
Forrestal, during a visit to the United States by German Social Democrat leader Kurt 
Schumacher.  The AFL’s support for Schumacher was a source of tension with some of the 
more conservative US officials, such as Kennan, who favoured his Christian Democrat rival 
Conrad Adenauer (Morgan, 1999, p.168). Against that backdrop Forrestal’s support was a 
valuable asset to Lovestone as he sought to pressure General Clay’s military government 
into providing scarce post-war resources to the German trade unions (Morgan, 1999, 
p.169). In occupied Germany, wartime patterns of official patronage prevailed more than 
in liberated France. 
The immediate post-war activities of the Free Trade Union Committee, can be seen as a 
return to the pattern established prior to US entry into World War Two, in which AFL 
interventionists cooperated closely but informally with sympathetic officials. Much the 
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same can be said of the post-war development of a number of other wartime 
interventionist organisations. 
The International Rescue Committee 
The post-war environment presented significant challenges for the International Rescue 
Committee. It’s main funder, the National War Fund, was dissolved in December 1946 
(Chester, 1995, p.20). The Committee sought to secure its future by building on its wartime 
relationships with US labor leaders and the intelligence community. In 1945, the IRC 
appointed to its board Victor Reuther as a representative of the CIO and Matthew Woll, 
the Chairman of the Free Trade Union Committee, as a representative of the AFL (Chester, 
1995, p.60).  
Like the FTUC, the International Rescue Committee was closely involved in supporting 
European Social Democrats in the immediate post-war period, particularly in Germany, 
where it was one of eleven US relief agencies licensed to operate (Chester, 1995, p.58). 
The IRC’s European director, the Austrian Socialist Joseph Buttinger visited Germany from 
October 1945 to February 1946, and from October 1946 to March 1947 (Chester, 
1995,p.59). Buttinger worked closely with Irving Brown, both in Germany and in 
Washington, where he lobbied key decision-makers in an attempt to overcome General 
Clay’s indifference to the German trade unions (Chester, 1995, p.60).  
The IRC’s Executive Director, the former Lovestoneite Sheba Strunsky, cultivated links with 
the intelligence community in this period by recruiting former OSS officer Albert Jolis to 
the board. He in turn recruited fellow OSS veteran Arthur Schlesinger to the board in 1947. 
Schlesinger then recruited former Treasury Secretary Sumner Welles, a signal that the IRC 
was increasingly well-placed as the Truman Administration renewed its interest in political 
warfare abroad. (Chester, 1995, p.61).  
Verdict on the Post-War interlude 
In November 1947, Jay Lovestone reported to George Meany and Matthew Woll on the 
Free Trade Union Committee, stating that "our trade union programs have penetrated 
every country of Europe" (Morgan, 1999, p.169). 
The complex of organisations centred on the AFL pursued a vigorously anti-communist 
policy that was largely an extension of its ‘war within the war’ going back to the period of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Although often at odds with official policy in the immediate 
post-war period organisations such as the FTUC and the IRC continued to enjoy significant 
official patronage.  If the AFL took the initiative in attempting to influence the European 
labour scene during this period, it was significant less for its direct impact than in 
pioneering and lobbying for approaches that would become official US policy. 
Containment 1947-1950 
The period 1947-1950 saw the institutionalisation of a new apparatus for the prosecution 
of cold war political warfare. This created new opportunities for the AFL anti-communists, 
but ultimately created new tensions in their relationship with the American Government. 
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The Central Intelligence Agency 
Key building blocks of the official Cold War were put in place in the course of 1947. In 
response to the crisis in Greece, the US President set out what would become known as 
the Truman Doctrine in March, when he told Congress: ‘I believe that it must be the policy 
of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures” (quoted in Gaddis, 2005, p.31).  
In June, Secretary of State George Marshall announced a major programme of aid for 
Europe. Although the Soviets initially entertained the possibility of participating, they soon 
withdrew from negotiations (Gaddis, 2005, p.32). In May 1947, George Marshall appointed 
George Kennan head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Two months later 
Foreign Affairs published Kennan’s famous ‘long telegram’, calling for the United States to 
engage in the long-term containment of the Soviet Union, which was to be seen as a rival 
and not a partner (Chester, 1995, p. 24) . On the crucial issue that separated the CIO from 
the AFL, it was the latter’s viewpoint that was gaining ascendancy within the Truman 
administration. 
July 1947 also saw the passage of the National Security Act, which put in place much of the 
apparatus of the Cold War, including the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Despite its name, the CIA was initially bedevilled by 
departmental rivalries. Kennan at the State Department insisted on a key role in covert 
operations for his Policy Planning Staff. This was accommodated in December 1947 by the 
creation of a unit within the CIA, the Special Procedures Group (SPG). Its first task, at 
Kennan’s behest, was a covert anti-communist intervention in the Italian elections 
scheduled for April 1948 (Chester, 1995, p.27). Kennan’s enthusiasm for further 
intelligence operations, was however not shared by the CIA Director, Admiral Roscoe 
Hillenkoetter, who wished to concentrate on intelligence-gathering (Chester, 1995, p 28). 
The perennially difficult relationship between intelligence and covert action was examined 
during this period by a study group whose members included Allen Dulles. They argued 
that the two activities were interconnected and should be brought together, emulating 
Britain’s post-war merger of the Special Operations Executive into MI6 (Aldrich, 2002, 86). 
Although Kennan accepted the force of this argument, he nevertheless successfully 
resisted a merger of the CIA’s intelligence and covert operations (Aldrich, 2002, p.87). June 
1948 saw the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), nominally part of the CIA, 
but in practice under the control of Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff. The initial plan for a 
small central unit, was adapted on Dulles’ advice to allow for a larger field organisation 
(Chester, 1995, p.26). 
The AFL’s Irving Brown made the shortlist for the position of OPC Director, a fact which 
powerfully testified to the respect in which the AFL’s anti-communist efforts were held, 
even if Kennan acknowledged the problems of appointing an external candidate. His first 
choice, again following consultation with Dulles, went to former OSS officer Frank Wisner 
(Chester, 1995, p.25). 
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The OPC soon won control of CIA operations involving the FTUC from the OSO, establishing 
a relationship that was more formal, and therefore ultimately more fractious as a result 
(Hughes, 2011, p.66).  Lovestone was introduced to Wisner by Matthew Woll in December 
1948, and OPC cash began flowing to the FTUC with a $35,000 payment a few weeks later 
(Wilford, 2008, p.54). 
In the course of 1949, Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff developed extensive plans for political 
warfare. A high premium was placed on securing defectors, partly because of their 
propaganda and intelligence value, but also in order to maximise psychological pressure on 
Soviet elites (Chester, 1995, p.76). 
Despite its role in these plans, the AFL continued to maintain links with the other elements 
of the CIA. In 1949, Lovestone agreed to provide a cover position for Pagie Morris, an off-
the-books agent run by the head of foreign intelligence, James Angleton, who was 
suspicious of the OPC’s burgeoning plans (Morgan, 1999, p.266). 
The Information Research Department 
Britain was also active in institutionalising a political warfare apparatus to fight the Cold 
War in the late 1940s. 
In January 1948, the Cabinet secretly approved the formation of the Information Research 
Department (IRD) within the Foreign Office to conduct anti-communist propaganda. 
Although the IRD was in large part a reflection of Britain’s commitment to the American-
led Marshall Plan, the Foreign Office sought to win the support of left-wing ministers, by 
presenting it in terms of a ‘third force’ role for Britain as a social democratic force power 
independent of the United States and the Soviet Union (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, pp.27-
28). 
 Like the CIA, the IRD was very much a revival of wartime techniques and networks, 
particularly those of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its offshoot the Political 
Warfare Executive (PWE) (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.31).  Labour politicians with 
wartime experience of both organisations, notably Christopher Mayhew and Richard 
Crossman, were an important source of support for IRD (Wilford, 2003, p.55). These 
relationships facilitated the early establishment of links between the IRD and the Trade 
Union Congress, which was already working with the Foreign Office to combat communist 
domination of the World Federation of Trade Unions (Wilford, 2003, pp.64-65). 
 The IRD was more wary of working with literary intellectuals (Wilford, 2003, p. 64). There 
was, however, some unofficial Anglo-American co-operation in promoting the non-
communist left. A key figure in this was Richard Crossman, the wartime head of the 
German section of the PWE. In August 1948, Crossman approached the American C.D. 
Jackson for advice on behalf of his publisher Hamish Hamilton, which was planning a 
volume of essay by ex-communists, which eventually became the book The God That 
Failed. Like the early PWE, The God That Failed owed much to the pre-war anti-fascist 
networks run by Willi Münzenberg. Three of the contributors, Arthur Koestler, Louis 
Fischer and Ignazio Silone, had worked with Münzenberg (Saunders, 1999, pp. 64-65). 
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The Italian elections of 1948 
The CIA’s new covert action machinery saw its first major use in the campaign to prevent a 
communist victory in the April 1948 Italian elections. Tactics included the distribution of 
anti-communist literature, the provision of newsprint to friendly publications, and a black 
propaganda campaign run by former OSS officer James Angleton (Wilford, 2008, p.24) 
At the same time, the Free Trade Union Committee were running their own campaign to 
fight communist influence in the Italian trade unions. As in France, Lovestone and Brown 
sought to split the main the union confederation, the CGIL, in order to isolate the 
communists. In the Italian case, Lovestone’s and Brown’s low estimate of the Italian 
socialists led them to put their faith in Catholic trade union leader Guilio Pastore (Morgan, 
1999, p.190). 
Brown’s biographer Ben Rathbun emphasises that Brown ‘thought of himself as a Socialist 
and was quite at home in that stance’, but that ‘in this live-or-die climate, the most 
impressive and acceptable allies were De Gasperi, the Christian Democratic Prime Minister’ 
and his party’ (Rathbun, 1996, p.207). According to Rathbun, Lovestone and Brown worked 
closely with US ambassador to Italy, James Clement Dunn and with William Colby of the 
CIA (Rathbun, 1996, p.205). In the run-up to the elections, Dunn was active in soliciting 
funds from American corporations with interests in Italy, as well as from US labour 
(Rathbun, 1996, p.210). 
In the event, the elections proved to be a decisive victory for De Gasperi, one which 
Lovestone and Brown quickly moved to exploit. In June, Lovestone and Dubinsky visited 
Rome to support Pastore’s Catholic faction within CGIL. The following month, when the 
CGIL called a general strike, the Catholic workers’ refused to join them and were expelled. 
Pastore created a new federation, the LCGIL, in October (Morgan, 1999, p. 192). 
Lovestone and Brown hoped to quickly line-up other non-communist factions behind 
Pastore, in order to create an Italian federation that would play a part in their fight against 
the World Federation of Trade Unions. However, it was not until 1950 that these plans 
came to fruition with the creation of the Italian Federation of Trade Unions (Morgan, 1999, 
p.193). 
Germany 
Following their visit to Italy, Lovestone and Dubinsky visited Germany in August 1948, in 
the midst of the Berlin blockade (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.257). At a meeting 
with Lucius Clay in the American zone they pleaded for the restoration of trade union 
property. The AFL’s Henry Rutz and German labour leaders complained bitterly against 
what they saw as the anti-labour policies pursued by Clay, who was emboldened both by 
his success against the blockade, and by the expectation that the Republican Thomas 
Dewey would win the 1948 US presidential election (Morgan, 1999, p.170). 
Relations descended to mutual espionage, with Clay tapping the phones of German labour 
leaders like Willi Richter, and Lovestone spying on Clay through an employee in his office, 
John Meskimen. The conflict ultimately resolved itself when the re-elected President 
Truman appointed John J. McCloy as Clay’s successor in 1949 (Morgan, 1999, p.171). 
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Despite the stormy relationship between Clay and the AFL, the non-communist left began 
to play a role in American political warfare in Germany during his tenure. In October 1947, 
the Berlin correspondent of the New Leader and Partisan Review, Melvin Lasky disrupted 
the Communist-backed East Berlin Writers Congress, a move which initially disturbed the 
American authorities. (Saunders, 1999, p.27). 
However, Lasky lobbied determinedly for a campaign ‘to win the educated and cultured 
classes’ to support of the Marshall Plan, in a paper submitted to General Clay’s office in 
December 1947 (Saunders, 1999). He followed up with a proposal for a monthly magazine 
that would support US foreign-policy in Europe. This eventually came to fruition in October 
1948, when Lasky launched Der Monat with backing from the US military government 
(Saunders, 1999, p.30). Essays originally published in Der Monat would provide much of 
the material for The God that Failed, the anti-communist tract that was extensively 
distributed by the US Government and the British Information Research Department as the 
Cold War intensified (Saunders, 1999, p.65). 
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
 
Internal tensions within the WFTU increased in 1947, in the wake of the American 
announcement of the Marshall Plan, and of Soviet opposition to it. While both American 
labour federations backed the plan, they followed contrasting strategies in seeking 
international support for it. 
 
During a November 1947 trip to London, the AFL’s Irving Brown tried and failed to 
persuade the British TUC to leave the WFTU altogether (Wilford, 2003, p.39). The AFL’s 
James Carey, on the other hand, initially sought to achieve WFTU participation within the 
Marshall Plan, in the hopes of isolating the Soviets within the organisation (Buhle, 1999, 
p.141). 
Deepening Cold War tensions, however, meant that the British and American governments 
increasingly began to share the AFL’s longstanding opposition to the WFTU. This shift, 
described by Hugh Wilford as a ‘pivotal moment in the emerging public-private axis’ of 
western labour diplomacy, was a key motive for the flow of subsidies from the CIA to the 
FTUC from 1948 (Wilford, 2003, p.41).  
 
By the late 1940s, a number of other factors were beginning to work in favour of the AFL’s 
campaign. Communists were becoming increasingly isolated in the CIO, in an internal 
battle that mirrored the defeat of the progressive George Wallace by the Cold War liberal 
Truman in the 1948 US presidential election (Wilford, 2003, p.39). The TUC, like the CIO, 
was also becoming increasingly disillusioned with communist conduct in the WFTU 
(Wilford, 2003, p.40). 
The divisions came to a head in 1949, when the CIO and the TUC left the WFTU to join the 
AFL in a new organisation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
(Wilford, 2003, p.38). This was the logical culmination of the Free Trade Union Committee’s 
transnational campaign of union-splitting, but the victory was a bittersweet one. Some AFL 
leaders, notably William Green, baulked at a development which meant giving 
unprecedented international recognition to their domestic rival, the CIO, whose 
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involvement the TUC insisted on (Rathbun, 1996, p.129). The FTUC itself would soon face 
the re-emergence of the CIO as a competitor for official patronage in the sphere of labour 
diplomacy.  
The Cultural Cold War 
As well as supporting the FTUC’s labour operations, the CIA also involved key players such 
as Irving Brown in its cultural operations. These activities in any case were often based on 
existing initiatives of the non-communist left, of which the Lovestoneites had been a part 
since their alliance in the 1930s with the social democratic circles around ILGWU leader 
David Dubinsky.  
The New Leader was an important institution of the latter group, and the initiatives of its 
German correspondent Melvin Lasky, were an early post-war example of official American 
support for the Non-Communist Left abroad. This relationship was attacked early on in 
Soviet-backed publications in Germany. In May 1948, the Tagliche Rundschau attacked the 
New Leader and the Partisan Review as organs of the ‘American secret police’, and 
attacked Lasky and an American cultural official, Michael Josselson, who it described as a 
‘secret service officer’ (Caute, 2003, pp.254-255) . 
Josselson had worked in psychological warfare in the US army during the war before 
joining OMGUS and later the US High Commission (Saunders, 1999, p.12). Some months 
after the Tagliche Rundschau’s attack, in the autumn of 1948, he joined the CIA’s new 
covert action arm, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) (Saunders, 1999, p.42). 
Josselson’s work would soon involve him in countering communist propaganda in the 
United States itself. On 25 March 1949, he was in New York for the Cominform’s Cultural 
and Scientific Conference for World Peace, where with the help of David Dubinsky, he 
funded a group of intellectuals who sought to subvert the conference at the Waldorf 
Astoria, and who subsequently held a rally at Freedom House (Saunders, 1999, pp.54-55). 
Calling itself Americans for Intellectual Freedom, this group was led by the philosopher 
Sydney Hook, who had founded the Committee for Cultural Freedom in the late 1930s. It 
also included the writers Dwight MacDonald, Mary McCarthy, and Max Eastman, the 
composer Nicolas Nabokov and the labour reporter Arnold Beichman (Warner, 1995) 
In the month following the Waldorf-Astoria event, the OPC funded a similar effort to 
counter the World Peace Conference in Paris. This time Irving Brown was the conduit 
through which the French socialist newspaper Franc-Tireur was financed to hold an 
alternative International Day of Resistance to Dictatorship and War, with delegates 
including Ignazio Silone, Franz Borkenau, Fenner Brockway, the writer James T. Farrell, and 
Sidney Hook (Saunders, 1999, pp. 68-69). Brockway, it will be recalled, had been a key 
figure in the Independent Labour Party, during its involvement in the pre-war Paris Bureau 
alongside the Lovestoneites. The event as a whole had too much of a radical tone for Frank 




Wisner was nevertheless interested in a continuing organisation, which he called ‘a little 
DEMINFORM’. Similar ideas has been discussed by Hook and Lasky in Paris. In August 1949, 
Lasky met with two prominent former communists, Ruth Fischer and Franz Borkenau, and 
discussed the possibility of an anti-Stalinist conference in Berlin. Although the proposal 
soon reached the OPC in Washington, it languished for several months despite the support 
of Wisner’s assistant Carmel Offie (Warner, 1995). 
Renewed momentum came in the early months of 1950, when it was taken up by Michael 
Josselson, who recast Fischer’s proposal for a political conference into a ‘congress for 
cultural freedom’. In April Wisner agreed to covertly fund the project on condition that 
Lasky kept a low profile to avoid becoming a target of Communist propaganda.  However, 
this proviso largely went by the board as Lasky had already assumed a prominent role in 
organising the conference (Warner, 1995). 
 The Congress opened in Berlin on 26 June 1950, in the opening days of the Korean War 
(Warner, 1995) In its wake, the OPC agreed to the establishment of a permanent 
organisation in November 1950 (Warner, 1995). Josselson was placed in charge and Irving 
Brown was made a member of the steering committee (Saunders, 1999, p.87). As Giles 
Scott-Smith notes, Brown’s role in the CCF made him a ‘key link man’ between the 
economic/political and cultural sides of the CIA-sponsored anti-communist offensive 
(Scott-Smith, 2002, p.76). 
The Congress was the most important example of a Cold War operation aimed at 
intellectuals by intellectuals. In this it was true to the Comintern heritage of many of its 
principals, employing the Willi Münzenberg strategy of seeking to shape public opinion by 
cultivating the opinion-formers. Its focus on cultural freedom appealed to the specific 
interests of intellectuals in professional autonomy.  
Frances Stonor Saunders has drawn attention to the pre-occupation of James Burnham, a 
key player in the formation of the Congress, with elitist political theories from Machiavelli 
onwards (Saunders, 1999, p.88). Burnham was also a key theorist of the idea of the ‘new 
class’, a stratum of experts, emerging to challenge previous elites such as the nineteenth 
century bourgeoisie (Hacker, 1979, p.156). The CCF can perhaps be understood by seeing 
the function of this new class as analogous to that of the second tier within an epistemic 
community. In this way, the Congress can be understood as the product of a stratum of 
intellectuals playing a second-tier role in transnational politics, sponsored by a first tier of 
Cold War policymakers.  
Stonor Saunders has observed that the Congress’s proclaimed commitment to intellectual 
freedom was in stark contrast to the CIA’s high-handed treatment of its principals, 
exemplified by the removal of Arthur Koestler, one of the most high profile speakers at the 
Berlin conference from any further involvement (Saunders, 1999, p.90). Such conflicts 
arguably reflects a tension that is identified in Van der Pijl’s conception of the new class as 
a ‘cadre stratum’ whose role implies a ‘necessary functional autonomy’ (van der Pijl, 1998, 
p.155). The advisory role of the second tier requires an intellectual credibility that depends 
on a degree of operational independence. Yet too much autonomy threatens the second 
tier’s utility for first-tier policymakers.  
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In the 1950s, this tension between the CIA and its allies in the Non-Communist Left would 
become more marked, as the agency sought more control over relationships established in 
the more freewheeling days of World War Two and its immediate aftermath. Lasky, 
Burnham, Koestler, and to a lesser extent Brown, were among a number of figures 
associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom who steadily lost influence as the 
organisation’s overt concerns took a more narrowly cultural turn (Scott-Smith, 2002). The 
defeat of Brown’s candidate for General Secretary, Louis Fischer, was another sign of a 
shift away from ex-communist side of the organisation’s heritage, a trend that probably 
owed something to the CCF’s covert sponsor (Scott-Smith, 2002, p.121).  
From containment to roll- back 1950-56 
Despite these tensions, the two-tier relationship between the AFL anti-communists and US 
policy-makers continued to be a reflexive one, shaping US policies at home, as well 
implementing them abroad. They were amongst the foremost advocates of military 
expansion following the outbreak of the Korean War, as they had been in the face of the 
Nazi threat ten years earlier. 
NSC-68 and the Committee on the Present Danger 
As in the early 1940s, private groups were the vehicle for advocacy of a policy which the US 
government was not yet ready to advocate publicly, in a process which consciously 
emulated the World War Two precedent 
In this case the relevant policy was the one set out in NSC-68, a report to the US 
Secretaries of State and Defense in April 1970. NSC-68 reoriented the containment policy 
established by George Kennan, originally focused on the Soviet political threat to Western 
Europe, into a programme for a global struggle to roll back a Soviet challenge which was 
seen in increasingly military terms (Sanders, 1983, p.29). This Manichean view went hand 
in hand with a subtler appreciation of the threat that failure to sustain American economic 
support to Western Europe might lead its nations to seek an independent ‘neutralist’ 
solution (Sanders, 1983, p.37). NSC-68 therefore recommended closer co-ordination of 
economic and military aid to Western Europe (Sanders, 1983, p.41). Sanders account of the 
development of this new doctrine of ‘containment militarism’ suggests that it was actually 
this perceived need to bolster American economic leadership in Europe that drove NSC-
68’s focus on the Soviet military threat rather than the reverse (Sanders, 1983, p.44) 
The members of the State-Defense Policy Review Committee which drew up the report 
were keenly aware of the limitations of the Truman Administration’s political capital, and 
felt the strategy need a the support of a group of ‘worthy citizens’ who were seen to be 
independent of the government, if it were to win public approval (Sanders, 1983, p.45). 
In September 1950, one of the consultants who had helped to draw up NSC-68, the 
Harvard President James Conant, suggested the creation of a body along the lines of the 
wartime Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. He was encouraged to take up 
the task himself by Tracy Voorhees, one of the National Security Council’s NSC-68 planners 
(Sanders, 1983, pp.61-62). 
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The resulting organisation, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), was launched on 
12 December 1950 (Sanders, 1983, p.54). Its membership was largely drawn from the same 
foreign policy establishment that had lobbied for American support for Britain in 1940-41. 
No less that twelve CPD members had also been members of the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies (Sanders, 1983, p.75). Among these were some, such as 
Roosevelt’s former speechwriter Robert Sherwood, who had worked closely with British 
intelligence in the campaign to win American support for the allied war effort (Mahl, 1998, 
p.58). This history was not lost on Congressional opponents of an increased commitment 
to Europe, themselves largely conservative Republicans, in a debate that broke along 
isolationist/internationalist lines familiar from a decade earlier. The continuity with the 
CDAAA was highlighted on the floor of the Senate by Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who 
denounced the CPD as “the same old business, the same old salesmanship” (Sanders, 1983, 
p.60). 
David Dubinsky joined the CPD in the spring of 1951 (Sanders, 1983, p.77). The labour 
interest was otherwise not prominent in the CPD membership, with the exception of the 
OSS veteran and CIO legal counsel Arthur Goldberg (Sanders, 1983, p.87). Nevertheless, 
the presence of both men signalled the extent to which the leaderships of both major 
labour federations were now integrated into Atlanticist anticommunism.  
With the election of a sympathetic republican nominee to the presidency the following 
year the bipartisan dominance of containment militarism support was assured, and several 
key CPD members secured posts in the new Eisenhower administration (Sanders, 1983, 
p.15). Nevertheless, the advent of a Republican administration meant new constraints on 
liberal anti-communists from Republican officials, while attacks from Republicans in 
Congress only intensified. 
The CIA in the early 1950s 
Even before the election of Eisenhower, a significant shift in the relationship between the 
CIA and the non-communist left was under way. In October 1950, the new head of the CIA, 
General Walter Bedell Smith froze funding for Lovestone and Brown’s labour operations 
(Morgan, 1999, p.214). Smith agreed to release the funds at a meeting with Lovestone and 
AFL leaders on 24 November 1950, but he would continue to seek greater control of the 
operations that had mushroomed in Frank Wisner’s OPC (Morgan, 1999, p.216). In January 
1951, Smith appointed the Republican OSS veteran Allen Dulles as his Deputy Director for 
Plans, with overall responsibility for covert action (Wilford, 2003, p.98). The following 
March Lovestone approached Dulles in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of the Free 
Trade Union Committee’s relationship with the CIA but was rebuffed (Wilford, 2003, p.98). 
In April, Dulles brought in another OSS veteran, Thomas Braden, to handle labour 
operations (Morgan, 1999, p.220). After a tip-off that Braden was planning to circumvent 
Lovestone, the FTUC leaders sought another meeting with Bedell Smith on 9 April (Morgan, 
1999, p.220). The meeting degenerated into a row that marked the beginning of a steady 
decline of CIA support for the FTUC (Wilford, 2003, p.101). 
The effects of the changed relationship between the CIA and the FTUC would be apparent 
across a number of covert operations. By May 1952, new arrangements were in place to 
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fund the Congress for Cultural Freedom through dummy foundations, and Irving Brown’s 
role as a conduit for CIA funds started to diminish (Saunders, 1999, p.125). 
The vagaries of the relationship between the CIA and the FTUC also undermined the 
latter’s efforts to build links between the Paris-based Free Trade Union Center-in-Exile and 
the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), one of the CIA’s largest front operations 
(Hughes, 2011, p.135). In August 1950, an NCFE representative with links to the AFL, Henry 
Kirsch, had travelled to Europe to meet leaders of the Center-in-Exile (Hughes, 2011, 
p.135). Within a few months, however, the NCFE President Dewitt Poole, was seeking to 
cut Kirsch out, telling the Centre’s leadership to keep in touch with a Paris-based 
representative of the organisation instead (Hughes, 2011, p.136). Concerns about the NCFE 
were among the issues that contributed to the FTUC’s showdown meeting with Bedell 
Smith in April 1951 (Hughes, 2011, p.137). They were compounded by complaints from 
East European trade unionists that the exile national committees being set up by the NCFE 
were dominated by right-wingers and wartime collaborators (Hughes, 2011, p.137). The 
NFCE’s Radio Free Europe also became a source of tension in August 1951 when a contract 
with the ILGWU broadcasting station was cancelled (Hughes, 2011, p.139). By May 1952, 
the irreconcilable differences over control of the Center-in-Exile had led the FTUC’s 
Matthew Woll to resign from the NCFE (Hughes, 2011, p.152). 
McCarthyism and the non-communist left 
Diminishing patronage was not, however, the biggest problem that the CIA’s allies on the 
left would face in the early 1950s. By 1952, Senator Joe McCarthy was targeting the 
agency, which had become something of a haven for liberals in government (Smith, 2005, 
p.369). Bedell Smith’s successor as head of the CIA, Allen Dulles was able to avoid a public 
investigation only be agreeing to an internal purge (Smith, 2005, p.371). Tom Braden’s 
International Organizations Division, responsible for labour operations, was a particular 
target (Smith, 2005, p.371). 
Jay Lovestone’s past made him an obvious target for right-wing attacks in this political 
atmosphere, not least from old foes. In 1954, he came under investigation from J. Edgar 
Hoover’s FBI (Morgan, 1999, p.237). There were renewed attacks in the press from 
conservative journalist Westbrook Pegler, underlining the extent to which the McCarthyite 
era brought up old faultlines from the struggle between isolationists and interventionists in 
the early 1940s (Morgan, 1999, p.238). It is noteworthy in the light of his later relationship 
with Lovestone, that the man responsible for keeping an eye on the episode for the CIA 
was the agency’s liaison officer with the FBI, James Angleton (Morgan, 1999, p.239). 
Other Cold War liberal groups were facing similar challenges in the early 1950s. The 
International Rescue Committee’s support for left-wing European refugees exposed it to 
attacks from Vadim Makaroff, a white Russian exile with links to a rival conservative 
organisation, The Tolstoy Foundation (Chester, 1995, p.99). The pressure on the IRC 
became such that it was on the brink of collapse in 1952, when it was forced to remove its 
executive director, David Martin and moved vice-chairman Leo Cherne into the key 
leadership role (Chester, 1995, p.112).  
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Despite such episodes, some Cold War liberals were prepared to defend McCarthyism, 
notably Sidney Hook and Irving Kristol of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom 
(ACCF) (Saunders, 1999, p.207). This was something of an embarrassment for the wider 
Congress for Cultural Freedom, whose credibility as front operation depended on being 
seen to defend the very values which seemed to many observers to be under threat from 
McCarthy (Saunders, 1999, p.205).  
The Angleton Era 1955-1960 
 
The clashes between the CIA and the AFL in the early 1950s were ultimately less an 
ideological struggle between Republicans and Democrats, and more a struggle between 
government officials seeking increased control on the one hand and professionals 
defending their autonomy on the other. Perhaps the best evidence for this is the fact that 
Jay Lovestone subsequently settled into a close collaboration with one of the CIA’s arch-
conservatives.  
From 1955, Lovestone was run as an agent by CIA counterintelligence chief James 
Angleton, through an aide, Stephen Millett, who also headed the agency's Israeli desk. 
Payments to Lovestone were handled by New York lawyer Mario Brod (Mangold, 1991, 
p.291).  
Angleton had been appointed by Allen Dulles in December 1954 to head an enlarged 
counterintelligence staff focused on detecting penetrations of the CIA itself (Mangold, 
1991, p.29). As a veteran of X-2, the counterintelligence branch of the OSS, Angleton had 
enjoyed privileged access to Britain’s successful wartime operations to counter and deceive 
German espionage (Mangold, 1991, p.18-19). The necessarily compartmentalised nature of 
the counterintelligence role enabled Angleton to carve out a high degree of autonomy 
from the CIA’s bureaucracy, with an un-audited budget and direct access to CIA directors 
(Mangold, 1991, p.31) 
This modus operandi was to prove far more congenial to Jay Lovestone than the 
managerial approach of Wisner’s OPC and he developed a close friendship with Angleton 
(Morgan, 1999, p. 247). 
Angleton, Lovestone and Israel 
The two cover operations Angleton ran through Stephen Millet, the Lovestone agent 
network, and liaison with Israel seem to have been interconnected. 
Lovestone’s biographer Ted Morgan records that ‘Lovestone did not share Angleton’s 
fondness for the Israelis. He thought they were too friendly to the Soviet Union’ a view 
reflected in his correspondence with Pagie Morris in the early 1950s (Morgan, 1999, 
p.271). In fact, Angleton himself viewed Israel, to which many Eastern European Jews had 
emigrated, as a security risk, but also as a potentially valuable source of intelligence on the 
Soviets (Raviv and Melman, 1991, p.79). He was well-placed to exploit this opportunity 
having worked with key figures in the intelligence apparatus of the Jewish Agency that 
preceded the Israeli state during World War Two (Raviv and Melman, 1991, p.78) 
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Lovestone and his key AFL patron David Dubinsky had also had contacts with Zionist 
organisations in the European anti-fascist resistance in the same period. A number of 
Palestinian Zionist groups had been active in International Workers Front Against War 
formed immediately before the war, alongside the Lovestoneites and other groups such as 
Neue Weg and Die Funke which became central to the non-communist left of the wartime 
resistance (Alexander, 1981, pp.292-3) 
Dubinsky had worked with American Zionists as part of the coalition of forces that sought 
to combat the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe since the early 1930s. This collaboration was 
not always harmonious, however. At its foundation in 1934, the Jewish Labor Committee, 
of which Dubinsky was appointed treasurer stated that ‘the Jewish question must be 
solved in the countries in which the Jews live’, a position which met with objections from 
the labour Zionist Poale Zion group (Parmet, 2005, p.41) 
This episode would seem to be at odds with the claim of historian Harvey Levenstein that 
Dubinsky's anti-Communism was informed by Zionism (Levenstein, 1981, p.108). According 
to Dubinsky's biographer Robert Parmet, it was only after World War Two and the 
Holocaust's destruction of the European Jewish culture of his Bundist roots, that Dubinsky 
became more sympathetic to the idea of a state in Palestine (Parmet, 2005, p.236). 
Parmet's view is supported by Dubinsky's own account of his position at the time of his first 
meeting with Israeli David Ben Gurion in the late 1940s, around the time Israel achieved 
statehood: 
We first met at a meeting of the Jewish Labor Committee, and I told him that even 
though I was sympathetic to the creation of Israel, I was not a Zionist and I did not 
care much for the way some former Communists were now rallying to the Zionist 
cause because it was the fashionable thing for American Jews to do. "Now listen 
Dubinsky," he said to me. "Why should we fight? If I had come to the United States 
in 1911 when you did and you had come to Palestine when I did, you would be the 
Prime Minister and I would be the president of the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union" (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.331). 
Like Lovestone, Dubinsky appears to have maintained a critical distance from Zionism, 
rooted in his own political background, and reinforced by the ambiguous position of Israel 
in the early Cold War.  
Dubinsky's ILGWU was nevertheless a significant supporter of the emerging Israeli state. In 
the early post-war years the union lobbied Britain to allow greater Jewish migration to 
Palestine (Parmet, 2005, p.239). Shortly after the foundation of the State of Israel, Foreign 
Minister Golda Meir met Dubinsky in New York and requested a $1 million dollar loan, 
which was paid on 25 June 1948. The ILGWU also donated $220,000 to the Histadrut and 
$150,000 to the United Jewish Appeal (Parmet, 2005, p.241). 
Peter L. Hahn’s study of the relationship between Israel and US organised labour found 
that Dubinsky became a key supporter for Israeli bond drives in the US, routinely visited by 
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Israeli leaders, for whom he became “one of a select group of US Jewish leaders called 
upon to provide expert advice about Israel’s financial problems” (Hahn, 2001, p.158).  
After US diplomat James G. McDonald asked Dubinsky to investigate the status of 
communism in Israel, he sent the former Lovestoneite Charles Zimmerman on a visit to the 
new state. Zimmerman identified a communist problem but downplayed its seriousness 
(Parmet, 2005, p. 241). Lovestone’s own view during this period was that Israel was a 
diversion from the central issue of the fate of Western Europe, and although he was 
already providing some financial support to the Histadrut, he resisted the urgings of the 
OPC’s Frank Wisner, inspired by warnings from Israeli president Chaim Weizmann, to send 
an agent under AFL cover (Morgan, 1999, p.200) 
Lovestone’s judgement in this was arguably vindicated as the challenge to Ben Gurion’s 
Mapai Party from the left-wing Mapam faded in the early 1950s. The dominance of Mapai 
supporters in the Histadrut led to its withdrawal from the WFTU in 1950 (Jewish Telegrapic 
Agency, 1950). Mapam and the Communists were again outvoted when the Histadrut 
voted to join the ICFTU three years later, confirming the western orientation of Israeli 
organised labour (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1953). 
Lovestone was not an entirely passive observer, during this period. In 1953, he provided 
$15,000 to fund Beteram, a magazine run by Eliezer Livneh, a member of the Knesset he 
was running as a CIA agent (Morgan, 1999, p.332). Ultimately, however, the AFL’s part in 
bringing the cultural cold war to Israel may have been less significant than its role in the 
US-Israel intelligence relationship. Liaison assignments with Israeli intelligence were part of 
the work which Pagie Morris carried out for James Angleton while under FTUC cover 
(Morgan, 1999, p. 271). The most significant fruits of this relationship would emerge later 
in the 1950s, when the CIA and the AFL-CIO supported Israeli technical experts in Africa to 
prevent newly independent nations turning to the Eastern Bloc advisors (Melman and 
Raviv, 1994, p.90). 
Britain in the 1950s 
Increased American covert activity in the third world was in part a reflection of the 
uncertain position of the European colonial powers in the post-war order. In the case of 
Britain, conflicts over foreign policy came to a head in 1951 following the outbreak of the 
Korean War. In order to support British participation in the war, Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell, 
introduced an austerity budget which prompted a wave of ministerial resignations, led by 
Health Secretary Aneurin Bevan (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.10). 
Lovestone’s interest in Britain, of course, long predated this. One of his most long-standing 
correspondents on British conditions was the Irish socialist Jack Carney, whose reports in 
1940 had helped to persuade him to support the Allies in World War Two (Morgan, 1999, 
p.136) 
In the late 1940s, Lovestone’s and Irving Brown worked closely with the US labour attaché 
in Britain Samuel Berger. Berger nevertheless regarded Lovestone as ‘a man who could be 
utterly unscrupulous, so that one had to be cautious and guarded in working with him even 
when pursuing the same ends’ (Morgan, 1999, p.174). 
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Lovestone’s relationship with Joseph Godson, posted to London as Labour attaché from 
1953 to 1959, was less ambiguous. Godson was himself a pre-war Lovestoneite who joined 
the Jewish Labor Committee in 1943, a shift into labour diplomacy which paralleled 
Lovestone’s own trajectory (The Times, 1986). He had subsequently been among the 
beneficiaries of Lovestone’s influence at the State Department in the late 1940s, winning 
an appointment as labour attaché to Canada (Morgan, 1999, p.144). 
In London, Godson threw himself into the midst of the struggle within the Labour Party. In 
1955, he took part in a series of secret meetings held by Gaitskell to plan a campaign of 
expulsions against the Bevanites (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.14). This incident has been a 
source of enduring controversy. In their biography of Harold Wilson, Stephen Dorril and 
Robin Ramsay conclude that: ‘one of the most important post-war events in the Labour 
Party’s internal affairs was overseen by an American spook’ (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, 
p.14). Hugh Wilford’s examination of CIA influence on the British Left in this period finds no 
evidence that either Godson or his predecessor Samuel Berger were CIA agents, although 
both men had connections to the agency, and ‘the boundaries between the realms of overt 
labor diplomacy and private covert operations were frequently blurred’ (Wilford, 2003, 
p.182). 
In Godson’s case, this judgement reflects the fact that he was reporting to Lovestone as 
well as to the State Department (Wilford, 2003, p.182). Lovestone’s biographer reports at 
least one incident when his British correspondence made its way to the CIA during the mid-
1950s. A report from Jack Carney on a Trade Union Congress meeting was circulated in 
James Angleton’s JX reports, causing consternation when it reached MI6, who assumed 
that the CIA had an agent in the TUC (Morgan, 1999, p.247). 
If commentators such as Ramsay and Dorril are justified in seeing the activities of the 
Lovestone network as an example of covert American influence in Britain, it should be 
recalled that, as we saw in Chapter Three, the AFL played a significant role in British 
Security Co-ordination’s (BSC) campaign of covert action in America in the early years of 
World War Two. Ramsay and Dorril’s observation that Godson’s British ally, Hugh Gaitskell, 
worked for the Special Operations Executive during the war, is significant in this light 
(Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.14). SOE was one of a number of British intelligence 
organisations represented in the US by the BSC (Mahl, 1998, p.12). 
That the networks promoting American Atlanticism in Britain in the 1950s had evolved out 
of those promoting British Atlanticism in the United States should alert us to the possibility 
that we are dealing with an essentially transnational phenomenon, which is not reducible 
to British influence in America or vice-versa, but needs to be understood in terms of 
specific interest groups working across national boundaries. 
 Hugh Wilford provides significant evidence for this by showing that there were conflicting 
strands within Anglo-American labour diplomacy. During the same period that Godson was 
reporting to Lovestone, William Gaussman of the Marshall Plan’s European Cooperation 
Agency (ECA) was reporting back to Victor Reuther of the CIO. Together with another ECA 
officer, Maurice Goldblum, Gaussman drafted a report for Reuther which attacked the 
Lovestoneites’ conspiratorial tactics, and called for a more positive brand of anti-
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communism to counter the impression that American labour organisations were simply 
apologists for the US Government (Wilford, 2003, p.170). 
Conversely, Godson’s reporting to Lovestone kept a close eye on the British activities of the 
CIO, notably Walter Reuther’s triumphant visit to the TUC conference in 1957 (Wilford, 
2003, p.180). 
The AFL-CIO Merger 
This conflict between the two competing strands of American labour diplomacy was 
however attenuated by the merger between the AFL and CIO in 1955. As union 
membership began to decline in the 1950s, competition became a luxury that neither 
federation could afford (Buhle, 1999, p.131).  
The merger would eventually lead to the end the end of the Free Trade Union Committee 
in 1957 (Wilford, 2008). In the hierarchy of the new AFL-CIO’s International Department, 
Lovestone initially found himself behind AFL veteran George Brown and the CIO’s Mike 
Ross, although Lovestone remained the most dynamic figure in the department which he 
would eventually head in the 1960s (Morgan, 1999, p.286). 
The continuing links between American labour and the world of intelligence were 
symbolised by the prominent role in the merger of labour lawyer and OSS veteran Arthur 
Goldberg (Buhle, 1999, p.149). The focus of those links was however already shifting with 
the changing landscape of the Cold War itself. 
Hungary and the end of rollback 
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a watershed for the western aspiration to ‘rollback’ 
communism in Eastern Europe. During the crisis, the public-private networks of cold war 
liberalism were highly active. 
In later October, Leo Cherne and Angier Biddle Duke of the International Rescue 
Committee arrived in Budapest with Marcel Faust, An Austrian IRC staffer who had worked 
with the OSS during World War Two (Chester, 1995, p.130). They distributed large 
quantities of aid to the conservative opposition led by Cardinal Mindszenty, avoiding any 
contact with the Communist-led Government of Imre Nagy, by then a multi-party coalition 
(Chester, 1995, p.134). 
The ex-Communist Lovestone seems to have had fewer qualms about dealing with the 
circles around Nagy, at least after his government was overthrown by the Soviets. He 
brought one of the deposed ministers, Anna Kethly, to the United States (Morgan, 1999, 
p.283). In conversations tapped by the FBI, Lovestone and Pagie Morris criticised the CIA’s 
Frank Wisner and Radio Free Europe (RFE) for inciting the revolution and then failing to 
support it (Morgan, 1999, p.284). 
If this criticism reflected long-standing tensions between the Lovestoneite brand of anti-
communism and that of the Eisenhower administration, it was also in line with much of the 
soul-searching within the administration itself. CIA Director Allen Dulles told the President 
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that RFE had not incited the uprising or promised American support, but had attempted to 
provide tactical advice at times once the uprising was underway (Aldrich, 2002, p.339).  
The failure of the Hungarian Uprising helped to bring an end to attempts to rollback 
communism in Eastern Europe through the most aggressive forms of covert action (Aldrich, 
2002, p.337). C.D. Jackson, a key advisor to the Eisenhower administration on covert 
action, nevertheless advised Dulles to make the maximum propaganda advantage of Soviet 
repression. 
Lovestone’s highly public lobbying on behalf of Kethly might have been congenial to such 
an agenda, even as it was resisted by the State Department. If this was not necessarily a 
reflection of Lovestone’s status as a paid CIA agent, it suggests that status might have been 
underpinned by a community of interests even when Lovestone was publicly at odds with 
other arms of the government. Though this is speculative, Lovestone’s role in what 
amounted to a parallel CIA foreign policy emerges more clearly from an examination of the 
new battlefields of the Cold War, which came to the forefront as the focus of covert action 
moved away from an increasingly static Europe. 
The Battle for the Third World 
By the late 1950s, the attention of the superpowers was moving towards Africa and Asia, 
where the first waves of decolonisation were creating a newly fluid situation. This created 
particular problems for the United States, which the AFL’s labour diplomats were well-
placed to help solve. 
During this period, Lovestone’s intelligence network of overseas contacts was, according to 
Ted Morgan ‘financed by Angleton in part in order to enable the CIA to penetrate 
independence movements, overcoming the problems presented in these parts of the world 
by the State Department’s close relationship with the British and French colonial powers’ 
(Morgan, 1999). 
The FTUC’s focus on these areas represented a shift of emphasis rather than a 
development de novo. Lovestone’s anti-colonial credentials, like so much else about his 
transnational activities, had roots in the era of the Comintern and the Right Opposition, the 
latter of which had retained anti-imperialism as a key part of its platform in the late 1930s 
(Alexander, 1981, p.289).  
The FTUC had operated in Asia from its early years. Its Far East Office in Tokyo was manned 
from 1949 by Richard Deverall, who had previously worked in for the Supreme Command 
Allied Powers (SCAP), which he had left under a cloud after spying on his colleagues for 
Army Intelligence (Morgan, 1999). In 1953, US diplomats intimated to the British 
authorities that Deverall was considering moving the FTUC’s Asian headquarters to Hong 
Kong, a move which was met with consternation because of reports that Deverall was 
‘somewhat anti-British’ and had been in touch with ‘the right wing TUC in Hong Kong’ 
(Scott, 1953). At a meeting with Deverall, E.H. Scott of the Foreign Office emphasised ‘the 
harm it would do to independent trade unionism in the Colony if at the present early stage 
in its growth it could be attacked by its enemies as being openly supported for political 
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motives by outside organisations’ (Scott, 1953). Similar tensions between the FTUC and the 
British authorities would emerge in the records of other colonies later in the 1950s. 
A number of other FTUC officers were active in Asia in the early 1950s. Willard Etter was 
subsidised by the CIA to run paramilitary operations in China from Taiwan (Wilford, 2008, 
p.56). In the same period, the old Lovestoneite Harry Goldberg was posted to Indonesia 
(Morgan, 1999, p.218). Indian trade unionist Mohan Das represented the FTUC in Bombay 
(Morgan, 1999, p.302). 
Irving Brown and Pagie Morris played prominent roles in FTUC activities in the Africa and 
the Middle East. In the early 1950s, Brown sought to support trade unionists in French 
North Africa from his Paris base, prompting complaints to US Ambassador David Bruce 
from the French Foreign Office (Rathbun, 1996, p.33). Brown believed that French 
repression reinforced communist dominance over colonial labour movements, which he 
sought to weaken by supporting the 1952 split of the Algerian UGTA from the French 
Communist-led CGT (Rathbun, 1996, p.287). Four years later, Brown was barred from 
Algeria by the French authorities, along with Guy Gomis, a French businessman who was 
accused of collaborating with the ‘special services of a foreign power’ (Rathbun, 1996, 
289). 
In the mid-1950s, Pagie Morris was involved in attempts to mediate between Egypt and 
Israel by arranging a meeting of trade union leaders from the two countries in New York, 
an initiative which broke down with the outbreak of the 1956 Suez crisis (Morgan, 1999, 
p.273) . 
The situation in North Africa featured on several occasions in Lovestone’s correspondence 
with Angleton. In August 1956, Lovestone warned Angleton that the French were playing 
into the hands of the Soviets by linking the Algerian situation to the Suez crisis (cited in 
Morgan, 1999, p.256). The following year, he told Angleton that Tunisian President Habib 
Bourguiba would turn to the Soviets if the Tunisians did not get ‘certain types of military 
assistance to enable them to maintain order at home’ (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.256). 
Sub-Saharan Africa became an increasing priority for the Lovestone network in the late 
1950s. Lovestone’s key operative on the continent was Maida Springer, an African-
American woman who had come up through the ranks of the ILGWU (Morgan, 1999, 
p.304).  After joining Local 22 in 1933, Springer had quickly won the confidence of its 
Lovestoneite manager Charles Zimmerman, and of David Dubinsky, through whom she 
developed contacts with leading black socialists like A. Philip Randolph (Richards, 2000, 
pp.36-37). 
In 1945, as an AFL delegate on a trade union mission to Europe, Springer established links 
with pan-African leaders such as George Padmore and Jomo Kenyatta (Richards, 2004, 
p.134) . During a scholarship to Oxford’s Ruskin College in 1951, she deepened her 
relationship with a generation of young African intellectuals on the cusp of independence 
(Richards, 2004, p.155).  On her return to the United States, she became an important 
point of contact for emerging African leaders such as Kenyan trade unionist Tom Mboya, 
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who stayed with her during a 1956 visit to New York which secured funding and 
scholarships from the AFL-CIO (Morgan, 1999, p.305). 
Mboya was also being courted during the mid-1950s by the British who had secured a 
scholarship for him through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 
in order to get him out of Kenya during the state of emergency prompted by the Mau-Mau 
Rebellion (Bloch, 1983, p.144). Although Britain and the US had a common interest in 
supporting non-communist leaders, there was a strong element of competition for post-
independence influence. So concerned were the British about the AFL-CIO’s scholarship 
program that they secured a ICFTU ban on independent AFL-CIO activity in Africa (Richards, 
2004, p.14). British records confirm that Springer was carefully watched by local Special 
Branches during her visits to British colonies in Africa.  During her trip to East Africa in 
February 1957 reference was made to the local Security Liaison Officer who reported that 
Springer had come to the attention of the Security Service but was ‘security clear’ (National 
Archives FCO 141/17746, 1957). On Springer’s arrival in Entebbe later that year a thorough 
search of her baggage turned up a copy of Milovan Djilas’ The New Class – An Analysis of 
The Communist System, a work which was destined to become a key influence on the non-
communist left, but which was regarded by the British authorities as an item of security 
interest (National Archives, FCO 141/17746, 1957). In November 1957, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies informed the governors of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda that he 
was ‘most reluctant to see Springer stay in East Africa a moment longer than necessary’ 
and warned that ‘she may be assuming the role of a political go between among African 
Nationalist leaders in East Africa and even beyond’ (National Archives FCO 141/17746, 
1957). He went on to set out the possibilities for intervention with the Americans: 
From what I have heard on my return I realise that a fuss over Springer’s expulsion 
now might have a wholly disproportionate effect on Anglo-American relations and 
there are signs of differing views within A.F.L/C.I.O. on the subject of her visit. Early 
action against her might counteract this development which we would wish to 
encourage. There may also be something to be done through T.U.C. (Tewson is 
expected to visit America in December) although I am not too hopeful (1957). 
The Americans, however, continued to fear that British attitudes risked driving African 
labour leaders into the arms of the Soviets. As a result of such concerns, Irving Brown 
recommended in 1958 that a number of black American trade unionists including Springer, 
the CIO’s George McCray and the veteran Lovestoneite Ed Welsh should spend more time 
in Africa (Richards, 1998, p.317).In later life, Springer denied accusations she had been 
working for the CIA in Africa (Richards, 2004, p.202). She nevertheless declined to revise 
her view of her relationship with Lovestone when his proven connection to the agency was 
put to her (Richards, 2004, p.16). The AFL-CIO’s black American operatives in Africa 
generally shared the liberal anti-communism of their colleagues. Springer had acquired a 
critical view of the Communist Party’s proselytising among black Americans as an ILGWU 
activist in the 1930s (Richards, 2004, p.85). Welsh had defied overtures from Stalin as part 
of the American Communist leadership that accompanied Lovestone to Moscow in 1929 
(Morgan, 1999, p.97). They were however driven by genuine support for pan-Africanism, 
and sought to correct what they saw as their colleagues’ exaggerated view of the potential 
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for communist influence on the independence movement (Richards, 2004, p.16). It is 
tempting to see in their anti-colonialism a parallel with the organic anti-totalitarianism of 
the European émigrés who were drawn into Anglo-American covert action in the 1940s. 
Their positions as correspondents of the Lovestone network were valuable sources of an 
American perspective on Africa independent of the European powers. An analogous role 
was played by Israel through its Histadrut labour federation, which co-founded the Afro-
Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation with the AFL-CIO in 1959. 
The AFL-CIO’s labour diplomacy in the Third World were often hamstrung by the AFL 
tradition of ‘free trade unionism’ with its insistence on an arms-length relationship with 
the state, something that was sometimes resisted by trade unionists in newly independent 
countries, who saw the state as a necessary ally in the process of national development . 
The AFL-CIO officials most closely involved in Africa, such as Springer and Irving Brown, 
came to accept the need for flexibility on this point (Richards, 1998, p.309). 
 Histadrut’s history of central involvement in the movement for Israeli statehood, made it 
in a more congenial model in this respect, and some in the United States were quick to 
recognise this potential. In 1959, Arthur Rivkin, then director of the Africa Research Project 
of the Center for International Studies at MIT, argued that 'The Israeli model might well 
prove to be a sort of economic "third force"--an alternative differing from the Western 
pattern but certainly far more compatible with free-world interests than any Communist 
model’ (Rivkin, 1959).  The Israeli intelligence journalist Yossi Melman has claimed the AFL-
CIO funding for the Afro-Asian Institute came ultimately from the CIA, and was used to post 
Mossad officers in Africa (Melman, 2009). Israel’s combination of socialist 
developmentalism and alignment with the West made it, in effect, a sort of geopolitical 
equivalent of the Non-Communist Left. 
The Covert Action Coalition in the Early Cold War 
During the Early Cold War the American covert action capability developed during World 
War Two was revived and institutionalised for the long term. The political warfare coalition 
that lobbied for the creation of the CIA and provided its cadre, was largely a development 
from the earlier interventionist movement which had allied itself to British Security 
Coordination, and later to the Office of Strategic Services. 
If the dominant force within this coalition was the East Coast establishment represented by 
figures like Allen Dulles, the AFL anti-communists were nevertheless always a valuable 
component. Just as the Lovestoneites had fought against the Stalinization of the 
Comintern, they resisted the bureaucratization of Franks Wisner’s Office of Special Plans. 
Lovestone’s cultivation of a more congenial relationship with James Angleton would assist 
the AFL-CIO in remaining key allies of the official US covert action apparatus for decades 





Chapter Five – The break-up of the post-war consensus  
This chapter examines the crisis which faced the political warfare coalition in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, including unprecedented scrutiny of the CIA; the challenge to its domestic 
political base from the New Left, and the turn towards détente at an international level. By 
the mid-1970s, key actors in the alliance between the CIA and the AFL-CIO were losing 
their institutional positions in the course of bureaucratic struggles over détente. 
The CIA and the AFL-CIO in the Kennedy years 
During the 1950s the journalist Westbrook Pegler had attempted to draw attention to Jay 
Lovestone’s covert activities and to his Communist past, but conservative critics like Pegler 
made little impact in the face of a bipartisan consensus in support of labour anti-
communism.  
The potential vulnerability of the CIA to exposure was highlighted by the disastrous Bay of 
Pigs operation, which led to the departure of the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen 
Dulles, and his Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, key advocates of aggressive 
covert action (Jeffreys-Jones, 2002. P.180). 
The debacle prompted a short-lived effort by the incoming Kennedy administration to 
tighten control of operations (Johnson, 1989, p.90). Kennedy was nevertheless not above 
using the CIA’s connections to attempt to manage domestic labour rivalries, a tactic which 
itself carried significant risk of publicity. 
In January 1961, sources close to Victor Reuther were responsible for a Washington Post 
story claiming that Irving Brown was a CIA operative (Morgan, 1999, p.330).  The potential 
for the exposure of CIA operations may have been one factor in the decision of the 
incoming Kennedy Administration recorded by the CIA’s so-called ‘Family Jewels’ 
document a decade later: 
 At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit 
approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particularly Cord 
Meyer, into the US labor situation and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel 
between George Meany and Walter Reuther. Cord Meyer steered a very skilful 
course in this connection, but the agency could be vulnerable to charges that we 
went behind Meany’s back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against 
Meany’s wishes (Elder, 1973, p.461).  
 The concern expressed in the Family Jewels document highlight the difficulty in separating 
the AFL-CIO’s international alliance with the CIA from its role in domestic politics. At the 
1960 election, Meany, Reuther and Dubinsky had all supported Kennedy, whose labour 
support was marshalled by Arthur Goldberg (Parmet, 2005, p.284). Ironically, it was 
Dubinsky who had persuaded Reuther not to speak out against the vice-presidential 
nomination of Lyndon Johnson, a southern Democrat viewed with suspicion by AFL-CIO 
leaders who initially favoured Hubert Humphrey or Henry Jackson (Parmet, 2005, p.285).  
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Dubinsky and the ILGWU were able to claim significant credit for Kennedy’s victory through 
their ongoing involvement in the Liberal Party of New York, which followed its traditional 
practice of nominating Kennedy independently of the Democrats on the New York 
presidential ballot, gaining enough votes to account for his margin of victory in the state 
(Parmet, 2005, p.291). During the campaign, the Trade Union Council of the Liberal Party 
was addressed by Lyndon Johnson, who was developing a particularly close relationship 
with Dubinsky (Parmet, 2005, p.291.).  
The close identification of the leaders of organised labour with Democratic presidents, and 
with American foreign policy was to prove fateful when the establishment consensus in 
favour of that policy broke down under the pressure of the Vietnam War later in the 1960s. 
Cold War liberalism and Vietnam 
As elsewhere in the post-war world, the state-private networks of cold war liberalism were 
key allies of American foreign policy in Vietnam. In 1955, Joseph Buttinger of the 
International Rescue Committee founded the American Friends of Vietnam which grew 
into an unofficial lobby for the South Vietnamese government (Chester, 1995, p.163).  
For its part, the AFL-CIO was heavily involved in cultivating anti-communist trade union 
leaders. Irving Brown visited the country in 1961 and established links with Tran Buc Quo, 
the Catholic trade unionist who led the Vietnamese Confederation of Workers (CVT) 
(Morgan, 1999, p.336). The AFL-CIO subsequently provided the CVT with funding and 
lobbying support in Washington, a task that was complicated by South Vietnamese 
repression of trade unionists. A continuing overlap between AFL-CIO and CIA activities was 
demonstrated in late 1964, when an AFL-CIO delegation to South Vietnam included an 
undercover CIA officer, Tom Altaffer (Morgan, 1999, p.336.). 
As American involvement In the Vietnam War deepened, the risks of exposure of such 
activities grew. The American Friends of Vietnam was wound up after its links to the South 
Vietnamese regime were exposed in the July 1965 edition of the New Left magazine 
Ramparts (Chester, 1995, p.178). An unofficial replacement emerged two years later with 
the formation of the Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam (Chester, 
1995, p.178).  
By the mid-1960s, the extent of the CIA’s sponsorship of private organisations was 
beginning to be exposed. In April 1966, the New York Times reported claims that the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom’s British Encounter magazine was funded by the CIA 
(Saunders, 1999, p.371). In May, Victor Reuther gave an interview hinting at CIA 
involvement in foreign labour operations, to the consternation of Cord Meyer, the head of 
the CIA’s International Organizations Division (Wilford, 2008, p.238). In February 1967, 
another Reuther-inspired story from columnist Drew Pearson, revealed Jay Lovestone’s 
central role in CIA labour operations around the world (Morgan, 1999, p.338). In April 
1967, Ramparts published a wide-ranging exposé of CIA front organisations, despite CIA 
attempts to derail a long-running investigation (Saunders, 1999, p.382). 
In May 1967, Meyer’s predecessor as head of the International Organizations Division, Tom 
Braden went public with his own version of events in an article which revealed the extent 
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of CIA collusion with labour leaders, pointedly including Victor Reuther (Saunders, 1999, 
p.398). Some former CIA officers suspected that Braden’s revelations had been sanctioned 
as a way to break off the CIA’s relationship with the non-communist left, although Braden 
himself maintained that initiative came from journalist Stewart Alsop. It may be significant 
that Alsop, like Braden, was a former OSS officer (Smith, 2005, p.190). Pearson too had 
intelligence links, having been a key contact of the British Security Coordination in the early 
years of World War Two (Mahl, 1998, p.49). In the face of the escalating conflict in 
Vietnam, a generational consensus was being shattered. 
Braden’s animosity towards CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton, whose influence 
on Cord Meyer he distrusted, may also have been a factor (Saunders, 1999, p.342). By the 
mid-1960s Angleton was engaged in an increasingly paranoid and destructive search for 
moles within the CIA (Mangold, 1991, p.222). In this, he was encouraged by Soviet defector 
Anatoly Golitsyn, who Angleton ran through New York lawyer Mario Brod, also a key 
intermediary in Angleton’s relationship with Lovestone (Mangold, 1991, p.291). 
Angleton continued to run Lovestone as an agent after the revelations of 1966-67, a fact 
which was apparently unknown to the AFL-CIO leadership, who believed the relationship 
had ended after the report of the Katzenbach Committee in March 1967 (Morgan, 1999, 
p.340). This committee, appointed by President Johnson, and including CIA Director 
Richard Helms among its three members, had recommended that the US Government end 
any covert support for private educational or voluntary organisations by December 1967 
(Saunders, 1999, p.405).  However, while this was adopted as government policy, it never 
acquired any legal sanction, and only applied to US-based organizations (Saunders, 1999, 
p.406). Likewise, the Committee’s recommendation that a public-private mechanism 
should be created to provide overt public funding for American organisations abroad was 
never acted on (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). In April 1967, Dante Fascell, a Democratic 
Congressman from Florida, tried and failed to pass a bill establishing an Institute of 
International Affairs to fulfil this role (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). Some CIA support for the 
international activities of domestic organizations was transferred to overt government 
agencies, such as the Agency for International Development (AID) in the case of the AFL-
CIO (Morgan, 1999, p.340). Other former CIA operations found private sponsors to fill the 
void. Millionaire Richard Mellon Scaife was notable in this regard, providing grants to 
Encounter magazine and to Forum World Features, a news agency offshoot of the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom (Chinoy and Kaiser, 1999). 
The Domestic Break-up of cold war liberalism 
The controversy over CIA activities was one facet of widening political divisions over 
Vietnam, which began to have a dramatic impact on the domestic political base of cold war 
liberalism by the late 1960s. 
In February 1968, David Dubinsky’s successor as head of the ILGWU, Louis Stulberg, 
resigned from Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), after the paradigmatic cold war 
liberal organisation supported peace candidate Eugene McCarthy for that year’s 
Democratic presidential nomination (Parmet, 2005, p.335). The AFL-CIO remained 
staunchly behind Lyndon Johnson until his withdrawal from the race, subsequently 
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supporting Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who won the nomination at a traumatic 
convention in Chicago (Buhle, 1999, p.185). Humphrey eventually softened his position on 
the war enough to win back the support of the ADA before losing the election to Richard 
Nixon (Parmet, 2005, p.339). 
Vietnam also caused ructions within in the more rarefied ranks of the Socialist Party. In the 
mid-1950s, the party’s leader Norman Thomas had been drawn into support for the Diem 
regime by the American Friends of Vietnam and the International Rescue Committee 
(Chester, 1995, p.143). This was in part a reflection of the IRC’s longstanding links with 
American social democrats since its formation during World War Two (Chester, 1995, p. 
60). However, Thomas resigned from the AFVN in 1958, as a result of misgivings over 
Diem’s authoritarian conduct (Chester, 1995, p.170). 
Interventionist sentiment within the Socialist Party nevertheless received a powerful boost 
in the late 1950s from mergers with the Social Democratic Federation and with the 
followers of ex-Trotskyist Max Shachtman (Alexander, 1991, p.899). For Shachtman, this 
was part of a journey that saw him move from a ‘third camp’ critique of capitalism and 
Stalinism, towards an alliance with what he came to see as progressive forces within the 
American mainstream (Wald, 1987, p.191). 
The Shachtmanites have widely been seen as precursors of the neoconservative movement 
(King, 2004). Less often noted is the extent to which their trajectory was prefigured by that 
of the Lovestoneites, their one time rivals on the Old Left. Like the Lovestoneites before 
them, Shachtman’s supporters moved into the bureaucracy of the AFL-CIO, notably in the 
United Federation of Teachers (Buhle, 1999, p.156). Shachtman’s foreign policy views 
increasingly converged with those of Lovestone, leading him to support the Bay of Pigs 
landing in Cuba in 1961, and to oppose American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1965 
(Isserman, 2000, p.268). 
After the Six Day War in 1967, the Middle East increasingly became part of the complex of 
foreign policy issues dividing the American left, in part because Soviet support for the Arab 
powers gave the conflict a clearer Cold War significance than in earlier years. Many new 
left critics of Israel, such as Noam Chomsky and I.F. Stone were themselves Jewish 
(Ehrman, 1995, p.39). Nevertheless, Middle East issues became bound up with domestic 
racial and political tensions , as support for the Palestinians came from black activists who 
were challenging older civil rights leaders (Ehrman, 1995, p.39). 
The ideological struggles on the American left only intensified following Hubert 
Humphrey’s defeat by Richard Nixon in 1968. The Democrats embarked on a series of 
reforms driven by the ‘New Politics’ movement on the left of the party, which weakened 
the hold of the traditional party establishment (Ehrman, 1995, p.57). On the right of the 
party, Washington Senator Henry Jackson emerged as a key standard-bearer, gaining 
influence in part because he was cultivated as an ally by President Nixon (Ognibene, 1975, 
p.217). Jackson had strong ties to the AFL-CIO, having been George Meany’s preferred 
choice as John F. Kennedy’s running mate in 1960 (Parmet, 2005, p.285). He was also a 




Nixon, Kissinger, and the rise of détente 
At the time he took office in early 1969, Richard Nixon had a well-earned reputation as a 
’the quintessential cold warrior’ (Litwak, 1984, p.51). He had also acquired significant 
foreign policy experience as vice-president under President Eisenhower (Hanhimaki 2004, 
p.19). During Nixon’s 1962 presidential campaign that experience informed a significantly 
more pragmatic approach to the Cold War than that of the eventual victor John F. Kennedy 
(Hanhimaki 2004, p.19). 
By 1969, such pragmatism was at a premium. President’s Johnson had announced 
American willingness to seek a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War a year earlier, 
under intense domestic pressure in the wake of the Tet Offensive (Sanders 1983, p.140). 
While that decision was broadly supported by the foreign policy establishment, new 
divisions emerged over the strategy to be pursued for de-escalation (Sanders 1983, p.140). 
Within Johnson’s Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze saw a narrow 
problem of over-commitment, while Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs 
Paul Warnke began to raise much wider questions about the value of the policy of 
containment as a whole (Sanders 1983, p.140). Their emerging rivalry would mark a key 
faultline in the foreign policy debates of the 1970s. 
As (Sanders 1983, p.144) notes, the fallout from containment militarism in Vietnam, was 
now threatening the very goals which the original doctrine of containment had been 
designed to protect. 
The war was undermining America’s position in Europe, and imposing significant economic 
costs, at the very time when Europe was re-emerging as a significant economic competitor 
to the United States (Hanhimaki 2004, p.29). US military pre-eminence was also threatened 
as the Soviet Union moved towards parity in nuclear weapons (Hanhimaki 2004, p.28). 
Nixon’s national security advisor Henry Kissinger would emerge as his key strategist in 
dealing with these manifold problems (Hanhimaki 2004, p.31). Kissinger would later state: 
“Simultaneously we had to end a war, manage a global rivalry with the Soviet Union in the 
shadow of nuclear weapons, reinvigorate our alliance with industrial democracies, and 
integrate the new nations into a new world equilibrium” (cited in Hanhimaki 2004, p.30). 
Kissinger was already a noted scholar of the realist approach to international relations, 
having gained his doctorate for research on Metternich and Castlereagh and the 
Nineteenth Century Concert of Europe (Hanhimaki 2004, p.7). Perhaps because of his 
association with the republican Nelson Rockefeller, he had nevertheless remained on the 
fringes of the circle of foreign policy intellectuals drawn into the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations as the Vietnam War escalated (Hanhimaki 2004, p.12). 
While seeking to rejuvenate America’s position by high-level diplomacy, both Nixon and 
Kissinger believed that diplomacy could only succeed from a position of relative strength. 
This resulted in an emphasis on ‘linkage’ (Hanhimaki 2004, p.28). The Soviets “should be 
brought to understand that they cannot expect to reap the benefits of co-operation in one 
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area while seeking to take advantage of tension or confrontation elsewhere”, as Nixon put 
it in a memorandum drafted by Kissinger’s NSC (cited in Hanhimaki 2004, p.28). 
In negotiations, Nixon particularly stressed the interdependence between nuclear issues 
and the resolution of regional conflicts (Hanhimaki 2004, p.38). Kissinger sought to take 
advantage of Soviet nuclear fears, advising that: ‘we should seek to utilize this Soviet 
interest to induce them to come to grips with the real sources of tension, notably in the 
Middle East, but also in Vietnam” (Hanhimaki 2004, p.39). This led the Nixon 
administration to pursue an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) programme in the face of 
Congressional opposition (Hanhimaki 2004, p.50). For Nixon, the approval of ABM 
preserved a useful bargaining chip with the Soviets (Mann, 2004, p.33). Events would 
show, however, that the programme’s supporters in Congress did not necessarily see it in 
the same light. 
This was one instance of what some have seen as the greatest weakness in Nixon and 
Kissinger’s approach. Their belief in charismatic back-channel diplomacy, unhindered by 
bureaucracy, risked leaving them without sufficient domestic support without to pursue 
their foreign agenda (Litwak, 1984, p.87). 
The Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy 
A key vehicle supporting Nixon’s ABM plans was the Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense Policy (CMPDP) a campaign launched in 1969, which lobbied Congress in favour of 
continued support for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The committee was founded 
by Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze to fend off liberal opposition to the ABM, the most 
expensive item in a defence budget facing growing scrutiny as a result of the unpopularity 
of the Vietnam War (Mann, 2004, p.32) 
A number of graduate students were recruited to work in the Committee's office by 
scientist Albert Wohlstetter; including two of his own students at the University of 
Chicago, Paul Wolfowitz and Peter Wilson, and Richard Perle from Princeton (Mann, 2004, 
p.32). As part of their work at the CMPDP they drafted material for Senator Jackson, the 
leading ABM supporter in the Senate (Mann, 2004, p.32). In late summer 1969, the Senate 
approved the system by 51 votes to 50, the closest vote on a major national defence 
program since 1941 (Mann, 2004, p.32). 
The SALT Treaty debate 
Having won the Congressional battle for the ABM programme in 1969, Jackson opposed 
the inclusion of an ABM treaty in the SALT accords in May 1972 (Kaufman, 2000, p.254). 
(Kaufman, 2000, p.253). However, he knew that he could not launch a frontal assault on 
the accords given the bipartisan support for Nixon on the issue (Kaufman, 2000, p.254). 
Instead, Jackson sought to throw grit into the gears of détente with amendments in the 
Senate. The first of these, the Jackson Amendment, calling for a future SALT Treaty to 
guarantee US equality in strategic nuclear forces, was passed in September 1972, 
significantly limiting US negotiators room for manoeuvre (Kaufman, 2000, p.257). 
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This was followed with an attack on the wider economic détente in the form of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US Trade Act, proposed in October 1972, which made 
the extension of Most Favoured Nation status to non-market economies conditional on the 
right of their citizens to emigrate (Kaufman, 2000, p.266). Nixon and his National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger feared that the application of this rule to the Soviet Union would 
unravel agreements central to the whole structure of the détente (Kaufman, 2000, Ibid).  
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was ultimately passed by Congress in late 1974 (Kaufman, 
2000, 279). Kissinger’s attempts to reach a compromise arrangement soon unravelled, and 
the prospective Soviet trade deal collapsed in consequence (Kaufman, 2000, p.280). Critics 
of the Israel lobby in American politics have seen the campaign in support of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment as a key milestone in its development (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008, 
p.126). During that campaign, however, it was Jackson who was often pushing for more 
radical positions from American supporters of Soviet Jewry who were wary of being 
saddled with the blame for the collapse of détente (Kaufman, 2000, p.269). His willingness 
to do so reflected the wider roots of his own opposition to détente. 
Jackson was a classic cold war liberal with a record of hawkishness going back to the 1940s 
(Ognibene, 1975, p.153). Throughout that time, he was a staunch supporter of the defence 
industry, notably of Boeing in his home state, a vocal believer in the existence of a ‘missile 
gap’ with the Soviet Union, and an advocate for strategic weapons programmes larger than 
anything that was ever ultimately constructed (Ognibene, 1975, p.160). 
Jackson had been a member of the Armed Service Committee since 1954, and had soon 
begun receiving clandestine briefings from the Air Force, which informed his pessimistic 
public statements about Soviet missile developments (Prados, 1986, p.59). In 1958, he had 
been prominent among Senators pressurising the Eisenhower administration over the 
Gaither Report, which has called for a major increase in US nuclear deterrent capabilities 
(Prados, 1986, p.74).  
There was nevertheless, a germ of truth in the charge from critics in the press that Jackson-
Vanik was a product of Jackson’s presidential ambitions (Kaufman, 2000, p.280). Despite 
Jackson’s decades long political career, he had little record as a supporter of Israel even as 
late as the Six Day War (Ognibene, 1975, p.193). However, once his presidential ambitions 
emerged in late 1960s, there is little doubt that he needed to win support among key 
ethnic groups in the eastern United States (Ognibene, 1975, p.195). By the time of his 1976 
campaign for example, he was willing to court Irish-Americans by expressing support for 
IRA hunger strikers (McManus, 2011, p.122).  
Nevertheless, Jackson’s shift on Israel was not simply electoral opportunism. In the months 
leading up to the Six Day War in 1967, Jackson had described the Near East as ‘one area in 
which the major powers are not directly involved’ (quoted in Ognibene, 1975, p.195). By 
the 1970s, he had come to see the situation in Cold War terms, arguing that ‘if there no 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets would invent one’ (quoted in Ognibene, 1975, p.195). 
The Cold War prism had come to seem a more natural one given Soviet support for the 
Arabs during and after the Six-Day War. It was strongly reinforced during the 1973 Yom 
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Kippur War, when the Soviet Union had threatened unilateral intervention and the 
superpowers had subsequently co-operated to pressure Israel into a ceasefire, raising the 
prospect that détente would lead to pressure on Israel for a wider political settlement 
(Cahn, 1998, p.31). For AFL-CIO president George Meany, Soviet arms supplies to the Arab 
states during the war demonstrated that détente was a fraud (Cahn, 1998, p.36). 
Ultimately the significance of Jackson-Vanik was that it marked the evolution of a natural 
coalition of forces opposed to détente including cold war ideologues, defence interests, 
and supporters of Israel, which would be central to the emergence of neoconservatism.  
The 1972 Presidential election 
If the early 1970s marked the point when neoconservatism cohered as a movement, that 
cohesion was in part a defensive reaction to weakening of the political base which the 
movement’s cold war liberal precursors had enjoyed. 
Alienated by the success of the New Politics movement within the party, Democratic hawks 
increasingly began to look beyond its ranks. By 1970, Lovestone felt that the AFL-CIO’s 
foreign policy was closer to that of President Nixon, who had made a significant effort to 
woo organised Labour (Morgan, 1999, p.342). Lovestone gave advice on labour issues to 
Nixon’s special counsel, Charles Colson, who in turn furnished him with FBI material on 
communist activities in the labour movement (Morgan, 1999, p.343).  
The hawks were nevertheless still fighting for control of the Democratic Party. In 1970, Ben 
Wattenberg and Richard Scammon published The Real Majority which argued that the New 
Politics approach was losing touch with a mainstream electorate which they described as 
‘unyoung, unpoor, unblack’ (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970, p.57). Wattenberg had been 
a speechwriter for Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey. By 1972, he was on Jackson’s 
staff supporting Jackson’s opposition to what he called ‘artificial bussing’ to achieve 
integrated education, a stance which dismayed many Democrats (Ognibene, 1975, p.19). 
Jackson’s campaign for the Democratic Presidential nomination that year enjoyed strong 
support from the AFL-CIO (Buhle, 1999, p.194). It was nevertheless a failure, with the 
nomination going to Senator George McGovern from the New Politics wing of the party. 
Many conservative Democrats felt unable to support McGovern, who became the first 
Democratic candidate since 1955 not to receive the endorsement of the AFL-CIO (Morgan, 
1999, p.344). A significant movement developed of Democrats for Nixon, which offered a 
qualified endorsement to the republican president (Vaïsse, 2010, p.86).  The IRC chairman 
Leo Cherne served as vice-chair of this group, earning an appointment to the President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as a result (Chester, 1995, p.202). Others who took this 
course included some influential socialists of the old left, such as Sidney Hook (Hook and 
Shapiro, 1995, p.262). 
Most conservative social democrats however, kept their powder dry until after Nixon had 
defeated McGovern. They following month, in December 1972, they created the Coalition 
for a Democratic Majority (CDM) to contest what they saw as the New Politics movement’s 
dominance in the party (Vaïsse, 2010, p.86). 
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Similar divisions were playing out in the much smaller Socialist party, which split in 1972-3 
amid the continuing fallout from Vietnam. Of the two successor organisations, the Social 
Democrats USA (SDUSA) broadly represented the conservative AFL tradition, while the 
Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC) reflected the more liberal heritage 
associated with the CIO and its leaders such as the Reuther brothers (Battista, 2008, p.74). 
In its account of the split, the SDUSA accused the leader of the opposing faction, Michael 
Harrington, of breaking with what it considered key social democratic principles: 
The dispute within the SDUSA has been fundamentally over two issues: 1) labor 
role and influence within the liberal coalition, and the related question of the role 
and influence of the affluent, educated elite making up the so-called New Politics 
movement: and 2) the attitude of socialists toward Communist totalitarianism 
(Social Democrats USA 1973, p.ii).  
The SDUSA cited Harrington’s criticisms of the AFL-CIO and George Meany as evidence of 
his weakness on the former point, his criticism of the opponents of détente as evidence of 
his weakness on the latter (Social Democrats USA, , 1973, ibid). Harrington was among the 
first to apply the label neoconservative to those he called ‘disappointed liberals’ in the Fall 
1973 issue of Dissent, singling out Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
(Harrington, 1973). 
Although the split involved a small number of people, less than a thousand activists in the 
case of the Social Democrats USA, it retained a wider political significance because of the 
involvement of social democratic activists in the Democratic Party through the CDM, and in 
the labour movement, through the AFL-CIO and its affiliates (Battista, 2008, p.74). 
Their links to the AFL tradition also made the Social Democrats USA the heirs of the wing of 
the labour movement most heavily involved in the Cold War CIA-NCL alliance, an alliance 
which was facing a new round of challenges as the post-Vietnam scrutiny of the secret 
state reached a climax in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.  
The Lovestone and Angleton purges 
Throughout this period, Jay Lovestone was still being run as a CIA agent by James Angleton 
as he had been since the 1950s. In 1973, however, this relationship began to come under 
pressure from a new CIA director, William Colby.  
During the 17-week tenure of the previous director, James Schlesinger, Colby had 
implemented a purge of CIA ‘old boys’ in which the clandestine service, responsible for 
covert action and intelligence collection, was hit particularly hard, losing over a thousand 
officers (Weiner, 2008, p.376). He had failed however, to persuade Schlesinger to remove 
Angleton. (Weiner, 2007, pp.377). The seeds of Angleton’s downfall were nevertheless 
sown by Schlesinger’s authorisation of the so-called ‘Family Jewels’ document, which listed 
all of the potentially illegal activities that might embarrass the CIA in the midst of the 
emerging Watergate scandal (Wise, 1992, p. 267).  
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Once Colby succeeded Schlesinger, he was determined to break up Angleton’s 
counterintelligence empire. Angleton’s responsibilities were removed one by one, 
beginning with his control of the CIA’s liaison with the FBI (Wise, 1992, pp.263-4). Colby 
later claimed, perhaps disingenuously, that his cautious approach was prompted by fears 
that Angleton might commit suicide (Wise, 1992, pp.263-64). 
It was in this context, according to Angleton biographer Tom Mangold, that Colby ordered 
an internal investigation of the Lovestone operation, which he feared was unconstitutional 
(Mangold, 1991, p.292).  The officer reported that the operation had little remaining value 
and posed risks to the CIA if it was exposed. Colby then informed a furious Angleton that it 
was to be terminated and all funds to Lovestone cut off (Mangold, 1991, 292).  Lovestone 
biographer Ted Morgan, who gives a similar account, cites Colby as stating that the officer 
who carried out the investigation was Horace Feldman (Morgan, 1999, p.349). 
In response to a Freedom of Information Request from the author, the CIA refused to 
confirm or deny any information about the Feldman investigation, on the grounds that any 
relevant records remained classified (Meeks, 2013). If such material were ever released, it 
might well shed considerable light on the relationship between the CIA and the non-
communist left from the late 1950s onwards. It may yet modify the existing picture which 
appears to be one of Lovestone’s close cooperation with Angleton on the one hand, and 
his longstanding resistance to control by the agency bureaucracy on the other. 
In this respect, it is intriguing that Lovestone’s own position in the AFL-CIO came under 
attack at the same time as Angleton’s downfall. According to Morgan, the proximate cause 
was a letter from Angleton containing a check for Lovestone’s subagent Pagie Morris, 
which was mislaid by Lovestone’s secretary Miriam Welsh, wife of the old Lovestoneite 
Eddy Welsh (Morgan, 1999, p.345). The letter turned up at the AFL-CIO headquarters in 
Washington. The evidence of Lovestone’s ongoing relationship with Angleton, seven years 
after the AFL’s CIA connection was supposed to have been terminated in the wake of Tom 
Braden’s revelations, gave George Meany ammunition which he used to replace Lovestone 
as AFL-CIO International Director, effective from 1 July 1974 (Morgan, 1999, pp.350-351). 
Given the timing of Lovestone’s departure in the midst of Colby’s campaign to isolate 
Angleton, there must be at least a suspicion that the two events were connected. In any 
case, that campaign came to a climax a few months later when Angleton’s own 
counterintelligence staff was purged. 
The final denouement came when Colby was approached by the investigative journalist 
Seymour Hersh, who had learned of the so-called ‘family jewels’, an internal report which 
detailed all of the CIA’s potentially illegal activities. Colby gave Hersh an interview, and 
demanded Angleton’s resignation in anticipation of the resulting story, which ran in the 
New York Times on 22 December 1974 (Wise, 1992, p.270). Within a few days, Angleton 
had resigned along with his top counterintelligence officers; Raymond Rocca, Scotty Miler 
and William J. Hood (Wise, 1992, pp.271). In Angleton’s place as counterintelligence chief, 
Colby appointed George Kalaris, a former Labour Department lawyer, who had joined the 
CIA in 1952 (Mangold, 1991, p.300). Although familiar with counterintelligence as an 
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aspect of his work in the CIA’s Operations Division, he did not share Angleton’s esoteric 
view of its status as a discipline (Mangold, 1991, p.301). 
Kalaris discovered that the counterintelligence staff had created a vast archive inaccessible 
from the CIA’s central filing system (Mangold, 1991, p.305). Tom Mangold characterises 
this as evidence that ‘Angleton had been quietly building an alternative CIA, subscribing 
only to his rules, beyond peer review or executive supervision’ (Mangold, 1991, p.306).It is 
arguably precisely this autonomy that made working for Angleton attractive to Lovestone 
in the 1950s, after the Office of Special Plans had attempted to bring the AFL-CIO’s 
operations under bureaucratic control. In the new era of scrutiny however, it was a liability 
to the CIA. 
So great was Angleton’s autonomy that the Directorate of Operations’ own labour division 
was unaware of Lovestone’s role as an agent until informed by Kalaris, who found his JX 
reports (Mangold, 1991, p.306). 
Angleton’s supporters believed that Colby had deliberately engineered the leak of the CIA 
‘family jewels’, a charge that Colby strongly denied (Mangold, 1991, p.293). He had, 
however, been trying to get rid of Angleton for several years. Both Colby himself and 
Angleton’s supporters agree on one key reason for this animosity. Colby told Mangold that 
the mission of the CIA’s Soviet Bloc Division was to recruit Soviets – ‘But here was Jim 
Angleton, whose staff spent all their time blocking those recruitments’ (Mangold, 1991, 
p.289). Angleton’s lieutenant, Scotty Miler, said of Colby ‘He felt CI [counterintelligence] 
approval for each operation was inhibiting ops. It got rid of people looking over the 
operators’ shoulders’ (Wise, 1992, p.265). 
The dispute between Colby and Angleton over the correct approach to intelligence had a 
political significance. Angleton beliefs about strategic deception led him to reject the 
reality of the Sino-Soviet split, putting him at odds with the Nixon Administration’s support 
for detente with China, and alienating even supporters like former CIA director Richard 
Helms (Epstein, 1989, p.98). Colby’s vision was arguably more compatible with the pursuit 
of detente. He was sceptical of Angleton’s theories and the strategic role he claimed for 
counterintelligence. Instead, he saw the primary role of the CIA as collecting and analysing 
information for policymakers (Mangold, 1991, p.290).  
Détente promised a valuable monitoring role for this kind of work. By contrast, it 
undermined the case for aggressive covert operations, and was at odds with the 
assumptions that underpinned Angleton’s approach to counterintelligence. As a result, the 
evolution of the political warfare coalition had become closely bound up with the 






Chapter Six: The Neoconservative Counteroffensive of the 1970s 
This chapter examines the late 1970s and the campaign against the détente, which 
provided the context for the political warfare coalition to assert a new status as an 
epistemic community. 
The Struggle against Detente 
Henry Jackson was the leading figure in the campaign against détente. At hearings of the 
Senate Subcommittee on arms control In June 1974, he succeeded in raising doubts about 
the administration’s policy on strategic arms negotiations by forensic questioning of 
Government officials such as Paul Nitze, who subsequently resigned as a SALT negotiator in 
opposition to Kissinger’s approach (Kaufman, 2000, p.278). Nitze accused Nixon and 
Kissinger of promoting a ‘myth of détente’ (Sanders, 1983, p.152).  
The theme was quickly taken up by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, which was to 
be among the most significant of a number of overlapping vehicles that emerged to 
support the anti-détente campaign. In July 1974, the CDM’s Foreign Policy Task Force 
published a pamphlet arguing that detente was a result of Soviet strength, claiming that: 
'The current "structure of peace", based on fluctuating pressures involving China, the US 
and the USSR, has come about precisely because of the growing potency of Soviet arms. 
The inherent instability of this triangle is increased by the relative decline in American 
strength' (Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.7). 
The Quest for Detente concluded with a call for strengthened deterrence and a warning 
that: 'if, on the other hand, we allow ourselves to be deceived by a myth of detente, 
reduce our military strength, and permit our alliances to erode, we may well suffer 
irreversible defeats, which could imperil the safety of democracy in America' (Coalition for 
a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.15). 
The chairman of the Foreign Policy Task Force was Eugene Rostow, a Yale Law Professor 
and former Under Secretary of State under President Johnson (Cahn, 1998, p.26).  He was 
supported by a 17-strong drafting committee that included several other veterans of the 
Johnson administration, along with the preeminent literary neoconservative, Commentary 
editor Norman Podhoretz, academic neoconservatives Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel 
Huntington and Paul Seabury, and AFL-CIO trade unionists J.C. Turner and Albert Shanker 
(Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.2). The Task Force’s secretary was Roy 
Godson, director of the International Labor Program at Georgetown University, and son of 
the former Lovestoneite labour diplomat Joseph Godson (Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority, 1974, p.2). 
The CDM’s argument was roundly rejected by Kissinger, who told Rostow in a letter of 19 
August 1974, that ‘we have sought to rely on a balance of mutual interest rather than on 
Soviet intentions as expressed by ideological dogma’ (cited in Sanders, 1983, p.151). 
Rostow wrote back on 4 September insisting that ‘Soviet policy never changes’ (cited in 
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Sanders, 1983, p.150). The exchange only served to underline that Kissingerian realism and 
neoconservatism were incompatible paradigms. In January 1975, Kissinger blamed 
Jackson’s sponsorship of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for the collapse of the projected 
Soviet trade deal, stoking press murmurings about Jackson’s presidential ambitions 
(Kaufman, 2000, p. 280). 
Yet Jackson’s success failed to translate into political capital in the 1976 Democratic 
primaries. A scathing report on Jackson’s record by Americans for Democratic Action, once 
the home of anti-communist Truman Democrats, was symptomatic of the enduring nature 
of the New Politics shift in the party (Kaufman, 2000, p.313). 
Jackson did attempt to reach out to Liberal Democrats by capitalising on a leak from 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, which showed that the Nixon Administration had made promises 
of renewed intervention to the South Vietnamese if North Vietnam breached the 1973 
Paris Peace Accords (Kaufman, 2000, p.291). Within his own natural constituency, Jackson 
was undermined by support for a Hubert Humphrey candidacy within the AFL-CIO, whose 
President, George Meany, was also alienated by Jackson’s support for détente with China 
(Kaufman, 2000, p.315).  
The Jackson campaign also made strategic missteps, concentrating resources on the larger 
states while conceding early momentum to Jimmy Carter, that contributed to defeat 
(Kaufman, 2000, p.325). It was a failing that reflected Jackson's political style as backroom 
negotiator, rather than a mass communicator.  
The Second Committee on the Present Danger 
As the 1976 presidential election loomed, the opponents of détente began to feel the need 
for a broader bipartisan campaign vehicle to influence the eventual victor. The exit of a key 
supporter, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, from the Ford administration for speaking 
out too strongly on the issue, deprived them of a key ally in government and prompted 
discussions to begin in earnest among a small group of former Republican and Democratic 
Cabinet officials (Sanders, 1983, p.152). 
As well as Rostow, Nitze and Schlesinger himself, these included former Treasury Secretary 
H. H. Fowler, former Deputy Treasury Secretary Charles E. Walker and former Deputy 
Defence Secretary David Packard (Sanders, 1983, p.152). In March 1976, the group offered 
the role of Director of the new organisation to Charles Tyroler II (Sanders, 1983, p.152).  
Tyroler had been the Defense Department's director of manpower supply in the early 
1950s, before becoming a Washington business consultant (Washington Post, 15 March, 
1995). He had worked in the democratic presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy, 
Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, and had been a director of the Citizens Committee 
for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam in the 1960s (Ibid). 
The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) was publicly launched on 11 November 1976, 
within days of Jimmy Carter’s election victory (Cahn, 1998, p.28). Like its namesake of the 
early 1950s, the CPD was dominated by experienced Cold war planners. Eugene Rostow 
served as chair of the Executive Committee, while Paul Nitze, the original architect of NSC-
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68, and a veteran of the earlier committee, was chair of policy studies (Sanders, 1983, 
p.154). 
The presence of Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, as one of three co-chairs 
signalled a greatly enlarged role for cold war social democrats in the 1976 committee 
compared to its predecessor (Sanders, 1983, p.212). In the 1950 committee, labour had 
been represented by David Dubinsky of the ILGWU and arguably by the CIO-connected 
labour lawyer Arthur Goldberg (Sanders, 1983, p.87).  
In the (much larger) membership of the 1976 CPD, The AFL-CIO was represented by 
Kirkland , Sol Chaikin and Evelyn DuBrow of the ILGWU, Rachelle Horowitz and Albert 
Shanker of the American Federation of Teachers, Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph 
Institute, and by Jay Lovestone himself (Sanders 1983, 154-160). Also on the committee 
was Bertram Wolfe, who had been second-in-command of the Lovestoneite group for most 
of the 1930s, before becoming an adviser to the State Department in the 1950s and later a 
professor at the Hoover Institution (Alexander 1981, 134). 
Of the 141 initial members of the CPD, 20 had also been among the signatories of the 
founding appeal of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. There was a significant overlap 
between this group and that of members of the CPD who were at one time or another 
members of the Social Democrats USA: a group which included Chaikin, DuBrow, Horowitz, 
Shanker, Rustin, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John P. Roche, Paul Seabury, and Midge Decter 
(Institute for Policy Studies, 2014). 
This section of the CPD’s support base effectively represented the Dubinsky-Lovestone 
tradition of labour anti-communism. The other wing of the Cold War alliance between the 
CIA and the non-communist left was represented by a number of former intelligence 
officers, including William Casey, Ray Cline, and the recently retired CIA director William 
Colby (Sanders, 1983, p.156).  
As an OSS officer in London during the Second World War, Casey had headed attempts to 
use German-speaking workers recruited through the ILGWU for operations into occupied 
Europe (Smith, 2005, p.225).  More recently, in the early 1970s, he had served as head of 
the International Rescue Committee (Chester, 1995, p.241). Cline was another OSS officer 
who later joined the CIA, where he served as station chief in Taiwan and Germany and 
Deputy Director for Intelligence before leaving in 1969 to become director of intelligence 
at the State Department (Smith, 2005, p.14). 
Colby was likewise an OSS veteran who had served as CIA Station Chief and as head of the 
American pacification program in South Vietnam, and as head of the CIA Far Eastern 
Division (Smith, 2005, p.202). Colby had been fired as CIA director a year earlier in 
November 1975, in part because of administration resentment at his candid approach to 
Congressional investigations of his agency (Wise, 1992, p.292). During his tenure Colby had 
resisted pressure from the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) for a 
competitive analysis that would challenge the CIA estimates that the Soviet Union was not 
close to nuclear superiority (Ford, 1993, p.188). This being the case, Colby’s membership of 
the CPD presents something of a challenge for our analysis. He was a defender of the CIA’s 
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intelligence and covert action work, but one who had a more circumscribed view of its role 
than some of his colleagues. This was to give him an ambiguous place in the ranks of the 
political warfare coalition, as will become clearer when we examine its development in the 
1980s. 
In opposing détente and the constraints on American strategy that this involved, the CPD 
was at least in part an expression of the political warfare coalition that had underpinned 
support for American political intervention overseas since the 1940s. 
Jerry Sanders has described the CPD as conducting a two-tier ‘insider-outsider strategy’: 
A pincer operation of sorts designed to squeeze an incoming president 
between a reassertion of hardline doctrine within the national security 
bureaucracy and from the outside by means of pressure by an interest-backed 
Cold War ideology led by hawkish Congressmen and groups associated with 
the military-industrial complex and the grassroots right-wing (Sanders, 1983, 
p.197) 
Boies and Pichardo have suggested that the CPD can best be characterised as an elite social 
movement organisation (ESMO) (Boies, 1993-1994, p.79). In making this argument, they 
suggest that elites form social movements when their regular channels of authority are 
constrained or insufficient to pursue their interests (Boies, 1993-1994, p.62). Their 
application of this concept to the CPD is persuasive given the marginalisation of its 
members by the Carter administration. Nevertheless, it is important to note the continuing 
access of CPD to ‘insider’ sources of power in the bureaucracy and in Congress. 
It is worth considering how closely Sanders’ insider-outsider strategy corresponds with the 
two-tier dynamic identified by Inderjeet Parmar as a feature of epistemic communities, 
within which ‘government officials have access to policy-making and use the second tier to 
publicise/disseminate their ideas and to legitimate them as ‘objective and scientific’ as well 
as to elaborate on public officials ideas’ (Parmar, 2006, pp. 17-18). 
If the CPD ‘s role in the struggle over détente arguably exemplified this process, two 
related episodes identified by Sanders illustrated its ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ aspects; the 
first within the US Government over the ‘Team B’ challenge to the CIA’s intelligence 
estimates; the second within the US Congress over the nomination of Paul Warnke to head 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Sanders, 1983, p.197). 
While the CPD may itself be best be characterised as an elite social movement 
organisation, the existence of the two-tier dynamic, reflecting continuing access to some 
‘insider’ decision-makers, arguably opened up the possibility that a true epistemic 
community could emerge from the movement.  
In interpreting these conflicts, it is useful to recall Parmar’s injunction that an 
understanding of the state-private networks of the Cold War as epistemic communities 




A comparison of the makeup of the 1976 CPD and allied organisations with earlier 
interventionist organisations such as the CDAAA and the CPD is one way of interrogating 
the evolution of the hegemonic coalition that shaped American foreign policy over the 
course of the Cold War. 
In this respect, there were important differences between the 1950 CPD, largely a 
movement of the bipartisan centre and the foreign policy establishment against the 
Republican right, and its successor, which was confronted by the break-up of Cold War 
liberalism and by divisions within the foreign policy establishment itself over détente 
(Sanders, 1983, p.192). 
By the 1970s, the dominant strands of the Republican right were largely reconciled to the 
‘containment militarism’ espoused by both iterations of the CPD. Among the organisations 
that played a significant role in opposition to détente, the National Strategy Information 
Center and the American Security Council both had roots in conservative republicanism. 
The American Security Council 
The American Security Council (ASC) was founded in 1955 by a group of former FBI agents 
to provide anti-communist intelligence to private enterprise (Diamond, 1995, p.46). It was 
a product of a post-McCarthyite era when the conservative attacks on alleged domestic 
communist subversion could still threaten even anti-communist liberals (Sanders, 1983, 
p.211). Several of its early principals had close links to the isolationist right, which had 
opposed US participation in World War Two. These included William Regnery and General 
Robert E. Wood, two former members of the America First Committee, wartime 
antagonists of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (Diamond, 1995, 
p.47). In the early 1960s, the ASC’s educational subsidiary, the Institute for American 
Strategy was attacked by the Chair of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William 
Fulbright, for excessive influence on the military and for using a broad definition of 
communism that could have been taken to cover the Kennedy administration’s own 
policies (Diamond, 1995, p.48). 
The ASC nevertheless continued to enjoy significant influence. James Angleton joined the 
organisation in the summer of 1976, some eighteen months after leaving the CIA. 
According to the ASC’s account of Angleton’s time there, he told one early meeting that 
‘the CIA’s counterintelligence division was effectively disbanded, and for all practical 
purposes covert operations were also shut down’ (American Security Council, 2003c). 
In 1977, Angleton became chairman of the ASC’s Security and Intelligence Fund, set up to 
assist CIA and FBI officers facing prosecution as a result of the wave of investigations into 
the intelligence community (Gentry, 1977).  By that time, the ASC had become an affiliate 
of the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, an umbrella group for the 
anti-détente movement based at the Washington offices of the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority (Sanders, 1983, p.208). In effect, the most conservative sections of the old CIA-
Non Communist Left alliance had come together again to oppose the policy of détente. The 
political warfare coalition was rearticulating itself to contest the hegemony that it had lost 
in the post-Vietnam era. 
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The National Strategy Information Center 
The National Strategy Information Center was founded in 1962 under the leadership of 
Frank R. Barnett to provide information on defence and security issues. Barnett was a 
Russian-speaking veteran of the post-war US Military Government in Germany (Saxon, 
1993). He described himself as a ‘Robert Taft Republican’, alluding to a leading figure on 
the conservative wing of the party that had been at odds with the original CPD in the early 
1950s (quoted in Sanders, 1983, p.210). 
From 1955 to 1962, Barnett served as vice-president and research director of the anti-
Communist Smith Richardson Foundation (Saxon, 1993). From 1958, he was also research 
director of the Institute for American Strategy, a Smith Richardson funded offshoot of the 
American Security Council, which played a key role in the latter’s educational outreach to 
the military (Diamond, 1995, p.47). 
As head of the NSIC, Barnett continued to attract significant funding from Conservative 
donors, notably Richard Mellon Scaife (Scott-Smith, 2012, p.190). The son of an OSS officer, 
Scaife controlled the news agency Forum World Features for a period in the 1970s before 
its previous relationship with the CIA was exposed (Reed, 2014). The NSIC’s own activities 
themselves often overlapped with the CIA’s alliances. In the 1970s, it sponsored the 
establishment of Georgetown University’s International Labor Program alongside the AFL-
CIO (National Strategy Information Center, 2011). 
Both Barnett and Scaife were founder sponsors of the CPD in 1976 (Sanders, 1983, pp.155-
159). CPD chairman Rostow agreed to join the NSIC board in June 1976 in order to facilitate 
cooperation on a large scale anti-détente persuasion campaign (Sanders, 1983, p.197). 
To facilitate this alliance the NSIC opened a Washington office, working initially from the 
address of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a location which was shared by the 
Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament (Sanders, 1983, p.212). The NSIC 
representative was Roy Godson, the CDM member who also headed Georgetown’s 
International Labor Program (Sanders, 1983, p.213). 
Godson was thus at the centre of the emerging alliance between the neoconservatives and 
the New Right. The NSIC would play a significant role in the development of that alliance in 
the 1980s, and Godson would play a central one in the deepening of the political warfare 
coalition into a fully-fledged epistemic community focused on intelligence and covert 
action. The nature of that epistemic community would be profoundly shaped by battles 
over intelligence fought during the struggle over detente. 
Team B 
Challenging the intelligence estimates on which administration policy was based was a 
central plank of the ‘insider’ wing of anti-détente coalition’s activity, already well under 
way before the launch of the CPD in late 1976. Within the government, the President’s 




PFIAB had originally been formed as the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign 
Intelligence Activities in 1956, with a largely conservative membership recommended by 
then CIA director Allen Dulles (Cahn, 1998, p.101). The ideological cast of the board was 
largely unchanged by the mid-1970s. Members such as IRC President Leo Cherne, former 
ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce, and former chairman of the Psychological Strategy 
Board Gordon Gray had a record of support for offensive covert action going back decades, 
and were correspondingly sceptical about détente (Cahn, 1998, p.104). 
Debates within the PFIAB about CIA intelligence estimates produced the idea of an 
alternative threat assessment carried out by a group of outside experts (Cahn, 1998, 
p.112). CIA director William Colby rejected this proposal in a November 1975 letter to 
President Ford, which argued that outside experts would be unable to replicate the CIA’s 
expertise (Cahn, 1998, p.119). By this time, however, it had already been announced that 
Colby was due to be replaced by George H.W. Bush (Cahn, 1998, p.124). 
In May 1975, Bush agreed to a ‘competitive analysis’ of the CIA’s National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) (Cahn, 1998, p.139). His deputy at the time E. Henry Knoche, felt such a 
study would vindicate the CIA, but said later that ‘it just did not occur to me that there 
would be those with a vested interest in the public impugning of our national estimates’ 
(quoted in Cahn, 1998, p.138). The nature of the proposed process was set out in a letter 
to Bush from Leo Cherne the following month, which specified that a ‘Team B’ of outside 
experts would be given the same access to the information as a ‘Team A’ of CIA analysts to 
examine three chosen intelligence issues (Cahn, 1998, p.139). 
Initially, it was expected that the all the issues chosen would be technical in nature. 
However, objections from the US Navy meant that a panel on anti-submarine warfare was 
replaced at the last minute by one on strategic objectives, despite objections about the 
open-ended nature of the subject (Cahn, 1998, p.147).  
This panel was chaired by Professor Richard Pipes, while other members included Prof. 
William Van Cleave, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, Dr. Thomas Wolfe, Air Force Gen. John Vogt, 
Jr, Ambassador Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Ambassador Seymour Weiss, Maj. Gen. Jasper 
Welch, and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz (Sanders, 1983, p.199). 
These members were predominantly rooted in the defence establishment.  General 
Graham had been successively a senior figure in Army intelligence and the Defence 
Intelligence Agency before becoming Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the 
Intelligence Community in 1974, and Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency from 
1974 to 1976 (Godson, 1983, p.12). In later years, Graham was a strong advocate of 
removing oversight of the intelligence community as a whole from the CIA (Godson, 1983, 
Ibid). 
Nitze had been the author of the NSC-68 policy paper of 1950, and of the Gaither report of 
1957, both of them influential maximalist interpretations of the Soviet threat (Cahn, 1998, 
p.4). Prior to his resignation as a member of the SALT negotiation team in 1974, he had 
been a key ‘insider’ ally of Senator Henry Jackson’s anti-détente campaign in Congress 
(Kaufman, 2000, p.278). 
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In 1969, Jackson and Nitze had worked together in support of missile defence on the 
Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defence Policy (CPDM), where Wolfowitz had been a 
staffer (Mann, 2004, p.32). Richard Pipes had subsequently been recruited as a consultant 
to Jackson by Wolfowitz’s CPDM colleague Richard Perle (Blumenthal, 1987). Pipes was 
also a founder member of the pro-Jackson Coalition For A Democratic Majority (New York 
Times, 7 December 1972). 
Team B thus included strategically placed representation from the circle of conservative 
Democrats around Jackson within a broader composition drawn from the defence 
establishment. In this it could be said to represent in microcosm, a similar balance of forces 
to that in the Committee on the Present Danger, with which it had a significant overlapping 
membership including Nitze, Pipes, Kohler and Van Cleave (Sanders, 1983, pp.154-159). 
Team B’s conclusions would prove to be congenial to the CPD and the opponents of 
détente. The report on strategic objectives drafted by Pipes argued that the CIA had 
consistently under-estimated the Soviet threat by focusing on ‘the adversary’s capabilities 
rather than his intentions, his weapons, rather than his ideas, motives and aspirations’ 
(Cahn, 1998, p.163). It went on to make the prediction, startling in historical hindsight, that 
‘within the ten year period of the National Estimate the Soviets may well expect to achieve 
a degree of military superiority which would permit a dramatically more aggressive pursuit 
of their hegemonial objectives’ (quoted in Cahn, 1998, p.169). 
Even before these conclusions were finalised, the ‘insider’ struggle over intelligence 
estimates was moving into the public arena. A leak of Team B’s existence to the Boston 
Globe on 20 November 1976, led CIA Director George Bush to complain to PFIAB chairman 
Leo Cherne (Cahn, 1998, p.177). The resulting controversy ran throughout the November 
presidential election and the early weeks of Jimmy Carter’s presidency (Cahn, 1998, p.179). 
The Carter Administration 
Neither the launch of the Committee on the Present Danger, nor the leaks about Team B 
had an immediate impact on Carter’s foreign or defence policies. A list of 53 names put 
forward for security and foreign policy posts by the CPD, the CDM and the AFL-CIO was 
rebuffed by the incoming administration (Sanders, 1983, p.180).  
Unable to influence the executive directly, the anti-détente campaign returned to 
Congress, where it found a lightning-rod for its discontent in the confirmation hearings for 
Paul Warnke, Carter’s nominee as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) (Sanders, 1983, p.204). An anonymous memorandum was circulated on Capitol Hill, 
accusing Warnke of advocating the unilateral disarmament of US weapons systems 
(Sanders, 1983, p.204). Its authors were subsequently revealed to be Penn Kemble and 
Joshua Muravchik of the CDM (Sanders, 1983, p.205). Kemble and Muravchik were both 
former activists of the Shachtmanite Young People’s Socialist League and members of the 
Social Democrats USA as well as the CDM (Democracy Digest, 2005). Their report leaned 
heavily on the results of Team B to suggest an imminent threat of Soviet nuclear 
superiority, as did Nitze in testimony to the Senate (Sanders, 1983, p.206).  
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Although Warnke was ultimately confirmed, the umbrella group produced by the campaign 
against him, the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, would prove to be a 
landmark in the rapprochement between neoconservatism and the New Right (Sanders, 
1983, p.209). The failure to influence Carter’s approach would lead the neoconservatives 
to reassess what they had considered to be a temporary challenge from the New Politics 
movement as a fundamental challenge to their position in the Democratic Party (Ehrman, 
1995, p.98). 
Late in his term of office, Carter attempt to repair relations with the neoconservatives by 
meeting the CDM leadership in January, 1980, but the event proved to be a disaster 
(Kaufman 2000, p.397). In the absence of a primary challenge to Carter from Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, many neoconservatives moved to support Ronald Reagan and the Republican 
Party (Ehrman, 1995, p.99). 
The intelligence debate in the late 1970s 
Many of the neoconservatives involved in the anti-détente campaign of the mid-1970s had 
political roots in the cadres of the Cold War alliance of the CIA and the non-communist left. 
If the campaign had provided them with a vehicle to contest the political defeats of the 
post-Vietnam era, it had failed to regain them their previous political influence. 
One response was to build on the approach pioneered by Team B, and to develop a new 
epistemic community focused on intelligence. Like their cold war liberal precursors, the 
neoconservatives would aspire to official patronage while resisting bureaucratization. The 
crucial difference was that they acted against a post-Vietnam and post-Watergate climate 
of increased public criticism of the intelligence community. The need to influence that 
public debate would shape the emergence of the formal apparatus of an epistemic 
community, through which its members acquired the status to advocate a reinvigorated 
role for the intelligence community and for its erstwhile allies in civil society. 
The role of Roy Godson 
A key figure in this development was Roy Godson, the son of Joseph Godson, the former 
Lovestoneite Labour attaché in Britain (New York Times, 12 September 1986). From as 
early as 1969 when he was an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown 
University, Godson was working with Frank Barnett of the NSIC and involved in contacts 
between the AFL-CIO and European anti-communist networks (Scott-Smith, 2012, p.165). 
As the nature of the CIA’s alliance with organised labour began to come under public 
scrutiny in the wake of the Vietnam War, Godson mounted an academic defence of the 
AFL’s record.  Writing in Labor History in 1975, he attacked accounts of the AFL’s post-war 
role produced by New Left historians (Godson, 1975, p.325). He singled out Ronald Radosh 
who 'has maintained that the government played a decisive role in AFL policy making’ and 
Gabriel Kolko, who 'although less explicit, has maintained (without supporting evidence) 
that key AFL officials worked with and for American intelligence in post-war Europe and, by 
implication at least, that the U.S. government played a role in the making of AFL foreign 
policy’ (Godson, 1975, ibid). 
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It was of course true that the AFL had worked with and for the CIA in post-war Europe and 
Godson's own later writings would acknowledge this. By the 1990s, he would go so far as 
to criticise Tom Braden, the CIA officer who had first revealed the extent of the AFL’s CIA 
sponsorship, for blowing operations that were still running at the time of his revelations 
(Godson, 2001, p.43). 
Even in 1975, Godson did not attempt deny the CIA-AFL connection outright. This could 
have been informed by the fact that some of the interviewees for his article, such as 
George Meany, David Dubinsky and Jay Lovestone were involved in the CIA relationship, 
and indeed Lovestone had been a CIA agent until a year or two earlier (Godson, 1975, 
p.330). Without accepting Braden's allegations, he sought to turn them around, using 
Braden’s dissatisfaction with the AFL as evidence of its independence. ‘Even if one accepts 
Braden's basically unsubstantiated version, that at some point after 1947 the AFL used CIA 
funds, it appears that the AFL policy makers still retailed (sic) their autonomy’, he argued 
(Godson, 1975, pp.332-333). 
The picture put forward by Godson in Labor History thus has much in common with that of 
more recent historians of the Cultural Cold War, such as Hugh Wilford, who has argued 
that the AFL brought to their relationship with the CIA ‘a definite agenda of their own’ 
(Wilford, 2008, p.69). However, Godson's account does show why Wilford's labour-
management metaphor may not be the best way of understanding the CIA-AFL alliance, 
since it fails to capture the relative autonomy of AFL leaders from their own grassroots, 
which Godson acknowledges:  
Most rank and file, as well as middle and upper level union leaders appeared to be 
relatively uninterested in and ill-informed about international affairs. Even the 
convention proceedings and labor press of the ILGWU, one of the most 
internationally minded unions, contain little discussion of foreign policy 
alternatives. Although the ILGWU "establishment" was occasionally challenged, its 
resolutions were carried with only two or three dissenting votes (Godson, 1975, 
p.335). 
One attempt to reflect this reality might be the term 'corporate unionism' which Godson 
attributes to Radosh without directly attempting to challenge it (Godson, 1975, p.325). 
Another might be through Kees van der Pijl's concept of a distinct cadre stratum emerging 
out of the centralisation of capital in modern industrial economies, with a mediating role 
between and on behalf of wider social classes (van der Pijl, 2005, p.501). 
Indeed, Godson's own career at this juncture might be seen as an example of the way the 
transition from cold war liberalism to neoconservatism reflected the evolution of a fraction 
of this cadre stratum with a shifting social base. The mid-1970s was the very period when 
Godson was a key figure in the anti-détente campaign as a staffer at the NSIC and a 
member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (Sanders, 1983, p.212). This campaign 
would prove to be a key milestone in the fusion of neoconservatives with the new right 
into a new conservative coalition (Sanders, 1983, p.228). 
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The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence 
In the late 1970s, Godson was at the centre of a group of scholars who sought shift the 
terms of the debate on intelligence from the post-Watergate era. In 1979, this group 
founded the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) under the aegis of the NSIC 
(Godson, 1983, p.4). 
Godson outlined the Consortium’s approach in the introduction to its first volume of 
essays, Elements of Intelligence: 
To achieve their objectives, the group, calling itself the Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence, planned to assemble scholars, intelligence specialists and other 
organizations and individuals interested in the subject. Papers were to be 
commissioned in various areas, and discussed in a series of meetings over a four 
year period. The results of their deliberations were to be published and made 
available to concerned governmental and non-governmental entities, and to 
academics teaching intelligence in the context of diplomacy and foreign operations 
(Godson, 1983, p.4). 
This programme arguably represents an attempt to form an epistemic community as 
defined by Peter Haas, ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, p.3). Haas identified four key features of 
epistemic communities, including a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared 
causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common policy enterprise (Haas, 1992, p.3). 
The Consortium’s early work developed all of these features in the course of a policy 
enterprise rooted in the previous work of the Committee on the Present Danger and of the 
Team B analysts, groups from which a number of the scholars in the Consortium were 
drawn. Of eighteen founders, four had been founder members of the Committee on the 
Present Danger: Robert Pfaltzgraff, Adda Bozeman, Paul Seabury, and the former CIA 
officer Ray Cline (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 2007a). A fifth, Richard Pipes, 
had been the driving force of Team B’s Strategic Objectives Panel. The Consortium’s initial 
series of conferences would address many of the issues that had been raised by the Team 
B exercise. 
The CSI conferences: Elements of Intelligence 
The first CSI conference took place in Washington DC on 27-28 April 1979, and brought 
together some fifty to sixty scholars, congressional staffers, and current and former 
intelligence officers (Godson, 1983, p.4). Their discussion focused on a series of papers 
organised around four major intelligence disciplines: clandestine collection, analysis and 
estimates, covert action and counterintelligence (Godson, 1983, p.5). The structure of the 
resulting book, Elements on Intelligence itself arguably sheds some light on the crisis of the 
1970s, and how it affected different elements of the intelligence community devoted to 
each of these disciplines. 
In his introduction to the volume, Godson noted that 'in the 1970s, in the US an 
unprecedented public debate was initiated about the role of foreign intelligence in an open 
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society’ (Godson, 1983, p.3). However, he argued that the debate did not go far enough, 
focusing on abuses rather than effectiveness 
'Thus a reading of the congressional investigation reports would leave the 
impression that US covert action was either entirely immoral (promoting 
assassinations and interfering unilaterally in democratic politics of other countries) 
or of no utility. Intelligence analysis and estimates fared little better. The Pike 
Committee found only inadequacy; the Church Committee ignored the subject 
altogether' (Godson, 1983, p.3). 
He went on to suggest that the public debate had moved on to the question of 'existing 
intelligence capabilities matched against present and future needs' (Godson, 1983, p.3).  If 
this true it was least in part due to the efforts of the Committee on the Present Danger and 
of Team B. 
Elements of intelligence built directly on those precedents. The paper on intelligence 
analysis was written by a key member of Team B, the former director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency General Daniel O. Graham (Godson ed. 1983, 11-12). Graham had been 
described as the “most pungent and persistent single critic of the CIA’s estimating – 
analyzing hierarchy” by Washington Post journalist Joseph Alsop in 1973 (quoted in Cahn, 
1998, p.83).  The truth of this judgement was very apparent in Graham’s contribution to 
Elements of Intelligence, which accused the CIA of dominating the national estimates 
process and causing institutional friction with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Graham, 1983, p.24). 
Graham went on to argue that the impact of Team B on subsequent CIA estimates 
suggested that there was a case for institutionalising competitive analysis (Graham, 1983, 
pp.26-27). He acknowledged that this ‘might lead to the dismemberment of the CIA’, but 
argued that there was a case for ‘disentangling the CIA’s various functions’ (Graham, 1983, 
p.27). The CIA’s analysts ‘have often been unfairly critical of the military services on the 
premise that the latter produce self-serving intelligence’, despite their own ‘remarkable 
record of under-estimation of the Soviet armed forces’, they were nonetheless gaining 
support for ‘even greater centralization of the intelligence community’ with the 
appointment of the CIA director as Director of National Intelligence (Graham, 1983, p.27). 
Graham’s own proposals included a Director of National Intelligence separate from the CIA, 
a stronger DIA and the possible break-up of the CIA’s analytical side, the Directorate of 
Intelligence (Graham, 1983, p.28). 
The Elements of Intelligence essay on clandestine intelligence collection was written by 
Samuel Halpern, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services and the Strategic Services Unit 
who served as executive assistant to the head of the CIA’s clandestine service, the Deputy 
Director for Plans, before retiring in December 1974 (Graham, 1983, p.13). His retirement 
thus came at the climax of the purges during William Colby’s tenure as director of the CIA. 
In his contribution, Halpern pointedly argued that ‘there is some question now, following 
up on the heavy attrition through retirement and resignation during the 1970s, as to 
whether there are enough experienced officers on duty to meet current requirements’ 
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(Halpern, 1983, p.36). He also queried a number of other developments over the same 
period. The Freedom of Information Act, he suggested, had led to a decline in cooperation 
from American businesses and foreign intelligence services (Halpern, 1983, p.36). 
Proscriptions on intelligence officers operating as journalists or academics had narrowed 
the options for working undercover (Halpern, 1983, p.37). As for Congressional oversight, 
Halpern concluded, ‘Obviously, the fewer restrictions on clandestine collection the better, 
lest we end up with a service so hobbled as to be ineffective’ (Halpern, 1983, p.38). In 
institutional terms, Halpern’s recommendations were conservative, arguing for the 
continued centralisation of the inter-related disciplines of intelligence collection, covert 
action and counterintelligence in the CIA (Halpern, 1983, p.35). 
The chapter on counterintelligence by Newton S. Miler also emphasised the need for 
centralisation within its sphere. Miler had been a senior CIA counterintelligence officer 
until his retirement, which came, like Halpern’s, in December 1974 (Godson, 1983, p.14). 
Along with Raymond Rocca and William Hood, he was a one of a small group of senior 
counterintelligence officers who resigned together following the dismissal of their chief, 
James Angleton (Wise, 1992, p.271).  
In Elements of Intelligence, Miler argued that ‘US intelligence was devastated in the mid to 
late 1970s, and is still In disarray’ (Miler, 1983, p.47) . However, he went on to state that 
problems in counterintelligence were rooted in an internal CIA decision to dismantle its 
centralised counterintelligence program in 1973, ‘some 18 months before the concerted 
media and congressional attacks on the intelligence community began’ (Miler, 1983, p.48). 
He called for the restoration of a counterintelligence system that was ‘monolithically 
centralized and apolitical’, with extensive authority to conduct double agent and deception 
operations, to carry out counterintelligence liaison with foreign intelligence services, to 
review the CIA’s other clandestine operations, and to maintain a compartmented 
counterintelligence record system (Miler, 1983, p.54). 
All this was clearly based on the precedents of the Angleton era. ‘Beginning in 1954, and 
for some 19 years thereafter, the US had within the CIA a centralized counterintelligence 
component, the CI Staff, which saw a national counterintelligence program as its goal and 
attempted to attain the objectives, enforce the disciplines, and perform the functions 
outlined above,’, Miler noted, arguing that ‘the US needs to restore, and then increase, the 
central counterintelligence capabilities lost in 1973’ (Miler, 1983, p.56). One potential 
obstacle was opposition to the collection of ‘domestic intelligence’, a term which Miler 
argued should be restricted to information about threats ‘which are not instigated or 
supported by foreign powers’ (Miler, 1983, p.63). This was a key issue given that domestic 
intelligence activities, including the relationship with Lovestone, had helped to bring about 
Angleton’s downfall. 
 
Evidence that Miler's perspective enjoyed significant support from his former boss is 
provided by a declassified memo reporting a 1983 meeting between Angleton and serving 
CIA officers involved in the CIA Director’s Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Counterintelligence Analysis (Best, 2017). The report stated: 
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Angleton gave us his copy of an article on counterintelligence and the future 
authored by [REDACTED] the former Chief of Operations of the CI Staff. Angleton 
noted that while he would not subscribe to everything [REDACTED] has written in 
the article, he agrees with the positions it takes on the future. This article has been 
submitted for publication to Roy Godson and his Georgetown University group 
(cited in Best, 2017). 
The Chief of Operations seems likely to have been Miler, and the article in question may 
even have been Miler’s Elements of Intelligence chapter, Counterintelligence at the 
Crossroads. Miler’s argument is certainly consistent with the views attributed to Angleton 
in the 1983 memo: ‘Give the present CI Staff all the powers and responsibilities the pre 
1973 staff had and add powers that Angleton has always believed a properly constituted CI 
Staff should have, but which DCIs beginning with Dulles down to Helms were never willing 
to grant him’ (Best, 2017). 
The Elements of Intelligence chapter on covert action was written by Hugh Tovar, a CIA 
officer who retired in 1978 (Godson, 1983, p.15). Tovar was a veteran of the OSS, the 
Strategic Services and the Office of Special Operations, who had become head of the CIA’s 
covert action staff in the late 1960s (Godson, 2001, p.275). During his career, Tovar had 
been involved in covert operations in Laos, and had served as CIA station chief in 
Indonesia, where his role during the 1965 coup remains a subject of controversy (Prados, 
2003, p.150). 
In Elements of intelligence, Tovar argued that ‘covert action no longer seems to figure 
significantly in the operational posture of CIA (Tovar, 1983, p.72). In contrast, covert action 
had succeeded in the past when the three key ingredients of ‘policy, leadership and 
continuity’ had been in place (Tovar, 1983, p.73). He cited material assistance and 
professional guidance to the Italian trade unions, press and political parties, as an example 
of the major programs which had been conducted in Western Europe during the Truman 
era, and which he argued ‘were positive efforts to enable our allies to cope with their own 
problems’ (Tovar, 1983, p.73). He nevertheless went on to warn that covert action success 
often carried the seeds of its own failure, and that continuity, though desirable, was 
double-edged as successful operations involving international organisations representing 
labour, veterans, women, youth and students had become more insecure over time, 
leading to their exposure in the 1960s (Tovar, 1983. p.78). 
In arguing for a revived covert action infrastructure, Tovar shed significant light on how 
state actors conceptualised the relationships involved in covert action: 
As a rule – and in fact almost invariably – the action is believed by those who are 
carrying it out to be compatible also with their interests. We are thus taking sides 
in local issues, i.e., intervening in a manner which infringes host country 
sovereignty. In such circumstances it is not likely that a covert action asset would 
be asked or induced, certainly not forced, to do something he did not wish to do 
(Tovar, 1983, p.80). 
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He went on to emphasise that such covert action may or may not involve material 
assistance and formal agent relationships: ‘the association may be discreet without being 
clandestine, and may devolve on the exchange of ideas and guidance, or advice’ (Tovar, 
1983, p.80). This picture conforms closely to that presented in Roy Godson’s earlier 
defence of the AFL’s relationship with the CIA (Godson, 1975). It also in line with the view 
of that relationship in the recent academic literature on the Cultural Cold War (Wilford, 
2003, p.99). 
Taken together, the contributors to Elements of Intelligence were consistent in their 
opposition to developments in the CIA during the mid-1970s, when the agency had reined 
in its clandestine activities and presented analysis that supported détente. General 
Graham’s call for competitive intelligence was compatible with the agenda of the CIA 
contributors because their call for centralisation was largely focused on the clandestine 
disciplines of intelligence collection, covert action and counterintelligence. This 
convergence between military analysts such as Graham and CIA clandestine ‘old boys’ such 
as Halpern, Miler and Tovar, demonstrated the shared beliefs of an incipient epistemic 
community. 
The CSI Conferences: Analysis and Estimates 
The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence held a second conference from 30 December 
to 1 November 1979, attended once again by some sixty intelligence professionals, 
Congressional staffers, policymakers and scholars (Godson, 1980a, p.3). The Colloquium on 
Analysis and Estimates was the first of several devoted to each of the individual 
intelligence disciplines identified at the previous meeting (Godson, 1980a, p.3).  
The quality of the CIA’s estimates had been a key issue in the battle against détente in the 
preceding years, and many of those present had played central roles in the struggle. Some, 
such as the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Iklé and the 
former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, had been key allies of Senator 
Henry Jackson inside the executive branch of Government (Godson, 1980a, pp.221-223). 
Others were drawn from the incipient neoconservative movement, including CDM director 
Joshua Muravchik and Team B members Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Pipes (Godson, 1980a, 
pp.221-223). 
In his introduction to the volume of papers produced for the conference Analysis and 
Estimates, Roy Godson identified two major philosophical approaches to intelligence 
analysis. The first of these, associated with the CIA analyst Sherman Kent, saw intelligence 
as an empirical discipline focused on factual evidence, which should retain sufficient 
distance from policymakers to maintain its objectivity (Godson, 1980a, p.2). The second 
school, associated with the political theorist Wilmoore Kendall, argued that analysts should 
‘affirmatively articulate and evaluate alternative policies’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2). On this 
view, analysis must be informed by political theory: ‘by clarifying the ends sought by 
political actors, and the dynamics of the process, the course of events may become 
comprehensible as well’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2). 
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A similar framework was adopted in the chapter by Angelo Codevilla, a former 
congressional staffer who had been a key supporter of Team B during the deliberations of 
the Senate Select Committee on intelligence in 1977 (Cahn, 1998, p181). In his contribution 
to Analysis and Estimates, Codevilla argued that ‘as Wilmoore Kendall warned in 1949, 
empiricism substantially affects broader judgements’ (Codevilla, 1980pp.32-33). Codevilla’s 
description of the problems raised by such an approach underlined the significance of the 
issue for the struggle over détente: 
For example, the current rule with regard to counting Soviet strategic forces seems 
to be, ‘what we’ve not seen doesn’t exist’. If we have not seen something we have 
no other way of knowing its existence. This is textbook empiricism (Codevilla, 1980, 
p.33). 
Estimates of Soviet strategic forces were also at the centre of the chapter by David Sullivan, 
a CIA Soviet analyst from 1971 to 1978 (Godson, 1980a, p.5). Sullivan’s agency career had 
come to an end after he was found to have leaked a classified report on Soviet missiles to 
Senator Henry Jackson’s aide Richard Perle (Prados, 1986, p.243). 
 Sullivan argued that the SALT process of the 1970s had been driven by mistaken estimates 
(Sullivan, 1980, p.62). Reiterating arguments he had previously made in classified CIA 
studies, Sullivan suggested that the SALT I treaty had not constrained Soviet strategic arms 
programmes and predictions that the 1979 SALT Treaty would do so were based on ‘misuse 
of intelligence to support predetermined policy positions’ (Sullivan, 1980, p.63). 
The discussants of Sullivan’s paper included Admiral George W. Anderson, Leo Cherne’s 
predecessor as chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the 
body that had recommended the Team B exercise; and the former CIA analyst Ray Cline 
(Sullivan, 1980, p.75). Anderson said that he did not disagree with the paper, but argued 
that the fault lay fundamentally with policy-makers ‘who decided wrongly about the Bay of 
Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War’ (Sullivan, 1980, p.74). Cline pushed 
back against the criticism of the Sherman Kent tradition of analysis, and agreed with 
Anderson that political leaders had created problems in intelligence: ‘Its distribution was 
used as a tool to create power and create public opinion, and in particular to impress the 
media in this country with certain points of view, whether or not it had had anything to do 
with the outside world’(Sullivan, 1980, p.79). 
However, the most highly-charged section of Analysis and Estimates was arguably the 
chapter on analyst recruitment, which featured papers from former CIA Director William 
Colby, and from Team B member Richard Pipes. Colby’s contribution accepted key 
elements of the Team B critique of CIA analysis, arguing that analysts had been too remote 
from both policymakers and intelligence collectors (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.167). He 
noted that ‘Congressional praise for "objective" CIA comment reducing the Pentagon’s 
threat projections was reversed by Albert Wohlstetter’s article demonstrating its 
underestimates of the pace of Soviet strategic growth’ (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.167). 
There were nevertheless important differences in the approaches to analyst training 
recommended by Colby and Pipes. Colby emphasised that a range of disciplines would be 
required to process the growing amount of information available (Colby and Pipes, 1980, 
112 
 
p.165). Pipes, in contrast, emphasised the particular value of the humanities whose 
tradition of source criticism enables a scholar to ‘look at a book in an entirely alien field 
and be able to tell very rapidly whether it is a good book or a bad book’ (Colby and Pipes, 
1980, p.173). On this basis, he said he was struck by the faultiness of CIA estimates during 
the Team B exercise before he became expert in their substantive subject matter (Colby 
and Pipes, 1980, p.175). He suggested that Soviet scholars should focus on Lenin’s writings, 
arguing that ‘Lenin’s contribution to political strategy is comparable to Napoleon’s 
contribution to military strategy. Lenin militarized politics’ (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.175).  
Other chapters focused on themes such as surprise or deception, which emphasised the 
importance of analysis based on intentions rather than capabilities. In a chapter on 
deception by foreign governments, journalist Edward J. Epstein argued that forms of 
deception focused on disguising intentions could not be detected by analysis focused on 
capabilities (Epstein and Feer, 1980, p.128). Epstein was James Angleton’s principal 
supporter in the media, and his views about deception owed much to the influence of the 
former CIA counterintelligence chief and his supporters (Mangold, 1991, p.213). Among 
the respondents to the chapter was Angleton’s former deputy, Raymond Rocca, who 
complained that there was no treatment of the question of ‘how to do deception from our 
point of view’ (Epstein and Feer, 1980, p.154). 
Taken together, the broad thrust of the papers in Analysis and Estimates were clearly in 
support of the Wilmoore Kendall tradition rather than that associated with Sherman Kent. 
The epistemic community being curated by the CSI was therefore emerging as one which 
emphasised the limits of a scientific approach to intelligence analysis in favour of more 
intuitive methods. 
April 1980 Colloquium on Counterintelligence 
The third colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, focusing on 
counterintelligence, took place in 1980 (Godson, 1980b, p.1). Some 13 current and former 
CIA officers took part alongside others with backgrounds in the DIA, the FBI, and the armed 
services intelligence agencies, as well as foreign intelligence veterans included John Bruce 
Lockhart of Britain, Schlomo Gazit of Israel, Thyraud de Vosjoli of France and the Czech 
defector Ladislav Bittman (Godson, 1980b, pp.336-339). The balance of some sixty 
participants included academics and congressional staffers specialising in intelligence 
(Godson, 1980b, p.1). 
The colloquium identified a similar dichotomy of approaches to counterintelligence to the 
one the previous meeting had posited in the field of intelligence analysis. A paper by Arthur 
Zuehlke criticised Sherman Kent’s description of counterintelligence as essentially 
defensive ‘security intelligence’ because it under-emphasized the potential offensive role 
for the discipline (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p.14). Zuehlke argued that counterintelligence can not 
only detect and neutralise enemy activity but also manipulate it: ‘If CI [counterintelligence] 
has a capability for thorough detection (and is confident in its ability to detect enemy 
agents), it may opt to “double” these agents, controlling them as a valuable deception 
channel’ (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p.30).  
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Zuehlke pointed to a 1978 executive order on counterintelligence as evidence that the 
discipline was no longer seen as a narrow security function within the US Government 
(Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p..25). His optimism on this point was, however, challenged by Newton 
Miler, the veteran of James Angleton’s counterintelligence staff, who stated that ‘from the 
perspective of the attempt to establish a centralized counterintelligence program, such as 
the CI effort from 1955 to 1973, it is inadequate’ (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p.43). Miler outlined 
requirements for an effective counterintelligence system, arguing for a ‘monolithically 
centralised’ and ‘apolitical’ approach that resembled an idealized picture of Angleton’s 
former staff (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p.42). Two other veterans of Angleton’s staff, Norman 
Smith and Donovan Pratt, also presented papers which called for a revival of centralised 
counterintelligence (Godson, 1980b, p.8). A paper by Roy Godson and Arnold Beichman 
argued that a return to counterintelligence as it had been practised before the mid-1970s 
was impossible without a change in the legal framework that had been established in the 
intervening period (Godson and Beichman, 1980, p.300). 
A contribution by William R. Harris of the Rand Corporation underlined that an Angletonian 
approach to counterintelligence might actually have profound political implications in an 
era of détente. Harris argued that the Soviets had enough agents in the West in the 1960s 
to provide feedback to a hypothetical programme of technical deception on Soviet missile 
capabilities (Harris, 1980, p.73). As he noted, the channels for such deception would have 
been precisely the technical means on which verification of the SALT Treaties was based 
(Harris, 1980, p.53). He therefore argued for increased counterintelligence control over 
technical collection, because ‘the premises of counterintelligence training conflict with the 
scientific training and expectations of openness nurtured in the scientific community. The 
enemy is not nature but man’ (Harris, 1980, p.58). 
Another paper with implications for détente was congressional staffer Herbert 
Romerstein’s essay on domestic counterintelligence, which charged that Soviet successes 
come from ideological spies in periods of relaxed relations (Romerstein, 1980, p.162). 
Other papers pointed to a range of counterintelligence threats. A chapter by John Dziak of 
the DIA pointed to the covert action role of Soviet Spetsnaz special forces as a key factor in 
a strategic balance that had shifted significantly towards the Soviets (Dziak, 1980, p.109). In 
response to a paper by Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, a number of un-named 
participants, including a former counterintelligence officer, suggested that the Soviets 
exercised significant control over international terrorism (Gazit and Handel, 1980, p.157). 
Perhaps the clearest picture of the scope of counterintelligence threats seen by the 
colloquium’s participants was provided by a curious appendix to the volume of conference 
proceedings. This was a ‘deliberately overstated’ fictional instruction to the KGB’s London 
Station, actually written by former MI6 officer John Bruce Lockhart which praised “the 
steadily increasing influence of the militant left in Britain, in Parliament, in the Trade 
Unions, in education circles, and the increasing undermining of the central patriotic will of 
the British people” (Lockhart, 1980, p.324). If this was partly tongue-in-cheek it 




It was perhaps an appropriate postscript to a colloquium which underlined how much the 
Consortium’s agonistic view of intelligence owed to the legacy of James Angleton’s 
Counterintelligence Staff. 
International parallels 
The neoconservative counter-offensive against détente in the United States was linked to a 
number of related developments internationally. In Britain, events surrounding the demise 
of the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department had significant parallels with 
institutional battles over intelligence in the US.  In Israel, the 1979 Jerusalem Conference 
on International Terrorism brought together a range of actors sympathetic to the 
neoconservative critique of détente from around the world. 
Britain 
As in the United States, the debate over détente in Britain proved to be divisive for the 
intelligence establishment. This emerges most clearly from the fate of the Foreign Office 
propaganda arm, the Information Research Department. 
Like the CIA, the Information Research Department had established significant links with 
the anti-communist left in the early Cold War (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.119). By the 
early 1970s, a number of IRD intellectuals had established links to the anti-détente 
movement in the US. Henry Jackson and his staff made annual visits to Britain in the 1970s, 
during which they consulted with figures such as Robert Conquest, Leopold Labedz and 
Leonard Schapiro (Kaufman, 2000, p.259). These were all members of the circle of anti-
communist academics cultivated by the IRD (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.123). 
In November 1975, an IRD briefing paper, Two Standards on Détente, argued that Soviet 
bloc countries were ‘continuing to interpret détente and peaceful coexistence as allowing, 
and even assisting, the promotion of Communist revolutions throughout the world’ 
(Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.170). Such views were at odds with the British Government’s 
policy, a factor which contributed to Foreign Secretary David Owen’s decision to abolish 
the IRD in May 1977 (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.171). 
Like their fellow cold warriors in the US, former IRD cadres would respond to the loss of 
official patronage by moving into the private sector and lobbying for a renewal of Cold War 
intelligence structures. In the case of IRD, the main vehicle for this was the Institute for the 
Study of Conflict (ISC) founded in 1970 and funded by Richard Mellon Scaife, also a key 
financier of the anti-détente movement in the US (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.164). The 
ISCs director, Brian Crozier, would devote much fruitless effort in the late 1970s to 
lobbying Margaret Thatcher to create a new ‘Counter Subversion Executive’, possibly with 
the same relationship to the Foreign Office as the IRD (Crozier, 1994, p.143). 
Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism 
The Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism took place in Israel on 2-5 July 1979 
(Netanyahu, 1981, p.ix.). It was in effect a major international forum for the movement 
against détente, and many of those present had been central to the struggles of the 
preceding years. Speakers from the US included Senator Henry Jackson and prominent 
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members of the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority such as Ben Wattenberg and Bayard Rustin. In the closing statement of the 
conference, Jackson charged that there was now a ‘terrorist international’ which shared a 
common interest with the Soviet Union ‘in destroying the fabric of democratic, lawful 
societies all over the world’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.361).  
This central theme had been reiterated in various ways by a number of other speakers. Ray 
Cline, the former CIA officer and co-founder of the Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence, told the conference that the KGB had persuaded the Soviet Politburo to 
accept the PLO ‘as a major political instrument in the Mideast and to subsidise its terrorist 
policies’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.91). This he regarded as consistent with détente, ‘a Soviet 
recipe for ideological warfare’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.95).  
From Britain, ISC Director Brian Crozier supported the thesis of Soviet backing for 
terrorism, arguing that if there were gaps in the evidence ‘the contrary would be surprising 
in a field in which clandestinity is essential to success’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.64). Former 
Team B analyst Richard Pipes expanded on this argument by claiming that Soviet support 
for terrorism was kept secret because the Soviet Union was itself vulnerable to similar 
tactics from its own national minorities (Netanyahu, 1981, p.61). 
For the Israelis, the recently retired head of military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Schlomo Gazit 
charged that Soviet military assistance enabled the PLO to function as a clearing house for 
international terrorism (Netanyahu, 1981,p.348). 
The conference’s relentless focus on the theory of Soviet sponsorship of Arab terrorism 
arguably reflected a powerful community of interests among its participants. If the Israelis 
benefitted from portraying their struggle with the Palestinians as a dimension of the Cold 
War, American and European Cold Warriors would benefit from portraying Middle Eastern 
terrorism as evidence of Soviet duplicity. This was shown most clearly by Republican 
Congressman Jack Kemp who told the conference that ‘an examination of the Soviet role in 
promoting international terrorism casts grave doubt on the assumptions about Soviet 
policy upon which the American, and Western, policy toward the Soviet Union is based, 
particularly those policies which relate to SALT, Helsinki and Détente itself,’ (Netanyahu, 
1981, p.190).  
As in the early Cold War the political warfare coalition of the late 1970s was a transnational 






Chapter Seven: Neoconservatism in the Reagan era 
Chapter Seven will look at how the creation of an epistemic community focused on 
intelligence assisted the rise of the neoconservatives to a position of influence within the 
Reagan administration, and their subsequent displacement as a result of the Iran-Contra 
Affair and the renewal of détente with the Soviet Union. 
The Reagan Administration 
 
From the outset, the neoconservatives enjoyed a success in obtaining appointments in the 
Reagan Administration that was in stark contrast to their treatment under Carter. Reagan’s 
foreign policy advisor, Richard Allen, a founder member of the Committee on the Present 
Danger, was central to efforts to reach out to neoconservative Democrats and ensured that 
many of his CPD colleagues played a role in the Reagan transition team (Sanders, 1983, 
p.286). Allen’s role in sustaining this emerging alliance on national security issues was 
exemplified by his attendance at the 1979 CSI conference on analysis and estimates as 
chairman of the intelligence subcommittee of the Republican National Committee 
(Godson, 1980a, p.220). 
Reagan ultimately recruited some 32 CPD members to his administration in 1980, 
concentrated in the foreign policy, defence and security fields (Sanders, 1983, pp.287-288). 
A number of Henry Jackson’s allies in the struggle against détente returned to government 
including Paul Nitze, as Chief Negotiator for Theater Nuclear Forces, and Fred Iklé, as Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (Sanders, 1983, p.287). Former Jackson staffer Richard Perle 
was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Sanders, 
1983, p.288). 
Founder members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority who made the partisan leap 
into the Reagan Administration included Max Kampelman, as US Delegate to the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Jeane Kirkpatrick, as US Representative 
to the United Nations; Michael Novak; Richard Pipes, who joined the staff of the National 
Security Council; Eugene Rostow, who became the director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency; and Paul Seabury, who became one of eight CPD members recruited 
to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Sanders, 1983, pp.287-288).  
All these were members of the CPD as was the incoming head of the CIA, William Casey 
(Sanders, 1983, p.287). As a wartime OSS officer and a longstanding official of the 
International Rescue Committee, Casey had played a key role over decades in the alliance 
between the US state and the non-communist left (Chester, 1995, p.199). The 1980s would 
see renewed official support for intervention abroad by conservative social democrats and 
their neoconservative offshoots. This time, however, much of the effort would take place 
in the open. 
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Democracy promotion in the 1980s  
The genealogy of Reagan-era neoconservatism in the earlier alliance between the 
American state and cold war liberalism has been widely recognised. A number of scholars 
see the administration’s foreign policy focus on democracy and human rights as the 
primary expression of this. For Nicholas Guilhot ‘this alliance between political networks 
embodying a very ideological understanding of “democracy” or “human rights” and the 
state apparatus itself was similar to the one that had existed in the 1950s between the 
non-Communist left and the State Department or the CIA; it actually reproduced it under 
another form, albeit with different actors’ (Guilhot, 2005, p.69). Similarly, Justin Vaisse 
argues that support for democratic forces around the world was the main distinctive 
contribution of the neoconservatives to Reagan’s foreign policy (Vaïsse, 2010, p.191). In 
Vaisse’s view, other aspects of Reagan’s anti-Soviet strategy, including his expansion of 
covert action, ‘might have been approved by any hawk’ (Vaïsse, 2010, pp.190-191).  
The key vehicle for this democracy promotion agenda was the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) established in 1983 (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). Although defined in law as a 
non-governmental organisation, The NED was financed by Congress and the US 
Government and disbursed the majority of its funds to four organisations, the AFL-CIO’s 
Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) of 
the US Chamber of Commerce, the International Republican Institute and the National 
Democratic Institute (Guilhot, 2005, p.85). It thus replicated in overt form the covert 
support that the state had provided to the international operations of American civil 
society organisations during the early Cold War. Indeed, the combination of state 
patronage and operational autonomy arguably represented the achievement of the 
position that the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) had sought to achieve in its struggles 
with the Office of Policy Coordination in the 1950s. 
An examination of the NED can therefore perhaps shed some retrospective light on the 
debate about the nature of the relationship between the CIA and the FTUC. Hugh Wilford 
has argued that this can be understood in terms of a metaphor of labour-management 
relations (Wilford, 2003, p.101). In chapter Four, we argued that this failed to fully capture 
the significance of FTUC leaders’ insistence on their independent professional status. The 
emergence from the non-communist left milieu a generation later of what Guilhot calls 
‘professional “democracy experts”’ blurring the lines between state power and civil society 
is consistent with this interpretation of the AFL-CIO’s role as that of a cadre stratum 
distinct from their own mass base in the labour movement (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). 
The political roots of the NED leadership are recognised by Guilhot, who notes that the 
NED’s founding president Carl Gershman, research council members Joshua Muravchik and 
Seymour Lipset and the Free Trade Union Institute’s Eugenia Kemble all had backgrounds 
in the Shachtmanite wing of American social democracy (Guilhot, 2005, p.84). Vaisse also 
emphasises the neoconservative roots of the NED and particularly the Free Trade Union 
Institute (Vaïsse, 2010, p.192). 
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Developing the neoconservative theory of intelligence 
The rise of overt democracy promotion did not, however, mean a diminution of 
neoconservative interest in covert action. Instead, the emergence of professional 
democracy promotion overlapped with the continuing development of an epistemic 
community focused on intelligence. 
The CSI conferences: 1980 Colloquium on Covert Action 
The fourth conference of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, the Colloquium on 
Covert Action took place on 5-6 December 1980, just over a month after the election of 
Ronald Reagan as President (Godson, 1981, p.239). Alongside a large contingent of 
intelligence officers, and the usual contingents of academics, journalists and congressional 
staffers, the meeting was notable for the attendance of Richard Wilson, of the AFL-CIO’s 
Department of Organisation (Godson, 1981, p.243). 
In his introduction to the volume of conference proceedings, Roy Godson argued that most 
countries outside the United States made no clear distinction between covert action and 
wider foreign policy (Godson, 1981, p.2). He nevertheless argued that there were good 
reasons to link covert action to other intelligence disciplines, enabling covert action 
operators to benefit from the tradecraft and networks of intelligence collection and 
counterintelligence operators (Godson, 1981, p.3). Godson suggested that the Soviet Union 
had weaknesses that could be exploited by covert action, arguing that: ‘The US and other 
Western states could seek, for defensive reasons, to counter at the source Soviet efforts to 
shift the global balance in its favour. Or the West can more actively, assist in the non-
military destruction of the Soviet empire’ (Godson, 1981, p.5). He insisted, however, that 
this would require strong policy leadership from the President downwards. It was also 
require the recreation of a covert action infrastructure, with possible expedients including 
‘rehiring some of the best specialists who left in the 1970s’ (Godson, 1981, p.6). 
Angelo Codevilla developed similar themes in his contribution to a chapter on covert action 
and foreign policy. He emphasised that covert action was a uniquely American term and 
that all political activity contains covert aspects (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, pp.81-82). 
He went on to argue that no attempt by one country to influence politics in another is 
‘without some veneer of secrecy’, giving the example of the Federal Republic of Germany’s 
use of the Social Democratic Party to fund Portuguese socialists to forestall a communist 
takeover (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.93). ‘The veil was thin but proved sufficient’, he 
suggested, ‘The stronger and more wilful the country, the thinner the veil maybe’ 
(Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.93). He criticised the lack of covert action against the 
Soviet Bloc itself since the 1950s, singling out the activities of the AFL-CIO as an exception 
(Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.100). He concluded by placing covert action once again in 
the context of broader policy, warning that ‘covert activities are valuable servants of policy, 
they are not a substitute for policy’ (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.104).  
A similar emphasis on the need for ‘will on the part of decision-makers’ was made by the 
former Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, in a chapter entitled: The Uses 
of Political and Propaganda Covert Action in the 1980s (Walters, 1981, p.124). Almost half 
of Walters’ paper was devoted to the deliberations of a hypothetical Soviet covert action 
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planning group, which Walters imagined would focus on attacking the American character 
‘so that we will paralyse them through their own conscience when we move to advance 
our interests and help our friends’ (Walters, 1981, p.116). In a response to Walters’ paper, 
Senate Intelligence Committee Staffer Abram Shulsky supported calls for covert action in 
the Soviet Bloc, but warned that ‘I don’t believe this could possibly have the sort of success 
against totalitarian countries that General Walters was talking about for the Soviets’ 
hypothetical programs against us’ (Walters, 1981, p.129). He nevertheless called for the US 
to emulate the Soviets by pursuing foreign policy at an unofficial level, citing as an example 
the AFL-CIO ‘giving material support to the Polish unions in a way that the CIA cannot do, 
and without the dangers that would come about if the CIA did it’ (Walters, 1981, p.130) . 
The subsequent chapter by former senior CIA officer Ted Shackley argued that ‘probably 
the most effective form of covert action is the clandestine sponsorship of armed 
insurgency and its antidote, counterinsurgency’ (Shackley, 1981, p.137). Although he noted 
that insurgents in Afghanistan and Angola had sought American help, the main focus of his 
argument was the need to revive covert action as a defensive option against ‘Soviet-
backed wars of national liberation’ (Shackley, 1981, p.137). 
A chapter by Donald Jameson, a former covert action specialist in the CIA’s Soviet Division, 
examined current trends in Soviet covert action (Godson, 1981, p.9). Jameson identified 
key thematic campaigns ‘against the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons in NATO 
nations’ and towards ‘the destabilization of the racial situation in the Republic of South 
Africa’ (Jameson, 1981, p.173). In a response to Jameson’s paper, Herbert Romerstein, a 
staff of member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, argued that Soviet covert action 
included support for terrorism, carried out by ‘cutouts’ such as the PLO (Jameson, 1981, 
p.187). 
In a section reviewing the past record of American covert action, former CIA officer Hugh 
Tovar pointed to successes in the Western Europe under the leadership of President 
Truman in the 1940s (Tovar, 1981, p.194). He nevertheless acknowledged the expansion of 
these operations to Eastern Europe in the 1950s had been a failure (Tovar, 1981, p.197). 
The effectiveness of even the Western European activities was questioned by former 
French intelligence officer Thyraud De Vosjoli, who recalled ‘at that time, I was in Paris and 
I would receive almost daily report of supposedly covert activity’ (Tovar, 1981, p.211). De 
Vosjoli went on to argue that covert action should not be run by the CIA or by agents under 
official cover because of its intrinsic visibility compared to other kinds of intelligence 
activity (Tovar, 1981, p.211). 
The final chapter by the former chief of CIA Covert Action Staff, Donald Purcell, looked at 
the scope for covert action in the future (Godson, 1981, p.10). Reviewing the decline of 
covert action during the 1970s, Purcell lamented that ‘by 1978, CIA’s capabilities to 
respond to covert action tasking were minimal’(Purcell, 1981, p.219). 
He went on to suggest that it was unlikely that the CIA would be able to use private 
organisations in future, but that ‘it is worth considering alternative arrangements whereby 
non-governmental entities could be given overt government financing for foreign programs 
supporting United States foreign policy goals’ (Purcell, 1981, p.225). He argued that a 
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number of American non-governmental organisations ‘may be willing to accept an overt 
government subsidy which would free them from concerns with intelligence contamination 
and possible embarrassment or loss of profit stemming from covert relationships’ (Purcell, 
1981, p.225). 
Suggestions along these lines were well received in the conference discussion of Purcell’s 
paper: 
Two former intelligence officers spoke favourably of a proposal to create an 
American counterpart of the British Council, or of the “foundations” run by West 
Germany’s political parties but financed by the West German government. These 
semi-private, wholly overt entities channel money, advice and support to a variety 
of political causes around the world. The AFL-CIO has also done this sort of thing 
on a small scale for years, but there is now no way for Congress to provide it with 
support except through cumbersome grants through AID. They urged that an 
American bipartisan “board” be created , financed from both public and private 
sources, and that political action be done openly if at all possible (Purcell, 1981, 
pp.234-235) . 
In their general outline, these proposals clearly foreshadowed the emergence of the 
National Endowment for Democracy two years later. Taken as a whole, the Colloquium on 
Covert Action, demonstrated that at least some professional intelligence officers saw 
covert action primarily in terms of cooperation with sympathetic elements in civil society, 
sometimes with a minimum of plausible deniability which shaded into open political action, 
but which nevertheless always maintained a strategic, adversarial, character. The American 
state’s co-operation with the AFL-CIO was the most frequently cited example of this. It 
makes sense therefore to think of the advocates of and practitioners of this activity as a 
political warfare coalition, rather than a covert action coalition. In the Colloquium on 
Covert Action the participants in that coalition were seeking to reproduce it by making the 
case for the reconstruction of its apparatus in a modernised form. 
 
The October 1981 Colloquium on Clandestine Collection  
The fifth colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, on clandestine 
collection, took place in October 1981 (Godson, 1982b, p.2). With the previous meeting 
having taken place during a presidential transition, the 1981 colloquium was the first to 
happen while the Reagan administration was in office. While it was notable that several 
regular participants, including former Team B chairman Richard Pipes, Kenneth de 
Graffenreid and Carnes Lord, had joined the staff of the National Security Council since the 
previous meeting, the mix of attendees was broadly the same as before (Godson, 1982b, 
p.227-231). The presence of David Dorn, Director of International Affairs for the American 
Federation of Teachers, underlined the ongoing relationship between the AFL-CIO and the 
intelligence community, while the attendance of Roger Kaplan as a program officer of the 
Smith Richardson Foundation represented a link to one of the most significant New Right 
donor organisations (Godson, 1982b, p.227-228.). 
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In his preface to the volume of conference proceedings, Frank Barnett made it clear that 
the Consortium saw intelligence collection as intimately linked to covert action. ‘Is the 
threat of sowing “revolt in the rear” part of a realistic deterrent or romantic folklore from 
the era of Eisenhower and Dulles?’ he asked, making it clear that only high quality 
intelligence could answer such questions (Godson, 1982b, p.vii). 
Roy Godson’s introduction challenged the view that covert action and intelligence 
collection networks should be kept apart, arguing that they often needed the same foreign 
interlocutors (Godson, 1982b, p.1). Echoing Barnett, he called for a more comprehensive 
campaign of intelligence collection against the Soviet Union, which he claimed was ‘waging 
political warfare, particularly in Europe, on a truly strategic scale’ (Godson, 1982b, p.13). 
Godson expanded on this demand in a chapter devoted to intelligence collection against 
the Soviet Bloc, which he claimed had become too focused on monitoring Soviet 
compliance with the SALT Treaty (Godson, 1982a, p.18). He was also critical of attempts by 
Kremlinologists to distinguish hawkish and dovish elements in the Soviet leadership 
(Godson, 1982a, p.19).  Instead, he argued for a focus on Soviet vulnerabilities, while 
warning that ‘Since the Russian Revolution, Westerners have foretold of the Soviet Union’s 
impending collapse’ (Godson, 1982a, p.20). Despite manifest weaknesses, the Soviet 
economy might well be meeting the distinctive purposes of the Communist Party quite well 
(Godson, 1982a, p.20). The key issue for intelligence collection, he suggested, was how 
economic difficulties impacted cleavages between workers and managers, and 
relationships between different ethnic and religious groups (Godson, 1982a). Godson 
concluded by calling for a renewal of cooperation with liaison services such as Israel’s 
Mossad on the Soviet target, and for a re-emphasis on counterintelligence as a means of 
understanding the Soviet leadership (Godson, 1982a, pp.29-30). As with much of Godson’s 
work, these last two recommendations carried a strong sense of a return to the status quo 
ante, and in particular of the kind of anti-Soviet liaison carried out by James Angleton’s CIA 
Counterintelligence Staff. This subtext may perhaps explain the rather hostile reaction 
Godson’s paper received in a response by George Kalaris, the CIA officer who had been 
placed in charge of dismantling Angleton’s empire. Dismissing Godson’s recommendations 
as ‘more of the same old and overused techniques’, Kalaris stated that ‘the human effort 
can only go so far in my view, and I see that the breakthrough is going to come primarily in 
the technical field’ (Godson, 1982a, p.33). 
In a chapter on intelligence collection in more accessible parts of the world, former CIA 
station chief Robert Chapman argued for a shift of resources away from Europe, towards 
the developing world (Godson, 1982b, p.11-12). Like Godson, he criticised US policies that 
had alienated allies, in this case Latin American governments who Chapman saw as the key 
source of intelligence on local insurgencies (Chapman, 1982, p.44). In his view, terrorist 
organisations from the Puerto Rican FALN to the Provisional IRA were communist and 
supported by the Soviets through proxies (Chapman, 1982, p.48). In his conclusion, 
Chapman asked whether the American people were ready for the struggle that his analysis 
implied. ‘Do they want collectors to penetrate peace groups, anti-nuclear protest 
movements, environmentalists and left-of-center political parties’ he asked pointedly 
(Chapman, 1982, p.61). Chapman’s contribution was arguably most instructive in 
demonstrating the operational implications of a Manichean Cold War interpretation of 
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international terrorism, of the kind previously canvassed at the 1979 Jerusalem 
conference. 
In a chapter on human intelligence collection another former CIA officer, Eugene 
Burgstaller addressed the question of what motivates collection agents, arguing that are 
not usually driven primarily by venality (Burgstaller, 1982, p.74). As an example, he 
presented the scenario of a Palestinian agent who accepts recruitment because he hopes 
to influence US policy in the Middle East (Burgstaller, 1982, p.75). In this respect, his 
picture of collection agents as ideologically motivated allies was largely in accord with the 
description of covert action agents previously put forward in earlier Consortium 
publications, notably by Hugh Tovar (Tovar, 1983, p.80). 
Like his co-authors, Burgstaller lamented the developments of recent decades. He warned 
that past publicity about CIA activities, particularly disclosures from official sources, had 
dented the confidence of foreign allies in its intelligence collection effort (Burgstaller, 1982, 
p.76). However, his suggestion that the CIA had suffered from enemy penetration was 
criticised in a response by William Hood, who argued that this had been a bigger problem 
for other allied services (Burgstaller, 1982, p.93). Hood was himself a veteran of Angleton’s 
Counterintelligence Staff (Mangold, 1991, p.297). His presence, like that of his former 
colleagues Raymond Rocca and Newton Miler at several of the previous colloquia, 
underlined the extent to which Angleton’s supporters were a significant constituency 
within the Consortium. 
Technical intelligence collection was the subject of a chapter by Amrom Katz, a former 
assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Godson, 1982b, p.12). 
Katz argued that US successes in collecting technical intelligence from the Soviet Union 
may have owed less to American prowess than to a Soviet need for disclosure to ensure 
deterrence (Katz, 1982, p.113). There could, he suggested, be other weapons systems that 
the Soviets had more incentive to hide (Katz, 1982, p.113). The presence of an intelligent 
adversary meant that this could not be reduced to a technical, scientific problem (Katz, 
1982, p.113). In a remark that prefigured the language of ‘unknown unknowns’ two 
decades later, he warned that ‘we have never found anything that the Soviets have 
successfully hidden’ (Katz, 1982, p.116). Katz’s arguments were strongly challenged in a 
response by signals intelligence (SIGINT) expert David Kahn, who suggested that SIGINT 
was the most timely and reliable form of intelligence, and that its scale made attempts at 
deception easy to detect (Katz, 1982, p.119). At the colloquium, this view was reportedly 
challenged by several un-named speakers, one of whom suggested that the SALT II 
negotiations, had allowed the Soviets a channel for deception by permitting partially 
encrypted missile telemetry (Katz, 1982, p.124). The debate about Katz’s paper underlined 
a number of related themes which the dominant discourse of the Consortium had 
inherited from Team B: suspicion of a scientific ‘Sherman Kent’ view of intelligence was 
linked to opposition to a focus on intelligence as a means of monitoring détente. 
The opposing agonistic view of intelligence was taken to its logical conclusion in a chapter 
by Angelo Codevilla, which focused on planning for the role of intelligence in a general war 
against the Soviet Union (Codevilla, 1982, p.132). He called for a renewal of early Cold War 
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‘stay-behind’ networks, agents recruited in areas expected to be over-run in the event of a 
future conflict (Codevilla, 1982, p.143). In insisting that Soviet planning was already 
focused on war, he spelt out what arguably a fundamental assumption of the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence: ‘Conflict is their regime’s raison d’etre. It is not our 
regime’s raison d’etre’ (Codevilla, 1982, p.146). 
In the final chapter, William Harris of the Rand Corporation looked at resource allocation 
for intelligence (Godson, 1982b, p.13). Harris argued that centralised intelligence services 
have an incentive for bureaucratic growth that is denied to those which must compete for 
resources within individual government departments, resulting in what he called 
subsidised intelligence (Harris, 1982, 162). His solution was an internal market for 
intelligence, which would require other intelligence providers to be given the same 
Congressional authorisations as the CIA (Harris, 1982, p.178). As the former head of a rival 
agency, the Defence Intelligence Agency, Daniel O. Graham might have been expected to 
be favourable to Harris’s proposals. In fact, while sympathetic, he concluded they were 
unrealistic (Harris, 1982, p.189). Former CIA officer Theodore Shackley gave a similar 
verdict, arguing instead for the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
separate from the CIA (Harris, 1982, p.191). 
Like much of the Consortium’s previous output, Clandestine Collection gave some scope to 
exploring opposing views within the intelligence community, but nevertheless reflected a 
dominant perspective, one which was suspicious of attempts to use intelligence to monitor 
détente and instead saw its true value in its contribution to political warfare.  
The 1982 Colloquium on Domestic Intelligence 
With the CSI’s original program of looking at the four main intelligence disciplines now 
complete, later meetings turned to related issues. The sixth colloquium on 29-30 October 
1982 focused on domestic intelligence (Godson, 1986b, p.269). Public controversy over this 
issue had contributed to the exposure of the relationship between the CIA and the 
American labour movement in the 1960s and 1970s, and this background was reflected in 
some of contributions. Four delegates linked to the AFL-CIO were among the attendees: 
Eugenia Kemble of the American Federation of Teachers and her husband Penn Kemble, 
and David Jessup and Richard Wilson of the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education 
(Godson, 1986b, pp.273-279). 
Roy Godson’s introduction underlined the domestic implications of the Cold War. “Waging 
a complex worldwide struggle with a military and ideological superpower and its allies 
sometimes sets different elements of country’s complex society at odds with one another’” 
he argued (Godson, 1986b, p.1). He nevertheless saw a broad consensus over US domestic 
security intelligence arrangements from the 1940s, which had broken down in the 1970s 
(Godson, 1986b, pp.6-7). 
A contribution from Professor Allen Weinstein defended the record of liberal anti-
communists during this period (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.16). Organisations such as 
Americans for Democratic Action had, he suggested, been instrumental in reining in the 
excesses of McCarthyism (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.20). He nevertheless accepted 
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that the liberal ‘vital center’ of the 1950s was not ‘immune to some of the conspiratorial 
fantasies then prevalent on the political right (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.21). 
A counterpart essay by Angelo Codevilla sought to put a liberal spin on the issue of 
domestic security with an attack on American corporations doing business with the Soviet 
Union (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.34). He went on to cite AFL-CIO President Lane 
Kirkland’s call for government and business to recognise the necessity for economic 
warfare against the Soviet Union (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.35). In what might have 
been another anti-détente barb, Codevilla contrasted the prosecution of former CIA 
officers who wrote about their work with more favourable treatment given to the memoirs 
of CIA director Bill Colby (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.41). 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Codevilla’s essay was his discussion of foreign 
‘agents-of-influence’, which provided a useful definition of this intelligence term of art. On 
the one hand, he argued that ‘the agent-of-influence who is paid by a foreign government 
to exercise influence in his own society is an exception’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, 
p.44). On the other, he dismissed as a totalitarian concept the idea of ‘objective enemies’ 
whose interests merely happened to coincide with those of a foreign power (Weinstein 
and Codevilla, 1986, p.44). ‘Often’, he suggested ‘agents-of-influence are more or less 
secret allies of foreign powers rather than covertly recruited agents in foreign camps’ 
(Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.44). For this reason, Codevilla criticised the US Foreign 
Agents Registration Act, with its emphasis on foreign control as measured by payment, for 
failing to address the possibility that ‘political agents can be primarily allies, and that the 
alliance’s effect depends not on whether one party controls the other, but on whether 
both parties work together for common ends’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.45). 
Although this discussion was focused on Soviet agents-of-influence, it could arguably be 
applied to the liberal anti-communists themselves, to the AFL-CIO relationship with British 
intelligence in the early 1940s, and to the AFL-CIO’s European allies in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
The extent to which the Western side of Cold War struggle was also driven by alliances 
between the state and sympathetic elements in civil society was considered in a response 
to Weinstein and Codevilla by Penn Kemble. Indeed, Kemble addressed the question of his 
own position with stark directness: 
I started out in a current on the political left, which at times has found itself 
accused by unthinking people of being subversive. At other times, especially in 
more recent times, it has been accused of complicity in the military-industrial-
imperialist conspiracy. I may perhaps have been called a CIA agent more than most 
of you. Because my anti-Communism is more strenuous than that of most US 
intelligence agencies, I am not proud to be accused of being a mere CIA agent 
(Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.60). 
He went on to argue, citing the philosopher Sidney Hook, that ‘unless people in various 
spheres of private life take up the problem of subversion, the Government will be forced to 
become too involved’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.60). For an example of this 
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philosophy in practice Kemble turned to the labour movement, citing the expulsion of 
communists from the CIO in the late 1940s (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.61). 
Kemble’s proud anti-communism invites comparison with Hugh Wilford’s description of the 
1950s AFL-CIO, ‘entirely confident of their own ability to carry out covert operations, 
indeed positively jealous of their independence in the field’ (Wilford, 2003, p.99). As a 
former executive director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Kemble was a leading 
figure among those former Shachtmanites who had become close to the AFL-CIO 
leadership (Isserman, 2000, p.300). His presence at the colloquium underlined that in the 
1980s, as in the 1950s, the political heirs of labour anti-communism still held strong views 
on intelligence matters.  
While other contributions to the colloquium largely focused on detailed proposals for 
domestic intelligence reform, these were perhaps were the most instructive for the 
purpose of understanding the roots of the neoconservative theory of intelligence. Perhaps 
the most significant lesson that emerges from the proceedings is the extent to which those 
involved saw intelligence as a transnational enterprise, in which the struggle against 
foreign intelligence agencies was inevitably bound up with cleavages between different 
parts of society at home. 
1984 volume on Intelligence and Policy 
The last colloquium in the original series sponsored by the Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence took place on 9-10 November 1984 (Godson, 1986a, p.175). This meeting 
focused on the role of national policy in integrating the various intelligence disciplines 
discussed at previous meetings (Godson, 1986a, pp.2-3). 
In a chapter on Intelligence and the Oval Office, Kenneth deGraffenreid set out a 
dichotomy of approaches towards intelligence similar to that employed in previous 
Consortium publications on the various intelligence disciplines. The first of these defined 
intelligence as information gathered to inform policy, while the second focused instead on 
intelligence activities as a potential instrument for carrying out policy (deGraffenreid, 1986, 
p.12). The former ‘traditionalist’ approach was summed up with the statement that ‘the 
ethic of intelligence is independence from policy’, a quotation from Jimmy Carter’s CIA 
director Stansfield Turner (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.15). The identification of Sherman Kent 
as a representative of the traditionalist approach underlined that this was the same 
division between analytical and activist philosophies of intelligence which ran through 
much of the Consortium’s work (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.15). In the activist view defended 
by deGraffenreid ‘there is no such thing as “apolitical” intelligence policy’ (deGraffenreid, 
1986, p.17). Based on his reading of the 1947 National Security Act, deGraffenreid argued 
that intelligence policy was the domain of the President acting through the National 
Security Council (NSC), to which the Director of the CIA was responsible (deGraffenreid, 
1986, p.18).  He saw presidential priorities as having shifted from oversight under Carter to 
effectiveness under Reagan (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.22). He predicted that presidential 
involvement in intelligence would increase during the late 1980s and 1990s, in part 




Roy Godson noted in his introduction that deGraffenreid’s contribution to the literature of 
intelligence was unique because, at the time of writing, he was Director of Intelligence 
Programs at the National Security Council (Godson, 1986a, p.4). His argument for strong 
presidential leadership of an activist intelligence policy through the NSC was thus a clear 
indication of his aspirations in that role. In a response to deGraffenreid’s article, Leo 
Cherne, the chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, mounted a 
similarly robust defence of his own institutional interests, arguing that PFIAB was the only 
institution capable of offering the President independent advice on intelligence policy 
combined with relevant experience (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.33). 
Another administration official who contributed to the volume was Mark Schneider, the 
director of Strategic Arms Control Policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for International Security Policy (Godson, 1986a, p.4). Schneider’s chapter was largely a 
précis of the neoconservative critique of the 1970s SALT negotiations, blaming national 
intelligence estimates for shaping decisions that led to a ‘vast change in the military 
balance’ leaving ‘a major element in the US deterrent vulnerable to attack’ (Schneider, 
1986, p.71). 
In a chapter on covert action and counterintelligence, Godson and Codevilla argued that 
while détente was flawed, it was an example of a coherent policy driven from the centre 
(Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.89). The effective use of the active intelligence disciplines 
was only possible as part of a similarly overarching strategy (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, 
p.89). 
A contribution on intelligence oversight by Senate Minority Staffer Gary Schmitt also 
touched on détente, arguing that it had been an attempt to rebuild a containment strategy 
after the Vietnam War, but in practice had only served to undermine it further (Schmitt, 
1986, p.125). 
A chapter on intelligence in foreign policy by Richard Pipes, argued for an increased focus 
on political intelligence on the Soviet Union (Pipes, 1986, p.42). In support of the potential 
of politically-focused analysis, Pipes offered an anecdote which underlined the extent to 
which the neoconservative approach to intelligence was a determinedly ideological one:  
In 1971, I was asked by the late Sen. Henry M. Jackson to testify on the antiballistic 
missile question. I knew little about strategic missiles at the time, and even less 
about ABM. But when Senator Jackson asked whether the Russians would accept 
the concept of strategic parity, I was able to answer simply from my knowledge of 
Marxism-Leninism that this was inconceivable (Pipes, 1986, p.43).  
He suggested that it was worth emulating the Soviet approach to analysis because ‘as 
Marxists, that is, sociologists, they look more deeply into American conditions’ (Pipes, 
1986, p.44). In a supportive response to Pipes’ paper, Soviet defector Ilya Dzhirkelov 
argued that ‘the most important group in the Soviet Union, those who really make and 
conduct policy, is composed of the midlevel officials’ and that this group was relatively 
accessible to Western diplomats (Pipes, 1986, pp.46-47). 
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It is tempting to see these recommendations as a case of mirror-imaging given the extent 
to which the neoconservatives themselves were largely influential at the level of midlevel 
officials, as the contributors to Intelligence and Policy themselves exemplified. 
The CSI Conferences: An Assessment 
By the mid-1980s, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence had arguably fostered the 
emergence of an epistemic community which met all the criteria described by Peter Haass, 
in terms of a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared 
notions of validity and a common policy enterprise (Haas, 1992, p.3). 
This epistemic community was however distinctive in refusing to base its claim to expertise 
on an appeal to value-free scientific knowledge, a view which was attributed to the rival 
school of thought associated with the CIA analyst Sherman Kent. Instead the dominant 
approach within the Consortium was clearly that identified with Wilmoore Kendall, a 
school that reflected the legacy of the Cold War alliance between the CIA and the non-
communist left in attitude to intelligence as a whole and to each of its subordinate 
disciplines. 
The Consortium’s strong emphasis on covert action looked back to the experience of the 
AFL’s activities in Western Europe during the Early Cold War. Its approach to 
counterintelligence was a substantial defence although not always an uncritical one, of the 
practice of James Angleton, the key CIA sponsor of Jay Lovestone’s agent network for two 
decades. The role of these two disciplines as an active instrument of policy was 
emphasised rather than of intelligence collection and analysis as a means of informing 
policy. The legacy of Team B was reflected in strong support for competing centres of 
analysis. All four disciplines were seen as requiring integration in a central, activist 
intelligence policy after the manner of early Cold War leaders such as Eisenhower and 
Truman. 
This philosophy distilled the experience of the non-communist left in the Cold War and of 
emergent neoconservatism during the struggle over détente. It continued to shape and be 
shaped by neoconservative praxis in the 1980s. 
The neoconservative approach to intelligence in practice 
The AFL-CIO tradition of covert action continued into the 1980s, notably in response to the 
crisis in Poland. This episode sparked some tactical differences between the 
neoconservatives who had moved closer to the Reagan administration, and those right-
wing social democrats who retained institutional ties to the labour movement, with the 
latter believing that short-term concessions to the Polish Government combined with the 
threat of sanctions could stave off a crackdown (Chenoweth, 2013, p.107). 
These differences were reflected in a March 1981 debate between Norman Podhoretz of 
the Committee for the Free World and Tom Kahn of the League for Industrial Democracy 
(Chenoweth, 2013, p.117 n.23). Along with Irving Brown, Kahn was a key figure in the AFL-
CIO’s overt and covert funding of Solidarity via European trade unions (Chenoweth, 2013, 
pp.105-106). Solidarity itself was sometimes wary of AFL-CIO money because of the 
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widespread belief that it ultimately came from the American Government (Misgeld, 2012, 
p.26). By the mid-1980s, much of the AFL-CIO funding for Solidarity came overtly from the 
US Congress through the new mechanism provided by the National Endowment for 
Democracy (Chenoweth, 2013, p.109). 
In 1992, Carl Bernstein reported in Time magazine that some funds which reached 
Solidarity in the 1980s had ultimately come from the CIA but that CIA director Robert Casey 
chose to let the AFL-CIO take the lead (Bernstein, 1992). Former CIA Deputy Director Bobby 
Ray Inman told Bernstein ‘It was organization, and that was an infinitely better way to help 
them than through classic covert operations’ (cited in Bernstein, 1992). For a period during 
the early 1980s, the NSC staff member responsible for Eastern Europe was the co-founder 
of Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Richard Pipes, who told Bernstein: ‘sanctions 
were coordinated with Special Operations (the CIA division in charge of covert task forces), 
and the first objective was to keep Solidarity alive by supplying money, communications 
and equipment’ (cited in Bernstein, 1992). This approach, a throwback to the labour 
operations of the early Cold War, would certainly have been in line with the kind of covert 
action recommended in the Consortium’s publications. 
Despite its tactical differences with the AFL-CIO, the Committee for the Free World, 
emerged as a key lobbying organisation for more aggressive forms of anti-communist 
covert action in the 1980s. It first came to prominence on 6 April 1981 with a statement in 
the New York Times that attributed the insurgency in El Salvador to Soviet expansionism 
backed by Cuba and El Salvador (Sanders, 1983, p.304). The signatories list included a 
strong overlap with organisations of the anti-détente movement: founder members of the 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence represented included Ray Cline, Roy Godson, and 
Paul Seabury; figures associated with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority during the 
1970s included Arnold Beichman, Penn Kemble, Joshua Muravchik, Midge Decter, Norman 
Podhoretz, Eugene Rostow, Ben Wattenberg, Philip Siegelman and Bayard Rustin as well as 
Godson and Seabury (cited in Diamond, 1995, p.379, n.60). The strong CDM representation 
suggests that despite the debate over Poland, many of the Committee’s members came 
from a milieu very close to the AFL-CIO leadership.  
Central America would provide the clearest and most decisive example of neoconservative 
involvement in covert action during the 1980s in the shape of the Iran-Contra affair, a 
complex episode in which the US used the proceeds of an arms for hostages deal with Iran 
to fund the Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua (Walsh, 1997, xv). 
The problem represented by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was repeatedly canvassed 
at the colloquia organised by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. At the 1981 
meeting on clandestine collection, the former CIA officer Robert Chapman had lamented 
that some in the agency had considered supporting the Sandinistas (Chapman, 1982, p.61). 
At the 1984 meeting on intelligence policy Godson and Codevilla had suggested that it was 
open to the US to support anti-communist insurgencies in Nicaragua, Angola and 
Afghanistan (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.91). In response, former Ambassador Laurence 
Silberman attacked Congressional restrictions on support for the Contras, arguing that 
‘even if one wanted, as a policy matter, to pressure the Sandinista regime in some kind of 
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pluralistic direction, is it not clear that the last thing one would do is prohibit publicly 
oneself from overturning the regime?’ (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.108). In fact by the 
time of this conference in November 1984, efforts to circumvent that prohibition were 
already underway (Walsh, 1997, p.19). A number of those involved had close links to the 
Consortium and to the wider neoconservative movement.  
In July 1984, with CIA funding cut off under the terms of the Boland Amendment passed by 
Congress, CIA Director Bill Casey introduced the Contras to Col. Oliver North of the 
National Security Council, who assumed responsibility for raising money from third-country 
donors, while reporting back to Casey as well as National Security Advisor Robert 
McFarlane (Walsh, 1997, p.19). 
Casey’s links to the intelligence community went back to the earliest days of its alliance 
with the non-communist left. His involvement in Iran-Contra was in many ways a return to 
the free–wheeling covert operations of the Second World War. As an OSS officer in 
London, he had worked with its labour division, despatching anti-fascist socialists as agents 
into occupied Europe (Smith, 2005, p.225). He had been a director of the National Strategy 
Information Center, the parent body of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, in the 
1960s (Scott-Smith, 2012, p.190). In the early 1970s, he had served as of President of the 
International Rescue Committee, an organisation whose links to covert labour operations 
predated even the OSS (Chester, 1995, p.225). He had also been a member of the 
Committee on the Present Danger in 1976 (Sanders, 1983, p.156).  
The Middle Eastern end of Iran-Contra began in November 1984 when an Iranian 
intermediary, Manucher Ghorbanifar contacted retired CIA officer Ted Shackley to suggest 
an arms for hostages deal (Walsh, 1997, p.36). Shackley was a regular participant at the 
colloquia of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, taking part in the meeting on 
intelligence policy in the same month he met Ghorbanifar (Godson, 1986a, p.182). Four 
years earlier at the 1980 meeting on covert action, Shackley’s paper on paramilitary 
operations had identified threats from Soviet-backed revolutionaries in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Honduras, and warned that failure ‘to combat expanding Soviet influence 
through political warfare, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare’ risked leading to a 
general nuclear confrontation (Shackley, 1981, p.137). 
The Iran-Contra affair began to unravel in November 1986, when a Lebanese newspaper 
revealed the existence of the arms-for-hostages deal (Walsh, 1997, p.xv). As the 
investigation developed, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence would find its own 
coordinator, Roy Godson, embroiled in the controversy. This came as a result of Oliver 
North's work with two private fundraisers, Carl R. ‘Spitz’ Channell and Richard R. Miller, to 
solicit donations from wealthy Americans to a tax-exempt foundation, the National 
Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL) (Walsh, 1993). On the basis of FBI 
interviews with Miller in 1987, the 1993 report of special prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh 
accused Godson of involvement in these efforts: 
On two occasions, Roy Godson of the Heritage Foundation helped solicit funds 
from private donors. In the fall of 1985, Godson, at North's direction, informed 
Miller that an anonymous donor wanted to make a large contribution to the 
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Catholic church in Nicaragua. Based on a plan agreed to by Godson and Miller, the 
donor contributed $100,000 to the Heritage Foundation, which then forwarded the 
money to a Miller-Gomez entity known as the Institute for North-South Issues 
(INSI) (Walsh, 1993).  
In testimony to Congress in 1987, Oliver North acknowledged that he and National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane had met with Godson in order to seek funding for the Contras, 
which he said was non-military (Beamish, 1987). According to Heritage executive vice 
president Phil Truluck, Godson recommended in September 1985 that two donations be 
awarded to the Institute for North-South Issues (INSI) (Beamish, 1987). The Heritage 
Foundation expected this money, from investment consultant John Donahue, and from the 
Sarah Scaife Foundation, to go on research on Central America, but requests for a report 
had not received a reply, according to Truluck (Beamish, 1987). 
Of the second occasion on which Godson was accused of soliciting funds, the Walsh report 
stated: 
In November 1985, North spoke with another private donor about the needs of the 
contras and the Nicaraguan Catholic church. North informed Miller that Godson 
had located the donor, who would be making a $60,000 contribution. The money 
was deposited directly into the INSI account and then transferred to the Lake 
Resources Account in Switzerland (Walsh, 1997).  
In March 1987, Godson was accused of presiding over the diversion of funds from the 
International Youth Year Commission to the Contras (O'Brien, 1987). This allegation must 
be treated with some caution as it came from the head of a rival youth organisation, 
William Treanor, of the American Youth Work Center (O'Brien, 1987). According to 
Treanor, Godson had been appointed to head the Commission in 1981 by Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Elliott Abrams after a power 
struggle (O'Brien, 1987). There was some independent evidence linking the Commission to 
the Contras, in the form of a flow chart recovered by Congressional investigators from the 
office of Oliver North, which appeared to show the Commission as a conduit for funds to 
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the main Contra army (O'Brien, 1987). 
Given the testimony of North and Miller in particular, it seems clear that Godson had some 
involvement with the public/private effort to support the Contras, though in the absence 
of a prosecution it cannot be assumed that his actions would have been found to be illegal. 
Others involved in the Iran-Contra Affair were found to have broken the law. Elliott 
Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the National 
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane were convicted of withholding evidence from Congress 
but later pardoned by George H.W. Bush (Walsh, 1997, p.493). Oliver North was convicted 
on three counts related to Iran-Contra which were overturned in a split decision in 1990, 
with Laurence Silberman the leading judge in favour of acquittal (Walsh, 1997, p.256). 
Special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh had been wary of Silberman’s links to the Reagan 
administration, but did not feel he had a basis to seek his recusal until it was too late 
(Walsh, 1997, p.250). It is not clear if Walsh was aware of Silberman’s comments at the 
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1984 CSI colloquium on intelligence and policy, when he attacked the Congressional ban on 
supports for actions to overthrow the Sandinista regime (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, 
p.108).  
The 1987 Colloquium on intelligence requirements for the 1990s 
The fallout from the Iran-Contra Affair raised profound questions for the neoconservative 
theory of intelligence, and its emphasis on strong policy support for covert action. Some of 
these questions would be addressed at the CSI colloquium on intelligence requirements for 
the 1990s, which took place in Washington on 4-5 December 1987 (Godson, 1989, p. 241). 
The conference was heavily overshadowed by the controversy, which had embroiled a 
number of participants. Two of those who contributed papers had recently left the 
Government, Robert Gates, who had been acting Director of the CIA in early 1987, and 
Kenneth deGraffenreid who had been director of intelligence programs at the National 
Security Council, and was now an intelligence fellow at the NSIC (Godson, 1989, p.267). 
In his introduction to the volume that resulted from the conference, Godson warned that 
Iran-Contra had strengthened bureaucratic resistance to reform of intelligence analysis, 
because ‘some senior officials, people in the media charged – with relatively little 
evidence- that the DCI and senior intelligence officials had politicized intelligence and 
“cooked” analysis to suit their policy initiatives’ (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.9). The 
affair had led to renewed calls for restraints on covert action, but according to Godson 
‘most of the participants in the December 1987 colloquium favoured regularizing covert 
action in US statecraft’ (Godson, 1989, p.26).  
In a contribution on intelligence analysis, Paul Seabury argued that ‘one person’s 
politicization is another person’s wish to have an institution serving as an arm of a very 
purposive foreign policy’ (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.102). He suggested that ‘activist 
intelligence work’ could be promoted by ‘the appointment to key CIA positions of outsiders 
whose views correspond to the strategic views of the presidential leadership’ (Cohen and 
Seabury, 1989, p.102). He nevertheless warned that in the wake of ‘Contragate’, ‘those 
disposed to respond eagerly to tasks of advancing, rather than cautiously protecting, 
national interests, might need to be brash in risking bureaucratic reputations and careers’ 
(Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.103).  
In a chapter on covert action, Richard Shultz suggested that Iran-Contra would lead to 
renewed pressure from within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations for such activities to be 
removed from its area of responsibility (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.196). Former CIA officer Hugh 
Tovar thought that ‘covert action has even less respectability in the public mind than ever 
before’, but that future presidents would not be deterred from resorting to it (Shultz Jr., 
1989, p.208). He recommended that greater consideration should be given to the use of 
open alternatives such as the National Endowment for Democracy (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.209). 
He also called for a ‘period of quiescence’ to renew secrecy about covert action capabilities 
that had been compromised by disclosures from within the US government (Shultz Jr., 
1989, p.210). Iran-Contra had he suggested made the use of private organisations for 
covert action less attractive, as ‘if the groups in question drift off course, the United States 
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is left holding the bag for actions undertaken at its behest if not in its name (Shultz Jr., 
1989, p.217). In the discussion of Shultz and Tovar’s papers one unnamed government 
official argued that covert action could not be made consistent with policy because 
‘policymakers often continue to use covert action not as a tool of, but as a substitute for 
policymaking when a consensus for action is not present’ (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.235). 
If the tone of conference was somewhat chastened and reflective, contributions such as 
those of Godson and Seabury underlined that the dominant participants had not altered 
their fundamental beliefs. Old arguments about the inconsistent support of policymakers 
for covert action were ready to hand, given the extent to which Iran-Contra scrutiny 
represented a return to the atmosphere of the 1970s. 
 
 The neoconservatives eclipsed 
 
Iran-Contra was however only one aspect of a conjuncture which was turning against the 
neoconservatives. The view that the Soviet Union remained an expansionist power, 
expressed in magazines like Norman Podhoretz’s Commentary seemed increasingly out of 
touch with Gorbachev’s reforms although other neoconservatives around Irving Kristol’s 
National Interest were quicker to see that Soviet weakness in the late 1980s would lead to 
fundamental change (Ehrman, 1995, pp.177-78). Over the course of 1987, a number of 
neoconservative officials aligned with the former view, including Richard Perle and Frank 
Gaffney at the Department of Defense, and Kenneth Adelman at the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, left the Government as Reagan moved towards agreeing the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union (Garthoff, 2000, p.325). 
As Justin Vaisse has recognised in his Neoconservatism: The Biography of A Movement, an 
evaluation of the neoconservative role in the end of the Cold War is a key issue for any 
assessment of the movement as a whole (Vaïsse, 2010, pp.188-189). Vaisse argues that it 
was actually Reagan’s steady shift away from neoconservatism, decisively so by 1987, that 
enabled him to respond to changes in the Soviet Union in a way that brought about the 
end of the Cold War (Vaïsse, 2010, p.197). Like John Ehrman, Vaisse identifies ‘a lack of 
conceptual innovation’ amongst Commentary writers like Podhoretz, Richard Pipes, 
Edward Luttwak, Walter Laqueur, Angelo Codevilla and Patrick Glynn, which rendered 
them unable to assimilate the new international situation (Vaïsse, 2010, p.197). 
Although Vaisse does not specifically address the role of the Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence, most of these writers took part in its colloquia and Codevilla and Pipes in 
particular played central roles. The evidence of the Consortium’s deliberations largely 
supports the thesis that the neoconservatives were increasingly out of touch with 
developments in the Eastern Bloc.  
An important exception perhaps was Poland where Richard Pipes had been a key 
administration supporter of the AFL-CIO’s backing for Solidarity in the early 1980s 
(Bernstein, 1992). In 1984, Pipes claimed at the Colloquium on Intelligence and Policy that 
it had been possible to predict that the Soviet Union would not invade Poland because of 
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the language which was used to refer to the Polish Government in open Soviet sources 
(Pipes, 1986, p.43). This was perhaps a genuine example of what Pipes called at a previous 
colloquium ‘fingerspitzengefuhl, the feeling “on the tips of your fingers” for a given culture’ 
(Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.177). Even in the Polish case, other neoconservatives such as 
Norman Podhoretz, had assumed that Solidarity would be crushed by the Soviets 
(Chenoweth, 2013, p.117, n.23). 
The more general pattern was for the Consortium’s writers to impose Manichean Cold War 
assumptions on evidence that might have pointed in another direction, even where they 
acknowledged it. It was in this spirit that Roy Godson wrote in 1981 that ‘Since the Russian 
Revolution, Westerners have foretold of the Soviet Union’s economic collapse’(Godson, 
1982a, p.20). Even as he rehearsed the Soviet Union’s economic weaknesses, he argued 
that ‘the economic system in particular is designed for Party purposes and not primarily to 
produce and distribute goods. Given its purposes, the Soviet economic system has worked 
quite well’ (Godson, 1982a, p.20). 
A similar dichotomy was evident in the contribution of Soviet defector Ilya Dzhirkelov to 
the 1984 Colloquium on Intelligence and Policy. He acknowledged that many middle-
ranking Soviet officials were attracted to the West, but insisted that Western reports of 
differences within the Politburo were false (Pipes, 1986, p.48). 
It is impossible to say that there are two groups-one aggressive, one passive. Even 
if Gorbachev is Chernenko’s successor, he will not change the basic policy of the 
Soviet Union. Chernenko and Gorbachev are the same kind of human being. The 
same kind of communist (Pipes, 1986, p.48). 
At the 1987 colloquium, Paul Seabury attacked academic sovietologists for paying too little 
attention to Soviet intelligence (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.104). He reserved particular 
criticism for Bob Woodward’s book Veil for absolving the Soviets from responsibility for the 
attempted assassination of the Pope (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.104). 
The thesis that the KGB was behind the shooting of John Paul II had been widely promoted 
in the early 1980s by a number of scholars, notably in a 1984 report by the Georgetown 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (GCSIS) (Herman and Brodhead, 1986, 
p.245). Members of the working group responsible included Ray Cline of the Consortium 
for the Study of Intelligence along with other veterans of the CIA and the Committee on 
the Present Danger (Herman and Brodhead, 1986, p.247). Some analysts have suggested 
this accusation was deliberate disinformation, and therefore itself an example for covert 
action (Herman and Brodhead, 1986, p.246). For Seabury, however, Woodward’s 
refutation was a reflection of the mindset of his CIA sources. He quoted Edward J. Epstein’s 
review of Veil which concluded that the agency ‘no longer sees the Soviets as a potential 
enemy’ (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.104). 
Strikingly, the opening day of this colloquium coincided with a TV interview in which 
Ronald Reagan charged that 'some of the people who are objecting the most and just 
refusing even to accede to the idea of ever getting any understanding, whether they realize 
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it or not, those people, basically, down in their deepest thoughts, have accepted that war is 
inevitable' (cited in Vaïsse, 2010, p.196). 
The proposition that a genuine understanding with the Soviet leadership was possible, that 
the Soviets might not necessarily be an enemy, was a difficult one for neoconservatives to 
consider. In part this arguably reflected an error of which the neoconservatives often 
accused others. They saw the Soviets as like themselves, highly ideological cold warriors, 
committed to strategic covert action. 
In part it reflected the fundamental assumptions of a neoconservative theory of 
intelligence that was at bottom a theory of political warfare. Soviet caution in Poland, 
Soviet economic weakness, or the disillusionment of Soviet cadres, did not represent a 
fundamental challenge to this world-view. The possibility of an accommodation with the 
Soviet leadership did. The former considerations could all be factored into an agonistic 
theory of intelligence. The latter one implied that there was no fundamental conflict. 
The political warfare coalition in the 1980s 
The link between praxis of political warfare and theory of intelligence underlines the 
limitations of seeing neoconservative influence on the Reagan Administration too narrowly 
in terms of democracy promotion. 
Justin Vaisse has argued that while the Reagan administration pursued a range of 
strategies to limit Soviet power, from arming guerrillas in Afghanistan to manipulation of 
oil prices, ‘all these measures might have been approved by any hawk, but another aspect 
of Reagan’s foreign policy was without doubt to specific neoconservative influence, namely 
his support for democratic forces around the world’ (Vaïsse, 2010, p.191). This meant 
primarily support for the work of institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy, 
whose priorities were based on Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s thesis that Soviet totalitarianism, not 
the authoritarianism of US some allies, was the real challenge to democracy (Vaïsse, 2010, 
pp.191-192). 
Vaisse’s argument is correct in identifying political intervention abroad as a key 
neoconservative specialty within wider American grand strategy. However, the 
counterfactual could be misleading if it is taken to suggest that democracy promotion 
could be abstracted from the wider strategy of contesting Soviet power, or that 
neoconservative influence could be abstracted from those of their wider alliances. 
To address Vaisse’s counterfactual directly, any hawk intent on developing an anti-Soviet 
strategy would have had to consider the range of strategies employed in previous phases 
of the Cold War, with political intervention abroad among them, and considered the merits 
of consulting those with experience in such operations, such as former intelligence officers 
and their allies in civil society organisations operating abroad, the group that we have 
called the political warfare coalition. Indeed, this is arguably part of what happened in the 




The deliberations of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence underlined the extent to 
which democracy promotion was intertwined with other strategies. In the 1980s, 
professional CIA covert action officers were strong advocates of the creation of state-
sponsored organisations for overt political intervention (Purcell, 1981, p.225). They also 
continued to stress the extent to which covert action required the cooperation of 
experienced political experts, a skillset that had historically been provided by the Cold War 
liberal precursors of neoconservatism (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.221). Conversely, 
neoconservatives like Roy Godson and Angelo Codevilla remained among the most forceful 
advocates of the full range of covert action, from propaganda to paramilitary action, even 
after the creation of open instruments like the National Endowment for Democracy 
(Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.90). 
The neoconservative theory of intelligence provided the unifying paradigm within which 
covert and overt activity were seen as part of a single strategic enterprise. Understanding 
that theory enables us to see more clearly the connections between various phenomena 
identified by Vaisse, in particular between the neoconservative emphasis on democracy 
promotion, and their ‘lack of conceptual innovation’ in the late 1980s (Vaïsse, 2010, p.197). 
Neoconservative support for political intervention abroad was of a piece with their 
emphasis on the active intelligence disciplines of covert action and counterintelligence, at 
the expense of analysis which was to be subordinated to policy, rendering it unable to 
challenge the agonistic hard-core assumptions of the theory. 
In the 1980s, the elaboration of a neoconservative theory of intelligence assisted the 
political warfare coalition in regaining some of the influence that had been lost in the 
1960s and 1970s, but its inadequacy to the events of the late 1980s contributed to the loss 





Chapter Eight: Neoconservatism from the end of the Cold War to the 
War on Terror 
Chapter Eight will look at the renewed bid for epistemic authority by writers from within 
the political warfare coalition in the 1990s, which gave further elaboration to a distinctive 
neoconservative theory of intelligence. This theory received practical application once 
again in the campaign for war with Iraq following their return to influence in the George W. 
Bush administration. 
The American labour movement after the Cold War 
By the 1990s, the ties that linked the neoconservatives to the labour movement 
powerbase of their Cold War predecessors had begun to atrophy. Key activists of the 
previous generation had left the stage. Irving Brown died on February 1989, some months 
after he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom (Rathbun, 1996, p.377). Jay 
Lovestone died a year later, on 7 March 1990 (Morgan, 1999, p.369). 
By the time that Lane Kirkland stepped down as President of the AFL-CIO in 1995, the 
federation’s leadership was coming under grassroots pressure to devote more time to 
domestic organising rather than to state-supported international programmes (Buhle, 
1999, p.246). The defeat of Kirkland’s chosen successor by John Sweeney’s New Voices 
slate showed that the weakened position of organised labour in the 1990s had created the 
conditions for a modest reformist challenge to conservative labour leaders (Buhle, 1999, 
p.249).  
The Social Democrats USA remained active in the 1990s. Their leading figure Penn Kemble, 
served as deputy director and later acting director of the US Information Agency in the 
Clinton administration, before moving to the New Economy Information Service where he 
sought to build links between organized labour and the Democratic Party on a basis 
inspired by New Labour in Britain (Democracy Digest, 2005). 
Despite the weakening of their historic relationship with the labour bureaucracy, links to 
Atlanticist social democrats, would remain a source of strength for neoconservatives. 
Nevertheless, neoconservatism was now firmly part of the wider conservative movement 
This would be reflected in neoconservative writings on intelligence in the 1990s, which 
would begin to appeal to the ideas of the conservative political philosopher Leo Strauss 
(Schmitt, 1999).  
The neoconservative literature of intelligence in the 1990s 
Silent Warfare 
 
The early 1990s witnessed the production of the most succinct account of the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence up to that point in the form of the primer Silent 
Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. The book’s authors Abram Shulsky and 
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Gary Schmitt had followed a classic neoconservative career path, serving as aides to 
Democratic Senators Henry Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan before moving into the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s (Remnick, 1986). In the early 1980s, as minority 
(Democratic) staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Shulsky had 
been a keen advocate of covert action at the colloquia of the Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence (Godson, 1981, p.8). Schmitt had served as Shulsky’s successor at the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and as Executive Director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.247). 
Shulsky published the first edition of Silent Warfare in 1991, drawing on the course on  
intelligence which he taught at the John M. Olin Center for the Theory and Practice of 
Democracy at the University of Chicago (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.vii). At that time, he 
was a fellow of the National Strategy Information Center (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, 
p.247). A revised edition was produced in 1993 by Gary Schmitt, partly in order to reflect 
developments since the demise of the Soviet Union (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.vii). A 
second revision which appeared in 2002, was by the authors’ own admission too early to 
respond to the effect of the 9/11 attacks on its subject matter (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, 
p.ix). Silent Warfare is therefore primarily a document of the period between the Cold War 
and the War on Terror. 
The structure of Silent Warfare summarised much of the neoconservative theory of 
intelligence of the preceding decade, examining each of the four intelligence disciplines in 
turn, before considering the role of intelligence policy and positing two rival views of 
intelligence (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.v-vi). These two views largely coincided with the 
Sherman Kent and Wilmoore Kendall schools previously identified by Roy Godson (Godson, 
1980a, p.1-2). Shulsky and Schmitt saw the Sherman Kent school as a distinctively 
‘American view’, rooted in the emergence of large analytical branches consisting of trained 
social scientists in the wartime Office of Strategic Services, and its successor, the CIA 
(Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.161). Two Directors of Central Intelligence during the 1970s, 
William Colby and Stansfield, were identified as adherents of this view (Shulsky and 
Schmitt, 2002, p.167). An emphasis on technical intelligence and a denigration of 
counterintelligence were seen as characteristic. In contrast, for the rival perspective that 
Shulsky and Schmitt identify as the ‘traditional view’, counterintelligence is fundamental. 
For the “traditional” view on the other hand, the fact that an adversary is trying to 
keep vital information secret is the very essence of the matter; if an adversary 
were not trying to hide his intentions, there would be no need for complicated 
analyses of the situation in the first place (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.166). 
This formulation is striking in its implication that without enemy denial and deception, the 
problem of collection and analysis, of understanding the world, is a trivial one. This 
implication is repeated in the conclusion of the book, which closes by questioning the CIA 
motto, St Paul’s dictum that ‘Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free’: 
But intelligence can never forget that the attainment of the truth involves a 
struggle with a human enemy who is fighting back – or that truth is not the goal, 
but only a means towards victory (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002, 176).  
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This was arguably the most concise formulation yet of the neoconservative theory of 
intelligence, and of the principles underlying its emphasis on the subordination of 
intelligence to policy, and on the subordination of the information-gathering disciplines of 
intelligence collection and analysis to the active disciplines of covert action and 
counterintelligence. 
Given the Old Left heritage of the neoconservatives it is perhaps justified to see in this 
formulation an echo of Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.’ Shulsky and Schmitt’s 
formulation clearly shares Marx’s prioritisation of action over contemplation. There is 
nevertheless a crucial difference in the object of concern. It is the world that Marx is trying 
to change. It is the enemy that Shulsky and Schmitt are seeking victory over. In Shulsky and 
Schmitt’s view of intelligence, understanding the intentions of the enemy is the key 
problem that makes ‘complicated analyses’ necessary in understanding the world. For 
Shulsky and Schmitt ‘the concept of a struggle with nature is only a metaphor. In fact, 
nature, although sometimes complicated and difficult to understand, is indifferent to 
human efforts and not purposefully acting to obstruct them’ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, 
p.172). They are correspondingly sceptical about Sherman Kent’s aspiration to use social 
science to infer future intentions which the enemy themselves have not yet decided 
(Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.174). Whereas the tendency of Kent’s approach is 
materialistic, that of Shulsky and Schmitt is idealistic. 
The practical implications of this philosophical division are reflected in the different 
preoccupations that Shulsky and Schmitt attribute to William Colby and James Angleton. 
Colby complained that Angleton ‘seemed to be putting more emphasis on the KGB as the 
CIA’s adversary than on the Soviet Union as the United States’ adversary’ (Shulsky and 
Schmitt, 2002, p.175). For Colby the priority was to understand the Soviets through 
understanding their place in the world. For Angleton it was understanding their intentions 
by seeing through their attempts to deceive and manipulate the US. Defending the latter 
procedure, Schmitt and Shulsky argue that an intelligence service that ignores its adversary 
‘runs the risk of being deceived and of trying to misinterpret the world it is trying to 
understand’ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.176). 
Schmitt and Shulsky do acknowledge that dangers associated with the Angletonian view of 
intelligence, of ‘a wilderness of mirrors’ in which doubts about deception bring all progress 
to a halt (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.175). This had in fact happened in the 1960s, when 
Angleton’s counterintelligence investigations paralysed the work of the CIA’s Soviet 
Division, based on the deception theories of Soviet defector Anatoly Golitsyn (Wise, 1992, 
p.231).  
For Shulsky and Schmitt, intelligence is ‘caught in a dilemma that reflects its dual nature’ 
between seeking the truth on the one hand, and struggle to manipulate and avoid 
manipulation on the other (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.176). However, in insisting, 
against Sherman Kent, on clandestinity as the fundamental distinction between social 
science and intelligence, they nevertheless lean towards the Angletonian approach. This 
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emphasis, common to most of the neoconservative scholars of intelligence, arguably led 
them into mistakes similar to those made by Angleton.  
In the early 1960s, Angleton had been convinced that the Sino-Soviet split had been a fake, 
despite the impractical nature of such a deception. There were clear parallels with the 
response of some neoconservative theorists of intelligence to developments in the Soviet 
Union. At the 1987 colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Richard 
Shultz noted that sceptics viewed glasnost and perestroika as the ‘latest phase of a 
deception and active measures tradition that date backs to the early days of the Bolshevik 
regime’. Shultz himself took a middle course, by arguing that Glasnost might nevertheless 
create expectations the Soviet leadership could not control (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.177). It is 
nevertheless clear that the idealist cast of the neoconservative theory of intelligence 
affected neoconservative analyses of the Soviet Union. Roy Godson’s argument that the 
weaknesses of the Soviet economy should be interpreted primarily in terms of the 
purposes the economy served for the regime, is an example of this (Godson, 1982a, p.20).  
Leo Strauss and the neoconservative theory of intelligence 
Understanding the idealist dimension to the neoconservative theory of intelligence most 
clearly expressed in Silent Warfare may enable us to address an issue that has bedevilled 
the historiography of neoconservatism: the question of the influence of German 
philosopher Leo Strauss on the tradition.  
Shadia Drury has argued that ‘neoconservatism is the legacy of Leo Strauss’, a political 
perspective that echoes all the main features of his thought, including notably a ‘friend/foe 
mentality’ (Drury, 1997, p.178). She identifies a Straussian tradition among 
neoconservatives that includes Strauss’s students and their students in turn, embracing key 
figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, and William Kristol (Drury, 1997, p.3). A similar 
interpretation has been presented by Anne Norton, herself a student of Strauss’s student, 
Joseph Cropsey (Norton, 2004, p.ix).  Norton, however, emphasises that the views of the 
political Straussians are distinct from and sometimes in conflict with those of Strauss 
himself (Norton, 2004, p.216). 
The most prominent accounts of the history of neoconservatism are guarded on the 
significance of Strauss’s legacy. For Jacob Heilbrunn, ‘while Strauss has been wrongly used 
to tar the neoconservative movement as deceptive and dishonest, his influence on the 
movement is clear’ (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.90). This influence is, however is said to be 
restricted to a wing of the movement Heilbrunn identifies with Irving and William Kristol, 
while another wing associated with Norman Podhoretz is seen as uninterested in 
Straussian ideas (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.108).  Justin Vaisse argues that ‘for a small number of 
neoconservatives, Strauss was a meaningful influence, but not more important than 
others’ (Vaïsse, 2010, p.271). 
The world of intelligence provides some of the most significant evidence of Straussian 
influence on neoconservatism. In their 1999 essay Leo Strauss and the World of 
Intelligence, Shulsky and Schmitt argue that Strauss's critique of the scientific approach to 
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the study of politics could be applied to Sherman Kent's scientific approach to intelligence 
(Schmitt, 1999). 
They also suggest an application for Strauss’s doctrine of 'esoteric writing', which held that 
most pre-modern authors had sought to conceal part of the meaning of their texts from 
some readers (Schmitt, 1999). Straussian political theory was therefore seen as potential 
counterweight to the neglect of deception as an aspect of intelligence by thinkers such as 
Sherman Kent (Schmitt, 1999). 
Strauss's view certainly alerts one to the possibility that political life may be closely 
linked to deception. Indeed, it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, 
and the hope, to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can 
dispense with it is the exception (Schmitt, 1999). 
With these arguments, Shulsky and Schmitt gave a Straussian cast to ideas about 
intelligence that had been defended by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence for 
two decades. It is worth noting, however, that Roy Godson regarded a 1949 Wilmoore 
Kendall article as the earliest statement of the intelligence philosophy that animated the 
Consortium (Godson, 1980a. p.2). Kendall was one first thinkers to apply Straussian ideas 
to American politics (Drury, 1997, p.130). He was also a former Trotskyist, whose 
experiences during the Spanish Civil War led him to develop a strong anti-communism 
which would inform his work on psychological warfare for the US Army (Regnery, 2008, 
p.257).  
Kendall’s philosophical journey from Marxism to Straussianism could perhaps be 
interpreted as one example of a wider phenomenon in the break-up of the Marxist left of 
the early Twentieth Century, one described by Perry Anderson in relation to the 
development of Western Marxism in Europe. 
After 1920, according to Anderson, the development of Western European Marxism was 
shaped by the continuing dynamism of capitalism and the intellectual ossification of official 
Soviet communism, so that ‘In the absence of the magnetic pole of a revolutionary class 
movement, the needle of the whole tradition tended to swing increasingly away towards 
contemporary bourgeois culture’ (Anderson, 1979, p.55). Evidence for this was provided by 
the increasingly esoteric character of Western Marxist prose, ‘the sign of its divorce from 
any popular practice’ (Anderson, 1979, p.54). As a result of this situation ‘The most striking 
single trait of Western Marxism as a common tradition is thus perhaps the constant 
presence and influence on it of successive types of European idealism’ (Anderson, 1979, 
p.56). 
The pressures that Anderson identifies applied a fortiori to the Old Left in the United 
States, the precursor of Cold War liberalism and neoconservatism. From this perspective 
Straussianism is perhaps less the source of neoconservative political practice than an index 
of its development beyond the theoretical resources of the Old Left and the Labour 
movement. In the case of Shulsky and Schmitt, the appeal to idealism in the form of 
Strauss, provided a theoretical grounding for an emphasis on intentions rather than 
capabilities. This stance had long characterised the intelligence approach of Team B and 
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the Consortium for the Study of intelligence, and arguably served to insulate 
neoconservative intelligence analyses from empirical refutation. 
Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards 
If the writings of Shulsky and Schmitt provided a new philosophical basis for the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence in the 1990s, the continuing work of Roy Godson 
illustrated the theory’s deep roots in intelligence practice. Along with Silent Warfare, 
Godson’s 1995 volume Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and 
Counterintelligence, updated in 2001, is the major systematic statement of the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence (Godson, 2001). 
Godson was well-placed for this task as the son of Joseph Godson, the former labour 
diplomat (The Times 1986). As an attaché in London in the 1950s, the elder Godson had 
been part of Lovestone’s international intelligence network at a time when its chief was 
reporting to Angleton (Wilford, 2003 p. 182). In the 1970s, the younger Godson had 
defended (and minimised) the American Federation of Labor’s relationship with the CIA, 
interviewing most of the key leaders of the Free Trade Union Committee in the process 
(Godson, 1975). He had been heavily involved in the struggles over détente as a member of 
the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (Sanders, 1983, p.212), and as co-ordinator of the 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, he had presided over the development of the 
epistemic community that had created the neoconservative theory of intelligence (Godson, 
1979). In the 1980s, he had become embroiled in the Iran-Contra affair as the Reagan 
administration’s attempt to revive covert action turned sour in America (Walsh, 1993). 
The legacies of Lovestoneite covert action and Angletonian counterintelligence were both 
reflected in Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards. Godson’s central argument was that the United 
States was potentially at a disadvantage because these two active disciplines were 
‘neglected elements’ of the American approach to intelligence (Godson, 2001, p.9). In 
making the case for their value as instruments of American foreign policy, he drew 
repeatedly on examples drawn from the Lovestoneite tradition. 
American assistance to post-war Western Europe was cited as a prime example of success 
‘in the halcyon days of US covert action’ when operations were backed by strong 
leadership and coordination (Godson, 2001, p.42). Godson attributed this in part to the 
Office of Policy Coordination’s recruitment of liberal case officers with sufficient knowledge 
of Marxism to recruit anti-communist agents from a variety of backgrounds on the left 
(Godson, 2001, p.42). He also highlighted the pre-war European activities of the American 
Federation of Labor and the ILGWU, as well as their cooperation with the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) during World War Two (Godson, 2001, p.42).  
The activities of British Security Coordination (BSC) furnished Godson with another 
example of successful covert action (Godson, 2001, p.23). He noted that the British 
infiltrated the isolationist lobby, created their own front groups, and ‘worked closely with 
other major nongovernmental groups like the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and 
ethnic fraternal organisations’ (Godson, 2001, p.24). The intelligence advice given to 
President Roosevelt by BSC chief Sir William Stephenson provided an instance of another 
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form of covert influence (Godson, 2001, p.136). This included an important role in 
promoting both the creation of a new American intelligence service, which eventually 
became the OSS, and identifying William Donovan as the man to lead it (Godson, 2001, 
p.178). 
Godson also turned to Lovestoneite history to demonstrate the advantages of coordination 
between covert action and counterintelligence. Jay Lovestone’s use of Ben Mandel’s 
analysis of the writings of French Communist Party, originally carried out for the State 
Department in 1945, was presented as a valuable example of the creative use of open 
sources (Godson, 2001, p.205).  
In examining the history of counterintelligence, Godson sought to weigh the arguments of 
both sides in the dispute that had raged both inside and outside the CIA about the 
effectiveness of James Angleton’s methods. He noted that Angleton’s supporters within 
the CIA had written relatively little, with the exception of the former chief of operations of 
the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, Newton Miler, in his contributions to the literature of the 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Godson, 2001, p.286). 
Godson’s judgement that ‘while far from ideal, the counterintelligence system was able to 
protect the CIA itself, if not all its operations, from serious penetration,’ was ultimately 
favourable to Angleton (Godson, 2001, p.94). While recognizing Angleton’s idiosyncrasies, 
Godson attributed such failures as there were to disinterest in counterintelligence amongst 
the CIA’s covert action operators. He regarded Angleton’s approach as a serious, if 
ambitious, attempt to recreate the wartime successes of the OSS X-2 counterintelligence 
branch, which were based largely on British exploitation of double-agents and decryption 
of German communications, advantages the CIA did not enjoy (Godson, 2001, p.91). One 
intriguing element of Angleton’s efforts was an attempt to recruit members of non-ruling 
communist parties around the world as a channel for influencing Soviet intelligence 
(Godson, 2001, p.87). 
These efforts at creating an apparatus of offensive counterintelligence faced dramatic 
setbacks when US Government policy shifted in the 1970s (Godson, 2001, p.100). Godson’s 
account of the impact of détente is instructive: 
With this new policy, the political leadership sent a signal, intentional or not, to 
American intelligence managers: counterintelligence concerns were no longer the 
priority they had been during the height of the cold war. Furthermore, the actions 
intelligence and counterintelligence managers had taken for over ten years in 
response to White House requests to monitor and disrupt political groups were 
now repudiated by the nation’s political leadership (Godson, 2001, p.100). 
This comment perhaps helps to illuminate why many of those involved with US covert 
action and counterintelligence were drawn into the anti-détente movement. The sense of 
betrayal which Godson evokes here underlines that Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards is a 
document of a living tradition, a political warfare coalition that for fifty years had brought 
together US intelligence officers and their allies in civil society together in organised 
political intervention around the world. 
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The influence of this heritage, and particularly of the Lovestoneite tradition, emerges 
strongly from Godson’s positive recommendations. In setting out the principles of 
successful covert action, he argued ‘there is no need to control foreign assets – whether 
politicians or activists – as bureaucracies rooted in the Anglo-American tradition, favouring 
precision and efficiency, are tempted to do’ (Godson, 2001, p.127). Instead, he stressed the 
need for covert action operatives to be able to work independently, without precise 
instructions from the top, although he warned that ‘this kind of creativity, the ability to 
judge on the spot, to improvise, to act on that intangible blend of knowledge, conviction, 
and instinct, is not the stuff of modern, bureaucratic, organizational doctrine in 
authoritarian or democratic regimes’ (Godson 2001, 124).  
This distrust of bureaucratic managers was also a recurring theme, reflected in Godson’s 
analysis of the 1970s, when ‘bureaucratic pressures within the agency, combined with the 
breakup of the foreign policy consensus and new CIA leadership, led to important changes 
in the relative power and relationships of its components’ strengthening the practitioners 
of analysis and technical collection at the expense of covert action counterintelligence 
(Godson, 2001, p.244). Godson did not go into the nature of the response by the 
supporters of covert action and counterintelligence in the late 1970s.  He did argue that 
efforts were made to revive covert action and counterintelligence in the 1980s, but 
suggested that these had not got very far (Godson, 2001, p.245).  The Iran-contra episode 
was put down to a lack of clear policy leadership (Godson, 2001, p.120). 
Although Godson’s defence of covert action and counterintelligence wove together 
examples drawn from the history of the AFL with many others drawn from different places 
and times, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards ultimately emerges as the foremost defence of the 
Lovestoneite tradition of covert action. His repeated invocation of a dichotomy between 
the autonomous creative covert actor and the hidebound career bureaucrat strongly 
recalls many actual confrontations in Lovestoneite history, such as those between the AFL 
leadership and an expanding CIA in the early 1950s, and perhaps even that between the 
American Communist leadership and a Stalinizing Comintern in the late 1920s. 
The Working Group on Intelligence Reform 
If Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards was testimony to the neoconservative belief that intelligence 
reform had stalled in the 1980s, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence did not give 
up in the face of the setbacks at the end of that decade. In 1992, the Consortium 
established the Working Group on Intelligence Reform in an attempt to shift the terms of 
the post-Cold War debate about intelligence (Godson, 1995, p.vii). Chaired by Roy Godson 
and Ernest May of Harvard University, with the assistance of Gary Schmitt, the Working 
Group was intended to provide an open forum for intelligence officials and scholars 
(Godson, 1995, p.vii). A number of the papers presented were published in 1995 as US 
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas For Reform (Godson, 1995). While many of these 
papers reiterated positions long associated with the Consortium, several pointed to 
concerns that would shape the neoconservative theory of intelligence in the 21st Century. 
An April 1992 paper by Abram Shulsky noted Iraq’s success in concealing its nuclear 
programme before the 1991 Gulf War, which he attributed to good Iraqi 
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counterintelligence (Shulsky, 1995b, p.21). However, that programme’s reliance on imports 
meant that much information could have been available in the West if the right mechanism 
had existed, a mechanism which Shulsky suggested ‘must be as sophisticated as the one 
now used for the more traditional types of intelligence information’ (Shulsky, 1995b, p.21). 
However, Shulsky resisted the inference that because this information might be considered 
intelligence, it should best be analysed by an intelligence organisation, still less a single, 
centralised one like the CIA (Shulsky, 1995b, p.22). Instead, he argued that existence of a 
multiplicity of analytical organisations enabled the intelligence community to exploit a 
broader range of knowledge (Shulsky, 1995b, p.22). 
Within the government are many specialized staffs of various sorts – policy 
planning staffs, specialised analytical units in law enforcement agencies, the Office 
of Net Assessment in the Department of Defence and so forth. These organizations 
deal with classified information if necessary, but they are not normally regarded as 
intelligence organisations (Shulsky, 1995b, p.22). 
Shulsky’s suspicion of centralized intelligence perhaps reflected his awareness of what he 
called ‘the “aura” of intelligence within the policy world’, which he suggested often gave a 
spurious authority to the judgements of analysts (Shulsky, 1995b, p.27). 
Why fight it out on policy grounds if one can win by manipulating the intelligence 
product and arrogating its aura for one’s position? Yet this is the temptation one 
creates when one extends the sphere of intelligence to include virtually all policy-
relevant information and its analysis (Shulsky, 1995b, p.27). 
Shulsky returned to the same themes in another essay co-authored with Gary Schmitt and 
originally published in the Winter 1994/95 edition of The National Interest (Shulsky, 
1995a). Iraq’s nuclear programme was once again cited, this time to show the effectiveness 
of denial and deception measures against modern means of technical collection, such as 
satellites, that had been relied on in the Cold War (Shulsky, 1995a, p.49).  
There was a renewed attack on centralised intelligence, together with a call for more 
competitive analysis to bring to bear the perspectives of policymakers in the Departments 
of State and Defense (Shulsky, 1995a, p.51). Shulsky and Schmitt acknowledged that some 
of the impetus for centralization came from the particular biases attributed to various 
parts of the government, notably in the case of the Department of Defense, an incentive to 
exaggerate Soviet military expenditure and capabilities (Shulsky, 1995a, p.52). In response, 
they argued that the CIA had acquired its own incentives to defend its position as a 
corrective to other agencies, and its institutional role in the verification of arms control 
agreements (Shulsky, 1995a, p.52).  
With these comments, Shulsky and Schmitt shed an interesting light on the bureaucratic 
rivalries that had been apparent in the struggle over détente. They also perhaps underline 
why policymakers at the Department of Defense might wish to challenge the CIA’s 
monopoly on the ‘aura of intelligence’. Shulsky and Schmitt’s positive recommendations 
were strongly favourable to the Pentagon. They called for an expansion of human 
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intelligence collection at the Department of Defence, while suggesting that the CIA’s 
human intelligence capability should be separated from the agency (Shulsky, 1995a, p.59).  
In February 1994, the CIA official responsible for analysis, Deputy Director for Intelligence 
Doug MacEachin, delivered a paper to the Working Group that suggested the agency was 
taking on board some of the group’s concerns. The Directorate of Intelligence was being 
reformed to make the needs of policymakers ‘the driving factor in intelligence production’ 
(MacEachin, 1995, p.63). It would be down to the integrity of individual analysts and their 
supervisors to ensure the changed relationship did not lead to politicization of intelligence 
analysis (MacEachin, 1995, p.74) 
This development was welcomed in a response by Paul Wolfowitz, then the Dean of the 
School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (MacEachin, 1995, 
p.75). ‘Perhaps this is revealing a certain arrogance on my part, but I frequently think I am 
capable of coming up with an informed opinion about a matter as any number of people 
within the intelligence community who feel they have been uniquely anointed with this 
responsibility’, Wolfowitz stated (MacEachin, 1995, p.76). In an echo of Shulsky’s ‘aura of 
intelligence’ argument, he suggested that intelligence analysts claimed an authority that 
was largely spurious. 
I think it actually encourages the manipulation of intelligence judgements for 
political policy purposes. If you can get the authority of the Intelligence Community 
on your side, you can appeal to authority without having to bother appealing to 
the evidence (MacEachin, 1995, p.76). 
In another response to MacEachin, Abram Shulsky described politicization as ‘a very much 
overstated issue’ and argued that ‘as Paul Wolfowitz pointed out, politicization can also 
occur when intelligence and policy are kept quite separate’ (MacEachin, 1995, p.84). 
Perhaps the crudest application of the neoconservative theory of analysis came in a 
December 1993 paper by Robert Kohler of defence form TRW which attacked what Kohler 
said were disproportionate budget cuts to the defence industrial base sustaining the 
intelligence community (Kohler, 1995, p.97). To address this, Kohler proposed a new Team 
B panel of non-governmental experts to review the defence budget (Kohler, 1995, p.108). 
Analysis was not, however, the only focus of the Working Group. A September 1993 paper 
by the former executive director of CIA counterintelligence William Hood, accompanied by 
responses from former FBI officer James Nolan and former CIA covert action officer Samuel 
Halpern offered a strong defence of James Angleton’s legacy (Hood, 1995). Hood 
emphasised the formative nature of Angleton’s time in X-2, the heavily compartmentalised 
counterintelligence wing of OSS, which was entrusted with Britain’s most secret 
intelligence (Hood, 1995, p.129). He also emphasized the significance of Angleton’s 
relationship with Israel, contradicting authors who had dismissed it as extraneous (Hood, 
1995, p.134-135).  Hood was backed up on this point by Halpern, who also rejected 
suggestions that Angleton had been manipulated by the Israelis and argued that he had in 
fact produced valuable intelligence on the country (Hood, 1995, p.144). He also argued 
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that any involvement by Angleton in funding Israeli operations in Africa would have been 
approved by higher authority (Hood, 1995, p.144).  
These accounts perhaps support the suggestion that the neoconservatism cannot be seen 
simply as an extension of the Israel lobby as is sometimes suggested, any more than the 
labour interventionists of the 1940s were simply a pro-British lobby. Instead, 
neoconservative support for Israel should be interpreted at least in part in the light of the 
transnational alliances of the wider political warfare coalition of which the movement was 
a part. Hood and Halpern’s accounts are consistent with the suggestion in Chapter Four 
that Angleton’s relationship with Israel was a kind of geopolitical expression of the CIA’s 
sponsorship of the non-communist left. In both cases, a degree of autonomy, and indeed 
conflict, was inseparable from the factors which made the covert alliance worthwhile. 
Halpern noted that he himself had first met Angleton in the late 1940s, when he was 
reprimanded for cutting across Angleton’s labour operations in South East Asia (Hood, 
1995, p.141). He stated that he was unaware of Angleton’s connection with Jay Lovestone 
at the time, although it is not clear if he meant to imply that the relationship existed before 
the mid-1950s (Hood, 1995, p.141). 
If Hood and Halpern’s contribution shed a little light on the history of the political warfare 
coalition, others pointed toward the direction of its future development. 
In May 1994, former chief UN weapons inspector David Kay delivered a paper on the 
lessons of Iraq for denial and deception (Kay, 1995). Kay emphasized Iraqi success in denial 
of information to US technical collection systems such as satellites (Kay, 1995, p.120). He 
suggested this presaged a new period in which both nuclear technology and the means of 
denial and deception would be widely available to middle-sized powers. 
The 1990s mark the beginning of a period of virtual proliferation where capabilities 
are generally available and the real question becomes one of motivation and 
intentions. In such an environment the task of intelligence collection and analysis 
becomes harder as the requirements for denial and deception become easier (Kay, 
1995, p.127). 
Kay’s argument thus brought to a new field the traditional priorities of the neoconservative 
theory of intelligence from the days of Team B onwards, with its focus on intentions rather 
than capabilities and its corresponding downgrading of technical collection.  
The definitive statement of the Working Group’s priorities on these issues came in a 1996 
report by Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, The Future of US Intelligence. Shulsky and 
Schmitt argued that the proliferation of both information technology and post-Cold War 
intelligence requirements made aspirations for centralized intelligence obsolete, adding 
that ‘it is this report's view that the failure of centralization efforts can be seen as reflecting 
the reasonable needs of the various components of the national security bureaucracy’ 
(Shulsky, 1996, p.xiv). 
They recommended that analysis should be brought closer to policymakers and some of 
the dividing lines between analysis and policy deliberation removed (Shulsky, 1996, p.x). 
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The focus of the intelligence community should be on the clandestine disciplines of human 
collection, counterintelligence and covert action (Shulsky, 1996, p.xv). This would require 
an end to the phenomenon of ‘Angletonophobia’, a distrust of counterintelligence which 
Shulsky and Schmitt blamed for the 1994 Aldrich Ames spy case (Shulsky, 1996, p.xiv). The 
argued for a reinvigorated counterintelligence function ‘to guard the integrity of the 
government's information collection and analysis process by penetrating, understanding, 
and possibly manipulating an adversary's intelligence efforts against us’ (Shulsky, 1996, 
p.vii).  
The Working group’s recommendations were thus the latest iteration of a philosophy of 
activist intelligence with roots going back through Angleton’s CIA Counterintelligence Staff 
to the wartime activities of X-2. 
Strategic Denial and Deception 
In Silent Warfare Shulsky and Schmitt had argued that victory not truth is the goal of 
intelligence. In Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, Roy Godson had made the case for the 
disciplines of covert action and counterintelligence as key instruments to this end though 
offensive counterintelligence designed to manipulate the enemy. 
The details of how such manipulation could be carried out were the subject of Strategic 
Denial and Deception published by the National Strategy Information Center in 2002. In the 
opening chapter, originally published in the International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, Roy Godson and James Wirtz provided some basic definitions of the 
subject: 
Denial refers to the attempt to block information that could be used by an 
opponent to learn some truth. Deception, by contrast, refers to a nation’s effort to 
cause an adversary to believe something that is not true (Godson, 2006, p.1). 
A more extended discussion by Abram Shulsky argued that denial consisted in blocking the 
channels by which information reached the enemy, while deception consisted in sending 
false signals down those channels (Shulsky, 2006, p.19). Potential channels which Shulsky 
considered included espionage, diplomacy, propaganda, agents-of-influence and open 
sources (Shulsky, 2006, pp.20-26). In considering propaganda, Shulsky emphasised the role 
of non-state actors and reiterated the neoconservative call for operational autonomy in 
covert action: 
 
Soviet front groups might have been more effective, but Stalinist paranoia made 
impossible the operational autonomy needed to succeed. To the extent that future 
practitioners of this type of propaganda have learned lessons from the Soviet 
experience we may expect that nonstate groups will be controlled in a more 
sophisticated manner and that their ties to a given state will be less obvious 
(Shulsky, 2006, p.23). 
This comment is particularly evocative of the Lovestoneite roots of the neoconservative 
approach to covert action, given that Jay Lovestone himself learnt the lessons of the Soviet 
experience at first hand. It is intriguing, if nothing more, that it came in the context of a 
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discussion of the kind of co-ordinated deception operations to which Lovestone’s CIA 
handler, James Angleton, aspired.  
Despite Shulsky’s critique of the effectiveness Soviet covert action, Strategic Denial and 
Deception took seriously the threat of deception by authoritarian states, notably in a 
chapter on arms proliferation by the former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Lynn M. Hansen. Hansen not only noted the success of Iraqi 
concealment of its weapons programme before the First Gulf War, but also implied that it 
was continuing. 
In the end, the problem of eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was not 
resolved. Saddam Hussein remains capable of reconstituting all or any part of his 
program to acquire such weapons (Hansen 2002, 173-174). 
By the time that Strategic Denial and Deception appeared in 2002, the neoconservative 
intelligence theorists were once more in a position to address such concerns. They were to 
do so in a manner that underlined their commitment to the ideas articulated by the 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and the National Strategy Information Center. 
The neoconservatives in the George W. Bush Administration 
The position of the neoconservatives within the Bush Administration elected in 2000 was in 
many ways analogous to that in Reagan Administration 20 years before. Neoconservatives 
were largely concentrated in middle-ranking foreign and defence policy positions 
(Heilbrunn, 2008, p.230). 
Such influence as they wielded was largely dependent on the support of Cabinet–level 
patrons such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, the latter a veteran of the 1976 
Committee on the Present Danger and the Committee for the Free World (Vaïsse, 2010, 
p.242). Within Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense, the most powerful neoconservatives 
were Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas 
Feith (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.230). Feith had worked with Wolfowitz at the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, before joining the 1976 Senate Campaign of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, 
and later going to work at the Reagan-era National Security Council with Richard Pipes 
(Heilbrunn, 2008, p.257-258). Feith would be a central figure in implementing the approach 
to intelligence adopted by the Department of Defence in the period following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 2001. 
Neoconservative intelligence in Donald Rumsfeld’s Department of Defence 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Feith created a small unit within the 
Department of Defence to review intelligence on terrorist networks. 
Feith told a press conference in June 2003: 
 The team began its work in October of 2001.  It was not involved in intelligence 
collection.  Rather, it relied on reporting from the CIA and other parts of the 
intelligence community.  Its job was to review this intelligence to help digest it for 
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me and other policymakers, to help us develop Defense Department strategy for 
the war on terrorism.  And as I said, it looked at these interrelationships among 
terrorist organizations and their state sponsors.  It did not confine its review to Iraq 
or al Qaeda.  I mean, it was looking at global terrorist networks and the full range 
of state sponsors and other sources of support for terrorist groups.  Its main 
conclusion was that groups and states were willing to cooperate across 
philosophical, ideological lines (Feith, 2003). 
In January 2002, this group was named the Policy Counter Terrorism Research Group 
(PCTEG) (Edelman, 2007, p.13). In a memo on 22 January, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz 
asked for input from PCTEG on possible links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Edelman, 2007, 
p.14). 
Also in early 2002 a DIA analyst working for the Policy Support Office (PSO) of the Office of 
the Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy (OSDP) unearthed a 1998 CIA report linking 
Osama Bin Laden to Iraq and wrote a new assessment based upon it (Edelman, 2007, p.16).  
In July 2002, Wolfowitz began preparation of a briefing for Secretary Rumsfeld on links 
between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Edelman, 2007, p.18) . This work was carried out by 
Wolfowitz’s special assistant, along with PCTEG and the PSO (Edelman, 2007, p.18). On 25 
July, the DIA officer at the PSO drafted a memo entitled ‘Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the 
case’. This stated in part: 
In fact, a body of intelligence reporting for over a decade from varied sources 
reflects a pattern of Iraqi support for al-Qaida activities. The covert nature of the 
relationship makes it difficult to know the extent of that support. Moreover, 
intelligence gaps exist because of … Iraq’s need to cloak its activities, thus 
preventing collection of information on additional contacts between Iraq and Al-
Qaida (cited in Edelman, 2007, p.19). 
The memo went on to challenge assertions that this intelligence was not ‘solid’ or 
‘provable’: 
Legal standards for prosecution needed in law enforcement do not obtain in 
intelligence assessments, which look at trends, patterns, capabilities and 
intentions. Based on these criteria, the following information clearly makes the 
case for an Intelligence Finding –that Iraq has been complicit in supporting al-Qaida 
terrorist activities (Edelman, 2007, p.20). 
This formed the basis of a briefing given to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 8 August 
2002, entitled ‘Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida’ (Edelman, 2007, 
p.22). The briefing’s findings included references to ‘more than a decade of numerous 
contacts’ between Iraq and al-Qaida, to ‘shared interest and pursuit of WMD’ and to 
possible ‘coordination with al-Qaida specifically related to 9/11’ (Edelman, 2007, pp.23-24). 
Rumsfeld then ordered that the briefing be given to CIA director George Tenet, which took 
place on 15 August 2002 (Edelman, 2007, p.25). A slide critical of the intelligence 
community’s approach to analysis was omitted from this version of the briefing (Edelman, 
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2007, p.25). On 16 September, the briefing was given to the Deputy National Security 
Advisor and the Vice President’s Chief of Staff (Edelman, 2007, p.27). This version of the 
briefing included a new slide detailing a report by Czech intelligence of an alleged meeting 
in Prague between Iraqi intelligence and 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta (Edelman, 2007, 
p.28). 
Yet another organisation within the OUSD(P), the Office of Special Plans (OSP), came into 
de facto existence in mid-August 2002, and was formalised the following October 
(Edelman, 2007, p.12). According to Feith ‘the Special Plans Office was called Special Plans, 
because at the time, calling it Iraq Planning Office might have undercut the -- our 
diplomatic efforts with regard to Iraq and the U.N. and elsewhere.  We set up an office to 
address the whole range of issues regarding Iraq planning’ (Feith, 2003). In subsequent 
reporting, the name of the OSP tended to be used generically to refer to the overlapping 
activities of researchers from the PCTEG, the PSO and the OSP, all of which were 
responsible ultimately to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy – Douglas 
Feith (Edelman, 2007, p.10).  
The Pentagon research on Iraq began to come to public attention in October 2002. In 
response to an article in the New York Times, Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed that 
intelligence was being reviewed in the OUSD(P), but denied that this constituted 
intelligence activity in itself, instead emphasising the positive nature of the nature of his 
relationship with the CIA (Defense Department Briefing Transcript, 2002). 
There are always are going to be people who have different intelligence views 
within the agency, and there's no question but that on some of these important 
terrorism issues, you're seeing differences of opinions out of the intelligence 
community and the Central Intelligence Agency. There also are going to be people 
who will ask a lot of questions, and there's no question but that the people in the 
Department of Defense, General Myers or Rumsfeld and others, ask a lot of the 
questions of the intelligence community, and then they get - they come back with 
responses (Defense Department Briefing Transcript, 2002). 
However, less positive views of this interaction were beginning to enter the public domain 
in late 2002. In a November 2002 article in the American Prospect journalist Robert 
Dreyfuss characterised the OUSD(P) research as part of the Pentagon’s ‘war against the 
CIA’: 
The Pentagon is bringing relentless pressure to bear on the agency to produce 
intelligence reports more supportive of war with Iraq, according to former CIA 
officials. Key officials of the Department of Defense are also producing their own 
unverified intelligence reports to justify war. Much of the questionable information 
comes from Iraqi exiles long regarded with suspicion by CIA professionals. A 
parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation, in the office of Undersecretary of Defense 
for Policy Douglas J. Feith, collects the information from the exiles and scours other 




Dreyfuss claimed that the head of the un-named unit was Abram Shulsky, formerly of the 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Dreyfuss, 2002). 
Roy Godson, the head of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and a 
colleague of Shulsky's for many years, has high hopes for the success of the 
Pentagon's Iraq intelligence unit, despite its small size when arrayed against the 
CIA's might. 'It might turn out to be a David against Goliath,' says Godson 
(Dreyfuss, 2002). 
Shulsky served as an advisor to the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy from 2001 to 
2009, advising on issues related to Iraq and the War on Terror (Heritage Foundation, 2014). 
On 8 August 2002, he was among four recipients of an email from Deputy Secretary 
Wolfowitz praising the briefing given to Secretary Rumsfeld on links between Iraq and al-
Qaeda, and asking for some ‘next possible steps to see if we can illuminate the differences 
between us and the CIA’ (Committee on Armed Services, 2008). The Department of 
Defense later confirmed that Shulsky served as head of the Office of Special Plans from 
August 2002 to April 2003, stating that the OSP was focused on policy planning and 
guidance related to the Northern Arabian Gulf and the war on terrorism (Office of Public 
Affairs, Department of Defense, 2003a). According to Karen Kwiatkowski, a DIA analyst 
employed at the OUSD(P) in 2002-03, the OSP’s main function under Shulsky was drafting 
talking points for senior officials: ‘This crafting and approval of the exact words to use 
when discussing Iraq, WMD, and terrorism were, for most of us, the only known functions 
of OSP and Mr. Shulsky’ (Kwiatkowski, 2003). 
The OUSD(P)’s activities would come in for increasing scrutiny in the wake of the 2003 Iraq 
War. A 2004 report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that the 
research carried out by the PCTEG and others was referred to within the OUSD(P) as ‘the 
Iraqi intelligence cell’ (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.309). However, the 
Committee delayed substantive review of the analytical products produced by the OUSD(P) 
to a projected second-phase report (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.312). 
In October 2004, the ranking Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Carl Levin published a report on the alternative analysis of the issue of 
an Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship carried out within the OUSD(P) (Levin, 2004). Levin 
concluded the OUSD(P) analyses were carried out because assessments by the intelligence 
community had failed to support the preconceptions of senior policymakers at the 
Department of Defense (Levin, 2004, p.44).  
An alternative intelligence assessment process was established in the office of 
Under Secretary for Policy Doug Feith to look at the evidence through a different 
lens, one that was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq 
and al Qaeda. Drawing upon both reliable and unreliable reporting, they arrived at 
an “alternative” interpretation of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship that was much 
stronger than that assessed by the IC and more in accord with the policy views of 
senior officials in the Administration (Levin, 2004, p.44). 
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Levin concluded that members of the Bush administration made a number of misleading 
statements in 2002-3 that reflected the views of the OUSD(P) analysts, rather than those of 
the intelligence community (Levin, 2004, p.45). 
These assessments included, among others, allegations by the President that Iraq 
was an “ally” of al-Qaeda; assertions by National Security Advisor Rice and others 
that Iraq “had” provided training in WMD to al-Qaeda; and continued 
representations by Vice President Cheney that Mohammed Atta may have met 
with an Iraq intelligence officer before the 9/11 attacks when the CIA didn’t believe 
the meeting took place. (Levin, 2004, p.45) 
In September 2005, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Pat Roberts, 
asked the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, to review the activities 
of the Office of Special Plans (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2007b). 
Later the same month, Senator Levin asked the Inspector General to review the PCTEG and 
the Office of Policy Support (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2007b). 
An unclassified summary of the Inspector General’s report, published in 2007, concluded: 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and 
then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida 
relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the 
consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such 
actions were not illegal or unauthorised, the actions were, in our opinion, 
inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products 
and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence 
Community. This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy from policy formulation to 
alternative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defence for Policy did not provide “the most accurate analysis 
of intelligence” to senior decision-makers (Department of Defense Office of 
Inspector General, 2007b). 
Seen in the light of the neoconservative literature of intelligence, what is most striking 
about the intelligence process within the OUSD(P) is the extent to which it conformed to 
the theoretical prescriptions of some of the participants. Perhaps the strongest precedents 
for the methodology adopted by the OUSD(P) are to be found in Wolfowitz and Shulsky’s 
responses to Douglas MacEachin’s paper on the tradecraft of analysis for the Working 
Group for Intelligence Reform. Wolfowitz had strongly insisted on the right of policymakers 
to a role in the intelligence production process (MacEachin, 1995, p.80). Likewise, Shulsky 
had insisted on the need for a close relationship between intelligence analysts and 
policymakers at all levels in order to address the needs of intelligence consumers 
(MacEachin, 1995, pp.83-84). These were clear indications of the approach both men 
would take in the Bush-era Department of Defense. So too was Shulsky’s 1992 paper which 
praised the proliferation of analytic units throughout the Government and suggested that 
the real value of the intelligence community was in providing ‘nuggets of information’ 
rather than analytic judgements (Shulsky, 1995b, pp.24-25). 
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Similarly, the bureaucratic rivalries identified in Working Group papers prefigured the 
faultline that would develop within the US Government over Iraq. In their 1994/95 paper 
on intelligence reform Shulsky and Gary Schmitt had responded to claims that the 
Pentagon had a natural bias towards threat inflation, by arguing that the CIA had an 
institutional interest in promoting and monitoring détente arrangements (Shulsky, 1995a, 
p.53). 
Neoconservative observers outside the Government were among those who interpreted 
the debate over Iraq in terms of this antagonism. Roy Godson’s remark to Robert Dreyfuss 
that the Pentagon analysts ‘might turn out to be a David against Goliath’ in their dispute 
with the CIA was an example of this (Dreyfuss, 2002). So too was a comment to Dreyfuss by 
James Woolsey of the Defense Policy Board that ‘the CIA has started saying things that the 
Defense Department has been saying all along’ about the relationship between Iraq and Al 
Qaida (Dreyfuss, 2002). 
The relationship between the neoconservative theory of intelligence and neoconservative 
practise in the Bush administration meant that the internal debate over Iraq within the US 
Government became an extension of the struggle between competing conceptions of 
intelligence dating back to the mid-1970s. 
This theory of intelligence also shaped neoconservative contributions to the debate about 
Iraq more broadly. In Britain in early 2003, the Telegraph defended the Government’s use 
of academic sources in a dossier on Iraq, arguing: ‘Open source materials have long given 
governments some of their best leads: for example, the earliest predictions of the 
emerging Cold War were derived by Ben Mandel of the EUR-X unit of the State Department 
in April 1945 from French Communist publications’ (‘Back to Spy School’, Telegraph, 8 
February 2003) (2003b). 
This example was precisely the one that Roy Godson had used in support of the integration 
of intelligence with open source information in Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Godson, 2001, 
p.204). It is possible that the Telegraph editorial was written by his brother Dean Godson, 
then a Telegraph leader writer (Beckett, 2008). If so, it underlines the extent to which the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence was shaped by heritage of the Lovestoneite 
movement to which their father Joseph Godson belonged (The Times, 1986). 
The making of the case for war in Iraq was in significant measure an application of the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence developed since the 1970s in opposition to the rival 
‘Sherman Kent’ school of thought attributed to the CIA’s analytical-estimating hierarchy. A 
longer historical perspective on the structure of the epistemic community that produced 
that theory can illuminate the specific role of the neoconservatives within the Bush 
administration. 
As was shown in Chapter Seven, that epistemic community was an expression of a wider 
political coalition favouring an intensification of the Cold War and opposing détente, within 
which neoconservatives were allied to other strands of conservative American nationalism 
in organisations such as the Committee on the Present Danger. The patronage of 
neoconservatives by figures such as Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary 
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Rumsfeld in the Bush administration was essentially a continuation of this pattern. For this 
reason it could be argued that the role of neoconservatives in making the case for the Iraq 
War has been over-emphasized. 
Nevertheless, the neoconservative role in what we have called the political warfare 
coalition was a distinctive one precisely because of the theory of intelligence the 
neoconservatives articulated.  This role consistently exemplified the two-tier pattern which 
Inderjeet Parmar has characterised as distinctive of epistemic communities, in which a 
second-tier of intellectuals elaborates and publicises the ideas which provide the basis of 
decisions by policymakers (Parmar, 2006, p.17). In part the neoconservatives’ second-tier 
role may have reflected their outsider status within the wider conservative movement. 
More particularly, however, it reflected the particular experience of intelligence that the 
neoconservatives inherited from Cold War liberalism. 
The Neoconservative intelligence theorists after Iraq 
The Senate investigations of 2004 were part of a wider pattern of growing scrutiny of the 
neoconservative role in Iraq War intelligence. Indeed it has been suggested that criticisms 
such as those of Hersh (2005) had parallels with the ‘Who lost China’ debate of the 1950s 
(Fine and Xu 2011, p.593). Acknowledging that the analogy was imperfect though 
suggestive, Fine and Xu argued: 
 ‘Neo-conservatives did not face the claims of subversion that China experts faced 
in the 1950s.However, both groups held diverse posts, inside and outside of 
government, both contained a mix of generalists and area specialists, and both 
were charged with slanting (or lying about) facts as they knew them (Fine and Xu 
2011, p.597.n2). 
They went on to argue that: “The reputation of experts justifies state policy and attacks on 
these experts constitute criticism of those institutions through which they have been 
sponsored” (Fine and Xu 2011, p.611). They offered a useful typology of attacks 
distinguishing the ‘smear’ and the ‘degradation ceremony’ (Fine and Xu 2011, p.593). It 
should be noted that despite their emotive resonance, these terms do not, in Fine and Xu’s 
usage, imply a moral judgement on the activities they describe. 
The smear is defined as ‘broadcasting a set of linked and pejorative claims that tie the 
policy failure to moral deficiencies of the expert and her backers’ and is seen as the tactic 
of those lacking institutional power (Fine and Xu 2011, p.596). Such power is however 
essential to the degradation ceremony, which is defined as ‘formally assigning stigma to 
target’ (Fine and Xu 2011, p.596). 
This dichotomy could be seen as yet another aspect of the two-tier dynamic seen in the 
broader literature on epistemic communities, and in Gramsci’s distinction between 
dictatorship and hegemony. Indeed, by focusing on the overlap between epistemic debates 
and political conflict, Fine and Xu arguably illustrate some of the mechanisms by which 
hegemonic struggles take place in practice. 
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Neoconservative intelligence theorists like Godson and Shulsky had long experience of this 
kind of struggle in both offensive and defensive roles. Both had careers stretching back to 
the anti-détente movement of the 1970s, in which the ‘two-tier strategy’ described by 
Sanders (1983, p.197) can clearly be understood in terms of Fine and Xu’s typology. In the 
campaign against Paul Warnke’s nomination as Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the CDM memo accusing Warnke of unilateral disarmament 
(Sanders, 1983, p.204) clearly fits Fine and Xu’s definition of a smear. The bitterly 
contested confirmation hearings in the Senate, described as ‘venomous’ in the New York 
Times, (quoted Sanders 1983, p.208) could be identified as a nominally unsuccessful 
degradation ceremony, a role for which Fine and Xu observe Congressional hearings are 
well suited (Fine and Xu 2011, p.610). 
In the wake of the Iraq War the key neoconservative theorists of intelligence did not 
respond with the vigorous and public campaign that they had mounted in defence of 
covert action and counterintelligence in the late 1970s and early 80s. Nor was there 
anything to compare to Dirty Tricks and Trump Cards, effectively Roy Godson's apologia for 
the state-private network of the Iran-Contra Era.  
Following the Iraq Survey Group’s announcement of its failure to find of weapons of mass 
destruction in early 2004, elements of the wider neoconservative movement sought to de-
emphasise the significance of the intelligence case for war. Robert Kagan and William 
Kristol wrote in the Weekly Standard that 'while his weapons were a key part of the case 
for removing Saddam, that case was always broader' and that "the moral and humanitarian 
purpose provided a compelling reason for a war to remove Saddam" (Kagan & Kristol 
2004). In seeking to deny that the public had been ‘fundamentally misled by American 
intelligence’ they pointed out that ‘In December 2002, according to USA Today, a team of 
U.S. intelligence analysts predicted it would be extremely difficult to find weapons of mass 
destruction in the aftermath of an invasion’ (Kagan & Kristol 2004). The relevant article 
stated: 
The study by a team of U.S. intelligence analysts, military officers and civilian 
Pentagon officials warned that U.S. military tactics, guerrilla warfare, looting and 
lying by Iraqi officials would undermine the search for banned Iraqi weapons. 
Portions of the study were made available to USA TODAY. Three high-ranking U.S. 
intelligence officials described its purpose and conclusions. 
"Locating a program that ... has been driven by denial and deception imperatives is 
no small task," the December 2002 report said. "Prolonged insecurity with 
factional violence and guerrilla forces still at large would be the worst outcome for 
finding Saddam's WMD arsenal” (Diamond 2004). 
Given the article’s opaque sourcing the most that can be said is that the report’s mention 
of Pentagon civilians, and its emphasis on Iraqi denial and deception, is suggestive. There 
must be at least a suspicion that those at the Department of Defense who had been most 
aggressive in pushing the intelligence case for war were involved in the creation of a 
document that made their position impervious to empirical evidence. 
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We shall see that neoconservative intelligence theorists such as Roy Godson, Gary Schmitt 
and Abram Shulsky did not play a prominent role in the post-war debate on Iraq 
intelligence. Had they done so, it might well only have invited further scrutiny of the role of 
the Pentagon neoconservatives. That is not however, the only possible explanation for 
their relative quiescence. 
Unlike the era of 1970s detente or in the immediate post-Cold War period in the early 
1990s, America's commitment to an offensive intelligence posture was less open to doubt 
in the post-Iraq War period. Rather than debate the merits of the Iraq War, the 
neoconservative writers focused on winning it, and the other conflicts into which the 
administration was drawn in the name of counter-terrorism. The neoconservative 
literature of intelligence turned away from strategic intelligence at the national level to 
focus on these theatres. This may have owed something to the preoccupations of 
neoconservatives inside the administration. 
As (Vaisse 2010,  p.258) notes, neoconservative influence in government declining during 
the latter part of the George W. Bush administration, with Wolfowitz and Feith having 
departed by 2005, but remained significant in relation to the Middle East and the conduct 
of the Iraq war itself.  
Abram Shulsky continued to serve as an advisor to the under-Secretary of Defence for 
Policy throughout the Bush administration, working on issues related to Iraq and the 
‘Global War on Terrorism’ (Hudson Institute, 2017). In 2006, it was reported that he was 
heading a Pentagon office on Iran. McClatchy newspapers cited unnamed officials as 
fearing that the office 'is being used to funnel intelligence from [Manucher] Ghorbanifar, 
the arms dealer, and an Iranian exile group known as the Mujahedeen Khalq’ (Strobel & 
Walcott, 2016).  
After leaving the administration, Shulsky co-authored a number of publications with 
Douglas Feith which touched on his record in government service, but the emphasis was on 
counter-propaganda rather than intelligence analysis. A 2010 paper defended the Office of 
Strategic Influence, and denied press reports that it had intended to use disinformation 
(Feith & Shulsky, 2010, p.8). The study for the Hudson Institute called for the creation of an 
international non-governmental organisation to promote moderate thought in Muslim 
societies, a concept influenced by the precedent of the National Endowment for 
Democracy (Feith & Shulsky, 2010, p.3). In a second paper in 2012, co-authored with 
William Galston, Feith and Shulsky suggested that political instability in the Arab world had 
increased the urgency of their call for specific efforts to counter Islamism as an ideology 
(Feith et al. 2012, p.1). They cited precedents for such ideological struggle by the US 
Government from the Office of Policy Coordination in the early Cold War to the National 
Endowment for Democracy in the Reagan era (Feith et al. 2012. P.41). They argued that ‘Of 
particular relevance to the current situation is the fact that, in World  War II's aftermath, 
there was an important European debate in which the U.S. government couldn’t intervene 
directly—a clash in leftist circles between communists and democratic socialists’(Feith et 
al. 2012, p.41). 
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The fact that neoconservative intelligence theorists returned once again to the Cultural 
Cold War and in particular to CIA cooperation with labour activists for inspiration is 
instructive. It underlines the extent to which the heritage of Cold War state private 
networks shaped an organic tradition of which those theorists formed part. 
The deep historic memory which informed neoconservative prescriptions was in contrast 
to their sometimes perfunctory response to debates about recent events during this 
period. One of the few attempts to defend neoconservative prescriptions as they had been 
applied to Iraq intelligence came from Gary Schmitt in a 2005 essay which restated the 
longstanding critique of the Sherman Kent approach to intelligence analysis (Schmitt, 
2005). It was limited to a single paragraph: 
Indeed, one of the little-noted findings of the recent Senate Intelligence 
Committee, in its report on pre-war assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs and its 
ties to terrorism, was that “probing questions” on the part of Bush administration 
officials with respect to the issue of Iraq’s ties to terrorism “actually improved the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) products” (Schmitt, 2005, p.59). 
The senate report did indeed make the point that analysts should expect robust 
questioning (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.34). However, its first and arguably 
most significant conclusion was that the pre-war intelligence analysis about Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction programs was either over-stated or unsupported by underlying 
intelligence (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.14). 
In reaching this judgment, the report did not systematically consider the role of the 
neoconservative analysts at the Department of Defence. Instead, consideration of 
intelligence analysis by the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy was largely 
left to a follow-up phase two report (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.2). The 
completion of phase two subsequently became the subject of partisan conflict on the 
committee. In 2008, the then chairman of the Committee, Democratic Senator Jay 
Rockefeller, suggested the pre-2007 Republican majority had regarded elements of the 
investigation as 'a task too politically sensitive to handle' (Senate Committee on 
Intelligence, 2008, p.89).The most substantive scrutiny would eventually come in 
(Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2007b), which as we have seen 
concluded that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide the 
most accurate analysis possible. 
Even allowing for the fact that such criticisms lay in the future, the brevity of Schmitt’s 
mention of pre-war Iraq intelligence is striking. One might have expected that a scholar of 
intelligence analysis would have dealt with the outstanding intelligence controversy of the 
day at greater length. One possibility is that Schmitt avoided doing so precisely so as not to 
give any ammunition to democratic senators seeking to organise a degradation ceremony. 
As with Shulsky, Schmitt’s subsequent publications focused on areas that were tangential 
to the controversy, including domestic counter-terrorism, China and military resources. 
Roy Godson’s post-Iraq War publications likewise focused on areas related to the War on 
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Terror that did not necessarily raise the question uncomfortable questions about the 
recent record in relation to strategic intelligence analysis. 
A key example of the new approach came in a 2006 Weekly Standard article co-authored 
by Godson and Richard Shultz, the research director of the Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence. Based on conversations with security officials in Israel, Northern Ireland and 
elsewhere, they argued for the pursuit of ‘a common set of measures--intelligence 
dominance was the summary term we came up with to describe the model--they had used 
to overcome bloody threats posed by armed groups’ (Shultz and Godson, 2006).  
Some of their recommendations, such as an emphasis on ‘basic intelligence’ on the 
communities in which insurgents operate, reflected the specific problems of 
counterinsurgency. Others however, such as a call for integration of intelligence analysis 
with operations, reflected longstanding neoconservative doctrine. 
The model of was described as ‘utilizing all the tools in the intelligence toolbox--integrating 
collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence instruments--to maximize 
effectiveness against targets,’ suggesting it was itself an application to counterinsurgency 
of the ‘offensive intelligence’ approach previously outlined by Godson in Dirty Tricks or 
Trump Cards. 
Godson and Schultz returned to the subject of intelligence dominance in 'Adapting 
America’s Security Paradigm and Security Agenda', a volume published by the National 
Strategy Information Center in 2010.  
The papers in the volume were prepared with the oversight an NSIC International 
Practitioner Working Group which included military, diplomatic and intelligence 
professionals, from the US, UK, Israel, India, Australia, Colombia, Mexico and the 
Netherlands (Godson & Shultz, 2010, p.30). Almost half of those included were generals. 
This suggests that the new emphasis on counterinsurgency was shifting the balance of NSIC 
networking from political to professional policy-makers, conformant with Ruggie’s 
observation that more specialised epistemic communities tend to enjoy influence at lower 
levels of political concern (Ruggie 1975, p.570). The increased emphasis on the needs of 
operational commanders reflected in the intelligence dominance concept may therefore 
have been a natural response to increased political scrutiny. 
The ideas canvassed in Adapting America’s Security Paradigm formed one of two major 
programs pursued by the NSIC as it entered the 2010s (National Strategy Information 
Center, 2016a). The other major program, the Culture of Lawfulness Project, manifested 
the same trend towards specialisation, emphasising ‘bottom-up’ approaches, defined as 
‘formal and informal educational programs and training for government officials, civil 
society, and the private sector about the principles and benefits of the rule of law’ 
(National Strategy Information Center, 2016b). 
The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence now tended to become a vehicle for activities 
associated with these new priorities, such as a volume on intelligence for democratic 
security in the Americas (Godson & Vergara 2008). 
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In 2015, the NSIC was wound up with its assets being passed to the Institute for 
International Studies (IIS) of Bethesda, Maryland (NSIC & IIS Form 990s, 2014). Given that 
Godson was President of both the NSIC and the IIS, the significance of this was unclear, 
although a lower profile may have been dictated by the age of the principals as much as 
anything else. 
Godson’s work in this period, and particularly his focus on the Northern Irish experience in 
counter-insurgency, may have reflected the influence of his brother Dean. As head of 
foreign policy and security at the British think-tank Policy Exchange, the younger Godson 
became an outspoken voice on counter-extremism policy in the first decade of the 21st 
Century (Mills et al., 2011). His writings on the Northern Ireland conflict were seen by a 
number of authors including (Griffin, 2009) and (Dixon, 2015) as reflecting a distinctive 
neoconservative critique of the peace process. This underlined the extent to which the 
neoconservative approach to intelligence predisposed its adherents to distrust situations 
of détente. Alistair Crooke, a former British intelligence officer involved in peace process 
contacts was among those strongly criticised by Dean Godson (Godson, 2006b). This was 
despite the fact that Crooke saw a significant role for human intelligence in informing 
peace negotiations (Lloyd, 2015). There was thus in Godson’s critique an echo of the earlier 
neoconservative hostility to the role of technical intelligence in verifying US-Soviet détente. 
Godson’s prescriptions like those of his elder brother, were rooted in the tradition of cold 
war state-private networks. Writing in the Times, he stated:  
During the Cold War, organisations such as the Information Research Department 
of the Foreign Office would assert the superiority of the West over its totalitarian 
rivals. And magazines such as Encounter did hand-to-hand combat with Soviet 
fellow travellers. For any kind of truly moderate Islam to flourish, we need first to 
recapture our own self-confidence. At the moment, the extremists largely have the 
field to themselves (Godson, D. 2006). 
Such concerns reflected wider neoconservative preoccupations at the time. If the NSIC’s 
direct influence was on the decline, many of those who had attended its conferences over 
the years remained active in ways which suggested continuing shared commitments on 
intelligence and related issues. 
Godson’s worries about morale in Britain and Europe were shared by neoconservatives on 
the Defence Policy Board in Washington, one of whom, Devon Gaffney Cross, had travelled 
to London in 2003 to found a think tank addressing the issue, the Policy Forum on 
International Affairs (Lobe, 2008). 
Gaffney Cross and her brother Frank Gaffney were both former attendees at the CSI’s 1984 
Intelligence and Policy conference (Godson ed., 1986, p.179). By the 21st Century, Frank 
Gaffney had become one of the strongest critics of Islam in the US, espousing theories 
about the Muslim Brotherhood which reflected traditional neoconservative 
counterintelligence themes, in what was arguably their most extreme form (Beinart, 2017). 
Gaffney went on to become an early and vocal supporter of Donald Trump, whose 
candidacy for President was opposed equally vehemently by other neoconservatives such 
160 
 
as Eliot Cohen (Heilbrunn, 2016), another veteran of CSI colloquia (Godson ed., 1987, 
pp.71-96).  
Trump’s first National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, had co-authored a book in Islam 
with prominent neoconservative Michael Ledeen (Heilbrunn, 2016). During his short 
tenure in the administration, Flynn hired as the NSC’s senior director for intelligence 
programs, Ezra Cohen-Watnick, a 30-year-old ex-DIA officer who was reported to be a 
close family friend of Frank Gaffney (Marshall, 2017). Cohen-Watnick subsequently became 
embroiled in controversy when he was accused of leaking information to support claims 
that Trump had been under surveillance during the Obama administration (Rosenberg et 
al. 2017).  
The episode appeared as something of a reprise of the institutional conflicts in which 
neoconservatives had been embroiled in the Reagan and Bush administrations, with 
politically-appointed officials routing around the CIA in their handling of intelligence 
matters. 
Yet the Trump administration also brought distinctive challenges for neoconservatives. 
More than any other modern Republican president, Trump’s politics were rooted in strands 
of paleoconservatism that their Cold War Liberal precursors had fought in the 1940s and 
the 1950s (Greenberg, 2016). Accusations of Russian support for Trump also raised 
counterintelligence questions of a kind that had long been the neoconservatives’ stock in 
trade. Some saw this as presaging a new alliance between neoconservatives and 
Democrats (Pomorski, 2017). 
Any such alliance would likely have a much narrower social base than the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority of the 1970s. At the time of the Iraq War, there was a brief revival of 
activity by the Social Democrats USA. At a 2003 conference of the party, Joshua Muravchik 
highlighted its hawkish credentials with the comment that ‘in every big conflict we reap 
some important new recruits. In the wars of Central America, we reaped the Radoshes and 
the Leikens. There were some more after Bosnia. Now the war against terrorism has 
brought us Hitchens and Berman’ (Social Democrats, 2003d). However, the organisation 
would subsequently be reduced to a state of ‘near collapse’ according to vice-president 
David Hacker, who attributed the situation to the neoconservative trajectory of its former 
leadership which ‘put the party at odds with the opposite tendency of most of the 
American left’ (Hacker, 2017). 
The partisan politics of neoconservatives have never been straightforward, but in the early 
years of the Trump administration as in those of the Carter administration, the 
neoconservatives seemed positioned across a political faultline. The neoconservative 
intelligence theorists emerged as an epistemic community in the earlier conjuncture, but 
their ideas appeared open to competing interpretations in the later very different one. This 
may reflect an underlying weakness of the neoconservative theory of intelligence, for 
which the existence of enemies is more of a core theoretical principle than an empirical 
result. For the neoconservatives of the early Trump era, as for those of the immediate 
post-Cold War period, there were significant uncertainties about how to map that 
assumption on to reality.  Ultimately, different views as to the key enemy to be targeted by 
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means of offensive intelligence may well reflect a range of possibilities for their 





Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
It is widely understood that neoconservatism emerged out of the break-up of Cold War 
liberalism in the 1970s. The central role of the neoconservative theory of intelligence in 
this process is less often recognised. My contribution to knowledge has been to show that 
the creation of an epistemic community around a distinctive theory of intelligence in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, theorised the experiences of key actors in the political warfare 
coalition that brought together the CIA and the non-communist left during the Cold War, 
and that this theory subsequently informed the actions of neoconservatives in subsequent 
US administrations. 
The policy enterprise of this epistemic community were in large measure a defensive 
response by elements of the Cold War state-private network which we have called the 
political warfare coalition to the impact of détente on their previous hegemonic role. The 
case of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence therefore supports the contention of 
(Parmar, 2012, p.7) that a neo-Gramscian approach can usefully illuminate the role of 
epistemic communities. 
These conclusions were reached by undertaking a critical analysis of the literature of the 
Consortium for the Study of intelligence, alongside a larger historical investigation that 
examined both the background to which Consortium authors appealed and the extent to 
which they subsequently sought to apply the theory in practise. 
While elements of the latter task have been attempted by journalists such as Seymour 
Hersh (Hersh, 2003) and Tom Barry (Barry 2004), the major academic works on 
neoconservatism, which as will be seen below, have tended to underplay the role of 
intelligence as a distinct sphere within the neoconservative heritage. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the greatest lacuna in the existing literature relates to the origins of the 
neoconservative theory of intelligence. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the 
present work is to show how the theory's emergence reflected the perspective of interest 
groups which had played a key role in the cultural cold war. 
Notable among these was the Lovestoneite tradition of labor diplomacy, associated with 
the AFL. Labour historian Paul Buhle has called the Lovestoneite movement 'a curiously 
ignored subject', which would require the release of CIA files to ensure it enjoyed the 
attention it deserved (Buhle, 1999, p.280, n.71). Despite only limited access to CIA files, the 
current work has contributing to filling that lacuna by identifying a number of new archival 
sources, as well as by integrating the existing sources into a long-run historical account that 
can provide a critical perspective on the portrait of the Lovestoneite tradition that appears 
more episodically in the works of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Key sources 
which I have identified include: MI6 reports on the activities of the Lovestoneites in the 
late 1930s (National Archives, KV2 580), British reports on the activities of the AFL during 
the Second World War (National Archives, FO 371/30676), and on the post-war activities of 
AFL labor diplomats in Britain's African (National Archives, FCO 141/17746) and Asian 
(National Archives, FO 371/105354) colonies. 
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In prioritising counterintelligence and covert action, neoconservative intelligence theory 
defended the relationship that had existed between the intelligence community and 
elements of Cold War liberalism during the early Cold War. In effect that alliance, 
exemplified most clearly in the relationship between James Angleton and Jay Lovestone, 
moved out of the Government and into the conservative movement. Questions of 
intelligence thereafter remained central to the development of neoconservatism at every 
major turning point from Team B to Iran-Contra to the War on Iraq. 
The most important historians of neoconservatism have, however, played down the 
importance of this background. For example, Jacob Heilbrunn has written of the CIA-
sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF): 
If the CCF had not existed, the left would have had to invent it. To some extent, it 
did this by magnifying the amount of control the CIA had over the CCF. The 
purpose of the mythmaking is to create a moral equivalence between East and 
West. But intellectuals, an ornery lot, can seldom be ordered around (Heilbrunn, 
2008, p.53). 
Heilbrunn is here concerned to reject what Hugh Wilford has called the ‘puppet-on-a-
string’ theory of the relationship between Cold War liberals and the CIA (Wilford, 2003, 
p.101). Yet in doing so, he discounts the significance of that relationship entirely, ignoring 
the possibility of a more nuanced account of the kind which historians of the Cultural Cold 
War such as Wilford have provided for the earlier period, one which recognises the degree 
of initiative that the Cold War liberals enjoyed as well as the importance of CIA patronage. 
One reason for this may be an understandable focus on the literary intellectuals who were 
among the most visible exponents of both Cold War liberalism and neoconservatism, and 
therefore on the CCF, and on the Office of Policy Coordination’s attempts to control it as a 
front organisation along bureaucratic lines (Wilford, 2008, p.80). Another factor may be 
that the rightward drift of neoconservatism has come to make the importance of labour 
precursors seem counter-intuitive. Yet CIA sponsorship of the CCF was arguably less 
important than the longstanding cooperation between the intelligence community and the 
AFL, a relationship which predated the CIA itself and even its precursor intelligence agency 
the OSS. 
In this respect, Vaisse is correct to state that the history of neoconservatism was ‘linked to 
that of the unions, and this is a largely neglected aspect of the Cold War’ (Vaïsse, 2010, 
p.19). An understanding of how that history shaped a distinctive theory of intelligence may 
provide some potentially unifying themes within the ‘discontinuity, heterogeneity, and 
contradiction’ which he sees as integral to the history of neoconservatism (Vaïsse, 2010, 
p.5). 
A fuller understanding of neoconservatism’s debt to cold war liberalism also supports Bill 
King’s defence of the movement from the paleoconservative charge that it represents an 
‘inverted Trotskyism’ based on the politics of Max Shachtman (King, 2004, p.259). As King 
points out, Shachtman had long since left Trotskyism behind by the time he became an 
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influence on future neoconservatives in the Socialist Party in the late 1960s (King, 2004, 
p.257).  
It is an inability to distinguish between a specific form of revolutionary Marxism 
(“Shachtmanism”) and a uniquely American version of right-wing socialism that can 
be traced back to the 1930s, that underlies the confused allegations hurled by 
paleoconservatives at today’s neocons (King, 2004, p.259). 
King’s argument must be qualified, however. Firstly, as Hugh Wilford has suggested, the 
conflict between communists and Cold War liberals itself had ideological roots traceable 
back to the original split between socialists and communists in response to the October 
Revolution in 1917 (Wilford, 2003, p.148). This in itself implies a common root in second 
international Marxism that facilitated movement between the two groups. This Menshevik 
heritage actually reinforces the suggestion that the neoconservatives have an authentic 
claim to the heritage of Wilsonian democracy rather than Trotskyism, as does the AFL’s 
active support for Wilson’s foreign policy in 1917. 
Secondly, as an ex-Leninist infusion into right-wing social democracy, the Shachtmanites 
were arguably less important than their precursors, the Lovestoneites, whose ideological 
shift came in the very period, the 1930s, that King identifies as formative. 
Jacob Heilbrunn has argued that many of the intellectual precursors of neoconservatism 
treated the struggle against European fascism as a sideshow during this period (Heilbrunn, 
2008, p.28). If this has charge some force against the Shachtmanites towards whom it is 
directed, it has none against the Lovestoneites. 
Indeed, a key factor in establishing the relationship between the Lovestoneites and the 
AFL, and later Lovestone and the US Government, was Lovestoneite access to resistance 
networks across the Atlantic. In fascist Europe, small Leninist cadre parties were able to 
survive and operate when the larger Social Democrats and Communists could not 
(Alexander, 1981, p.145). 
If this was in some sense the heroic period of Lovestoneite political warfare, it was also one 
that would have fateful consequences. The very qualities that would make the 
Lovestoneites effective in the Europe of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, their elitism and 
clandestinity, their reflexive rivalry with the Communists, and their openness to the 
patronage of intelligence services, would shape elements of Cold War liberalism, and more 
particularly, neoconservatism, for generations afterwards. 
The World War Two alliance between social democratic elites and the American state for 
the purposes of transnational covert action, was institutionalised for the long term in the 
relationship between the CIA and the Cold War liberals. Alliances with the most 
conservative elements in the CIA, around James Angleton’s Counterintelligence Staff, 
would prefigure the induction of the neoconservatives into the conservative movement 
itself when Cold War liberalism broke up in the 1970s. The neoconservative literature of 
intelligence, which emerged as the product of an epistemic community formed to defend 
and distil this Cold War experience, would provide the clearest intellectual basis for 
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neoconservative conduct in Government from the late 1970s, including their contributions 
to covert support for the Nicaraguan contras in the 1980s, and to the case for war in Iraq in 
2003.. In the face of growing scrutiny in the wake of the latter conflict, neoconservatives 
did not fundamentally alter their ideas about intelligence, but rather sought to reshape 
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